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Abstract 
This thesis explores the relationships between political elites and their constituencies, 
looking specifically at the emergence and production of a new type of political elite in post-
war Lebanon. Based on micro-level ethnographic research amongst Beirut’s Sunni 
communities, mainly within Nejmeh Sports Club, I explore the crystallisation of the model 
of an ‘entrepreneurial elite’ as exemplified by the late Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, who 
came to be the club’s patron. The most popular football club – and indeed sports club – in 
Lebanon, Nejmeh embraced members from different social classes, sectarian affiliations 
and political camps. It therefore provided a rare fieldwork site from which to observe the 
negotiation of clientelistic relationships, and to do so over an extended period, including 
times of heightened political – and occasionally violent – conflict. The stadiums provided a 
theatre for the spectacular performance of politics, wealth and power, and the events which 
took place in them mirrored the interplay of both local and global transformations 
occurring over the span of almost two decades. 
My research argues that the post-war period ushered in a new ‘glocal’ model of political 
elite which combined a corporate background and the performative use of wealth with 
well-tried tactics of ascendance to power, namely philanthropy, sectarianism and 
clientelism. It is a model which amalgamated seemingly contradictory rhetoric and practice. 
Its rhetoric of professionalism, democracy, championing of state institutions, and 
nonviolence often paralleled practices of corruption, vote-buying, and the support of 
strong-arm racketeering. This model of an elite functioning at the highest level of Lebanese 
politics, moved the locus of power, as well as economic opportunities, into the control of 
an ever smaller number of people, marginalising both the power and roles of those actors 
operating further down the class and clientelistic hierarchy of relationships. Within such a 
hierarchy, public demonstrations of loyalty performed by those in the lower echelons of 
society served to simultaneously lay claim to the elite’s favours and to suppress alternative 
or dissident voices.  
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Transliteration and Terms Used 
Most Arabic words have been transliterated using the International Journal of Middle East 
Studies (IJMES) transliteration system, often adopting the simplified version of  the 
transliteration (zaʿim and not zaʿi ̄m). Transliterated words are italicised on first appearance 
only. Individual names, including those of  public figures, followed either the person’s own 
spelling when using the Latin alphabet (like Hariri not Hari ̄ri ̄) or the way English language 
media outlets spelled them. Names of  localities and political groups are spelled using the 
English version of  the name where available (like Beirut and not Bayru ̄t or Beyrouth). 
As a way of  preserving the anonymity of  research participants, I have changed the names 
of  interviewees and often use ‘club member’ as an umbrella term that includes past and 
present fans, employees, general assembly members and the elected board members of  
sports clubs. Where the position of  the research participant is of  relevance to the argument 
being made or the individual occupies a key position which would enable deduction of  
their real identity I have used their real names having been given full permission. 
I use term the ‘Hariri Establishment’ when speaking about the political and familial institution led 
by late Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, and by his son Saad Hariri after him, particularly when 
discussing issues and actions that cannot be clearly attributed to one person or institution within the 
establishment. For terminology used by participants when speaking about any of  the constituent 
parts of  the Hariri establishment, I translated the exact words used including ‘Hariri family’, ‘Hariri 
people’, ‘Future Movement’, and ‘Hariri’s parliamentary block’. 
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Glossary of Arabic Terms 
 
In alphabetical order: 
Transliterated Word Arabic Word Meaning 
ʾamāna – used as ʾamana 
in text 
هناما Trust (n) 
ʿarāqah – used as ʿaraqah 
in text 
ةقارع Rootage / Lineage 
fitna هنتف Discord 
haīʾa ʿāma ةماع ةئيه General Committee – in a sports club this 
includes all registered sports club 
members. 
haīʾa ʾidārīa ةيرادا ةئيه Executive committee - in a sports club this 
includes elected members responsible for 
the management of a sports club over a 
period of three years. 
mawna ةنوم Influence or authority (over somebody) 
raʿī - used as raʿi in text يعار Patron 
waqf فقو Endowment (often religious) 
wāsta - used as wasta in 
text 
ةطساو Going in between: achieving goals through 
links with persons in positions of high 
status. 
wazn نزو Weight, status 
Zaʿīm – used as Zaʿim in 
text (Plural: Zuʿamā – 
used as Zuʿama in text) 
ميعز )ءامعز(  Leader (s) 
Azʿar (plural Zuʿrān – 
used as Zuʿran in text) 
( رعزا)نارعز  Thug (s) 
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Figure 1: Timeline of  key sports and political events in Lebanon and the Arab region. 
 
20 
1 
Introduction 
  
‘For my part, I still think football is a precious gift to anthropologists. I sometimes even 
wonder if  it was not invented to please them!’ 
(Bromberger 2012: 7) 
‘Nejmeh club is not owned by its management, or its general assembly, and not even its 
fans. It is owned by the whole of  the Lebanese people, just like the gold at the Lebanese 
Central Bank, it can’t be touched’ 
(Long time Nejmeh club member and fan) 
 
A Game of  National Unity 
On April 13th, 2010, the Cite Sportive in Beirut witnessed one of  its most televised though poorly played 
matches. In an effort to demonstrate ‘national unity’ - and, incidentally, their downright lack of  physical 
fitness - Lebanese politicians of  varying political positions and backgrounds played a thirty minute friendly 
football match.  
The match took place on the 35th anniversary of  the start of  the 15 year Lebanese civil war – or, as most 
in Lebanon call it, ‘The War’ - under the slogan ‘we are all one team’. At the time, the country was going 
through one of  its worst political crises since the end of  the war in 1990. Politically, the country was 
divided between two camps, popularly termed ‘March 8’ and ‘March 14’, and the match was planned with 
the aims firstly, of  affirming that the ‘dark days’ of  the civil war were long gone, and secondly, reducing the 
political tension and strengthening the spirit of  cooperation and solidarity between the Lebanese.  
The referees were carefully selected to include a variety of  sectarian backgrounds, while players from rival 
political camps competed to score goals and demonstrate sportsmanship in Lebanon’s largest stadium. The 
red team, led by Saad Hariri - leader of  the March 14 coalition and Prime Minister at the time - won 
with two goals to nil over the white team which was led by parliamentarian and Hezbollah member of  the 
March 8 coalition, Ali Ammar. Despite being jointly organised by the Lebanese Ministry of  Youth and 
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Sports (MoYS) and the Parliamentary Sports Committee, the costs of  the match were covered by the 
Intercontinental Bank of  Lebanon. 
A press conference announcing the match had been held a few days earlier. During it Abdallah, Minister 
of  Youth and Sports at the time, explained that the match would send two messages to Lebanese youth; 
first, ‘that sport is the most appropriate method to strengthen unity among the Lebanese’ and second, that 
the presence of  ministers and parliamentarians in the field together to play a football game highlighted the 
importance of  ‘overcoming divisions born out of  periods of  political tension’ (As-Safir 10/4/2010). 
Following the press conference, a video clip of  politicians wearing sports gear in different team colours and 
singing the Lebanese national anthem was played on national television stations over several days preceding 
the match. The match itself  was broadcast live, reported front-page in Lebanese papers, and covered by 
Arab regional and international media. Yet in a stadium with the capacity to welcome 40,000 spectators, 
only selected fellow politicians and a large number of  media personnel were present at the match itself. 
Lebanese citizens and regular spectators were excluded for security reasons. The young people for whom the 
message was intended, and the audience for whom the spectacle was staged were not allowed to watch the 
match, at least not live. 
The ban on spectators was not unique to this match as fans in Lebanon had been banned from attending 
the majority of  football matches since 2006. The decision to ban spectators came after a series of  clashes 
between supporters of  different political groups at football matches and the failure of  sports and state 
institutions to establish a mechanism to guarantee calm in the stadium. Sports, particularly in that period, 
as fans well knew, was a space for mobilisation of  support for the same politicians who, in their match, 
claimed to be capable of  overcoming their differences. 
These paradoxes were readily spotted by journalists and commentators in their coverage of  the match. The 
novelty of  such a match in Lebanon and the friendliness of  the atmosphere in which it was played, did not 
succeed in concealing the superficiality of  this supposed performance of  unity. While some media coverage 
celebrated the event and saw in it an affirmation of  the desire to transcend political disagreement, most local 
Lebanese coverage was at minimum sarcastic. Blogger Imad Bazzi asserted that Lebanese politicians were 
truly all ‘one team’ collaborating in corruption, theft, and sectarian mobilisation. Fawz, reporting in the 
Lebanese daily newspaper, Al-Akhbar, saw in the match a spectacle that surpassed the imagination of  
comedians.  As-Safir’s, journalist, Jihad Bazzi, expressed surprise that the result of  the match was not 
prearranged, as in election results. He suggested that predictions, based on knowledge of  the Lebanese 
political system, were that the match was to end in a tie. He also questioned the fans’ exclusion from this 
match after many were mobilised to take part in massive political rallies to demonstrate support for each of  
the antagonistic political leaders. 
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In all ways, the match provided a caricatured representation of  the Lebanese political scene at the time; a 
private sector sponsored media event in which cooperation and competition were simultaneously and 
contradictorily performed by politicians. The spectators – the people – were excluded from the event while 
also being its target audience. The stadium then was a stage for one of  the many social and political 
spectacles that this thesis explores. 
 
Figure 2: Poster for the ‘Game of  National Unity’ played by Lebanese politicians. The match, played on April 
13th, 2010 marked the 35th anniversary of  the start of  the Lebanese civil war and was organized by the Lebanese 
Ministry of  Youth and Sports (MoYS), the Parliamentary Sports Committee, and the Intercontinental Bank of  
Lebanon (IBL)2. 
Research Questions 
This thesis explores the relationships between political elites and their constituencies, 
looking specifically at the role of  actors at various levels of  political power in negotiating, 
reproducing, and subverting prevalent socio-political divisions during times of  conflict. 
Patronage and clientelism have long been dominant themes in popular, policy, and 
academic discussion of  Lebanese politics as well as themes debated by political 
                                                 
2  Source: http://observers.france24.com/ar/content/20100413-lebanon-war-civil-again-tensions-religious 
Accessed 19/9/2015. 
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anthropologists. Both concepts are broad and incorporate several – and at times 
contradictory - understandings of  relationships between members of  the social and 
political elites and ordinary people. Based on research amongst Beirut’s Sunni communities, 
mainly within the Nejmeh Sports Club (hereafter Nejmeh), I try to expand and develop 
previous explorations of  clientelism’s role within a conflict-prone power-sharing political 
system. I also elaborate on the ways in which clientelism operates in a rapidly changing 
social context where wealth plays an increasingly important role in politics. 
Like the politicians on the pitch described in the chapter’s introduction, I approached 
sports via my interest in politics, and worked with the football community and the Nejmeh 
Sports Club in particular, using this club as my main fieldwork site. The club provided a 
unique entry point enabling my observations of  the clientelistic practices which were 
evolving among Beirut’s residents, most especially among members of  its Sunni 
communities and its political elite. 
Nejmeh, the most popular football club in Lebanon and one of  Beirut’s oldest, was a stage 
where Beirutis of  various social classes and political interests interacted over an extended 
period of  time. In the year 2003, it came under the patronage of  late Prime Minister Rafic 
Hariri ‘leader of  the Sunna par excellence’ in the post war period (Abdel- Latif  2008). 
Hariri neither came from a notable family, nor was he a militia leader. As an international 
business tycoon, he presented himself  to the Lebanese political scene as a renewed model 
of  the emerging elite for whom money played a pivotal role. He combined this approach 
with other well-tried tactics aimed at ascendance to power: philanthropy, sectarianism and 
clientelism. 
Johnson (1986: 1), in his research on the Sunni community of  Beirut and the Lebanese 
state, claims to have observed ‘the decline and fall of  Sunni Beirut’ which, after years of  
civil war, was destroyed as a political entity by ‘the ascendancy of  the Shiites’ (1986: 2). In 
his description of  the socio-political organisation of  Beirut’s Sunni community before and 
during the Lebanese civil war, Johnson suggests three interdependent structures of  
stratification, namely class, clientelism and sectarianism. He describes the Lebanese political 
system as one dominated by powerful local leaders, popularly called zuʿama (leaders, plural 
of  zaʿim), who are mostly descendants of  families notable in the Ottoman period. These 
patrons had a number of  strong-arm retainers operating for them and performing 
intermediary roles (including coercion by force) with their clientele. 
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This thesis starts where Johnson leaves off, and is to a large extent an exploration of  the 
(re)emergence of  the ‘Sunni sectarian community’ in the post war period. The 1990s 
witnessed a growing Sunni sentiment and communal solidarity that was often framed in 
opposition to the Shiite community3. This transformation was closely linked to the roles of  
a newly emergent political leadership in post-civil war Lebanon. The settlement that ended 
the war also brought with it an emerging and redefined political elite (El-Husseini 2004) 
and steered the long-entrenched clientelistic tradition in Lebanese politics to take ‘one 
more turn along an evolutionary track’ (Hamzeh 2001: 17). 
The beginning of  the 21st century brought the prospect for an escalation in political and 
civil violence. This renewal also brought about new grounds for the negotiation of  inter-
sectarian and political relations nationally, and examination of  the roles and allegiances 
within existing networks. Within this context I explore the evolution of  clientelism and the 
ways in which it is negotiated and recreated by members of  the political elite and by the 
residents of  Beirut, specifically: 
 I look at the changing role of  local and national political leadership in Lebanon and at the 
formation and installation of  new elites alongside the evolution of  clientelism within global 
and local contexts where money plays a central role in politics. I trace the role of  Beirut’s 
urban and Sunni bourgeoisies within the club and consider these peoples’ relationship to 
the club’s patron over more than a decade and explore their own understanding of  what 
these roles and relationships entail.  
Secondly, I examine the instrumental and symbolic role of  the practice and discourse of  
sectarianism and violence shaping relations between political leadership and their 
constituency. This research strand focuses on incidents of  violence and hostility within the 
stadium and in the city of  Beirut, and considers the ways in which such events are framed 
and interpreted by club members and fans.  
Thirdly, I explore the positioning of  micro-level clientelistic networks within the processes 
of  a power-sharing political system – or a ‘consociational democracy’ as some would 
describe it4. 
                                                 
3  See Chapter Three for an exploration of  the historical and contextual variables that affect this 
transformation. 
4  As described by Lipjhart (1980) and promoted, particularly in the post war Ta’if  agreement in Lebanon. 
Discussion of  the limitations of  the consociational model in Lebanon in the political science literature 
abounds (Hudson 1988; Zahar 2005; Salamey 2009). 
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Despite my choice of  research community, this study is not an anthropology of  sports: it is 
a political anthropology that is based within a sports institution. The sports stadium and 
the club provided me with a stage, a ‘theatrical production’ (Bromberger 1993) where the 
negotiation and reformulation of  power relations could be observed. 
Clientelism, the State and the Elite 
Extant anthropological literature provides many definitions of  clientelism, a phenomenon 
which is most usually summarised as a relationship of  exchange between a more powerful 
party, from which resources and protection flow, and a less powerful individual or group 
who provide political loyalty in return. Apparent agreement on this definition masks a 
plethora of  understandings of  what clientelism actually entails: it has long been rendered a 
‘concept for all seasons’ (Gilsenan 1977). Instead of  intervening in the extensive literature 
on clientelism which spans over five decades and mostly offers a sterile political science 
perspective, I aim to provide a ‘thick description’ (Geertz 1973) of  negotiations of  elite 
power at a certain point in time, while benefiting from the fluidity of  the concept of  
clientelism which gives an essential utility to my work. In the brief  discussion below, I 
selectively explore several key issues of  concern for this research. My discussion borrows 
from the literature which has concentrated on elites and elite cultures. It also draws on 
literature dealing with state-society relations, as well as the extensive literature devoted to 
clientelism. 
Clientelism, the State, and Democratic Representation 
Roniger (2004) speaks of  three waves of  work on clientelism. The first in the late 1960s-
early 1970s focused on agrarian and traditional settings as well as new migrants to the city. 
This wave of  studies conceptualised clientelism as an archaic phenomenon destined to 
disappear after the democratisation of  these agrarian / traditional societies. In a good deal 
of  that early literature, clientelism is discussed as ‘a parasite vine’ which ‘weakens 
government’ and ‘leads to nepotism, corruption, influence peddling and above all, it 
weakens the rule of  Law’ (Boissevain 1966: 30). The second wave in the 1980s and early 
1990s facilitated ‘greater awareness of  [clientelism’s] ubiquity also in parts and sectors of  
the developed democratic and Communist polities’ (Roniger 2004: 356). Clientelistic 
relationships were seen to coexist with institutional and state structures; they were, as 
Lande (1983) describes them, an addenda to political institutions. 
The late 1990s and the 2000s saw a third wave of  work (Auyero 2000; Piattoni 2001), 
which sought to move the discussion away from the mere resilience of  clientelism, and to 
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present instead the ‘real workings of  democracy, citizenship and civil society’ (Roniger 
2004: 357) and politics more broadly. This included research on intersections between 
clientelism, and contentious social action, and collective organisation by civil society actors 
(Auyero, Lapegna and Poma 2009; Gay 1994). A research perspective adopted by some 
writers within this third wave focused not only on the detailed practices of  politics but also 
addressed how conceptualisations and emotions attached to politics. This approach is best 
exemplified by the edited volume of  Joseph, Mahler and Auyero (2007) on political 
ethnography, where ethnography is used to provide a thick detailed description of  everyday 
practice of  politics - an approach which differed radically from formal macro-level political 
analysis. 
This thesis situates itself  within this third wave at three levels. Firstly, it adopts a specifically 
ethnographic approach mobilising detailed micro-level research which seeks to understand 
the day-to-day operation of  clientelism and the perceptions and practices associated with it 
within sports - a context which is not a distinctly political one. Secondly, the thesis 
recognises the blurred boundaries between state-citizen and patronage relationships (Gupta 
1995). Thirdly, it seeks a more dynamic exploration of  the relationship between patrons / 
political elites on the one hand and clients / people on the other, seeing all parties involved 
in these relationships as contributors – albeit in different ways and to different degrees 
(Roniger 1994). 
Such an approach in Lebanon is, so far, absent despite the vast literature on clientelism - a 
concept which has for decades occupied a dominant position in political and 
anthropological writing on Lebanon (Gellner & Waterbury 1977; Johnson 1986; Gilsenan 
1995; Hamze 2001; Hermez 2011). While some of  this literature is based on empirical 
research (Johnson 1986; Gilsenan 1995), there is little, if  any, recent empirical work on 
patronage politics in Lebanon, particularly not through the micro-political ethnographic 
approach. 
In addition, policy-level discussion of  patronage politics in Lebanon remains entrapped in 
the dominant trope of  the literature on clientelism, which sees it as an ill of  ‘traditional’ 
societies and, as such, fundamentally opposed to the construction of  the ‘modern’ state 
and its institutions; ideas that date back to the first wave of  work on clientelism mentioned 
earlier. What the majority of  this literature shares is a series of  agreements: that clientelism 
is a key contributor to sectarian antagonism and an obstacle to peace-building (ESCWA 
2009; ESCWA 2011; Kraft et al. 2008), that it weakens state institutions, accountability and 
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civic mobilisation, and is opposed to institutional state-building (AbiYaghi 2012; Abou Assi 
2006; Karam 2012). Collectively this literature affirms that transition to statehood requires 
breaking away from clientelism. 
Recent academic literature on the state in Lebanon has ushered in a different perspective - 
which this thesis aims to contribute to - namely that it disputes the divide between the state 
and democratic representation on the one hand, and personal clientelistic relationships on 
the other. For example, at the macro-level, a study of  corruption by political scientist 
Leenders (2012) affirms that the failure of  bureaucratic institutions does not necessarily 
mean that the state is non-existent. He argues that in fact it is through the capture and use 
of  state institutions that elites are capable of  applying bureaucratic rules selectively – by 
giving access to some and making it very difficult for others. Taking a local perspective, 
Obeid (2011), in her research on local elections in Lebanon, re-evaluates the role of  lineage 
in local political practice and frames it within a process of  experimentation that the 
electorate are willing to engage with in their search for ‘true’ representation. Reliance on 
lineage networks is thus not opposed to democratic representation but is, rather, an 
instrument that allows for experimentation with democracy. In proposing this idea, Obeid 
complicates the practice of  politics and advocates, following Hefner (2006), the study of  
‘democracy in its ethnographically emergent contexts and challenges the “one-size-fits-all” 
model’ (Obeid 2011: 253). 
Styles of  Instalment of  Elite / Political Patrons 
The pillar of  clientelistic relations is the patron, or the member of  the socio-political elite 
who is the primary contractor in this relationship of  exchange. Previous literature has 
discussed elite recruitment, production, and succession, noting the changes in these 
processes as well as the characteristics and culture of  elites over time (Pina-Cabral and 
Pedroso de Lima 2000; Shore and Nugent 2002; Perthes 2004). Two such patterns of  
change are of  note in Lebanon’s recent history, the first accompanying the changes in the 
national economy is ‘change from a preponderantly landowning elite to a business and 
professional elite’ in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Harik 1975: 207). The second is tied to 
the changes at various levels caused by the Lebanese civil war (1975 - 1989) which caused a 
modification of  elite composition in the 1990s, when 80% of  elected elites were new, and 
embraced groups not previously included (El-Husseini 2004). At this time new balances of  
power were appearing despite the fact that the way the system worked remained 
unchanged. The thesis examines this second wave of  elite transformation from an 
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ethnographic perspective, looking particularly at the late Prime Minister Hariri as one of  
the most notable and powerful entrepreneurial members of  what El-Husseini, a political 
scientist, called a ‘redefined elite’ (2004). In seeing elite formations as dynamic processes 
‘rather than static or bounded entities’ (Shore 2002: 13), I trace Hariri’s ascendance to elite 
status and document the consolidation and maintenance of  his position - a process that 
spanned fifteen years of  his political career and one that was closely tied to local, regional, 
and global economic and political conditions. 
While patronage continues to be the main path that emergent elite members take in their 
ascent to power, the approach by which they build popular support bases varies. While 
former warlords have gained high status in post war Lebanon, philanthropy and 
sectarianism continue to be key to aspiring elite’s ascendance to, and conservation of, status 
(Cammett and Issar 2010). Shore (2002: 9) argues that elites need a ‘demos’ to lend them 
credibility, and that they need to create a people. This necessitates ‘cultural branding of  
their flock’ or, in other words, ‘cultural actions to promote feelings of  solidarity and 
belonging among the peoples’. Highlighting the need for both ‘cultural branding’ as well a 
more instrumental attendance to the constituency’s need (Harik 1975), is in line with recent 
trends in the literature which argue that participation in clientelistic networks provides 
material resources as well as promoting political identity: in other words clientelism is a 
‘symbolic system, a structure that provides ways of  ordering reality’ (Auyero 2000: 27). 
A ‘symbolic system’ of  this kind is not by necessity one that is imposed by the elite on their 
constituency. Following a relatively recent line of  research in anthropology inspired by 
Bourdieu (Rutten 2007; Auyero et al. 2009), I understand such a system as part of  a 
‘clientelist habitus’. Clientelism here is argued to have instrumental dimensions of  material 
and political exchange, as well as a symbolic dimension where the engagement in patronage 
relationships has already become part of  a system of  dispositions that guides / dictates the 
socio-political behaviours of  individuals. The dispositions that clientelism impresses in 
various actors, and the combination of  symbolic and instrumental dimensions support its 
reproduction and endurance. Clients have a role in the reproduction of  this system of  
dispositions, and thus contribute to the means by which the terms and exchanges of  
clientelistic relationships are imagined and practiced. 
Despite decades passing on Nader’s call for anthropologists to study-up (1972), the Arab 
countries have been largely disregarded in the study of  political elite. Accounts deriving 
from the Arab countries are notably absent from relatively recent volumes which undertake 
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ethnographic exploration of  elites (Pina-Cabral and Pedroso de Lima 2000; Shore and 
Nugent 2002; Abbink and Salverda 2012). Similarly, Perthes (2004) argues that the Arab 
countries have largely been ignored in elite studies since the early 1980s, possibly because 
of  the limited turnover of  political leaders, a factor partly due to the longevity of  Arab 
leaders. The landmark publication in 2004 by Perthes on Arab elites in to a large extent 
necessitated by the death of  several Arab leaders in the beginning of  the 21st century and is 
the first such volume since Lenczowski’s on political elites in the Middle East (1975). Still, 
both volumes are edited by political scientists, and with rare exceptions (Hanafi and Tabar 
2005) there is little ethnographic scholarship that tackles elite power structures in the Arab 
countries. The political changes brought forward by the Arab uprisings renders the 
understanding of  transformations at top tiers of  politics, particularly from an 
anthropological perspective, not only opportune but necessary. 
Through the Lens of  Sports 
The Sports Scene in Lebanon: A Bench Player 
Football matches played in empty stadiums, as in the politicians’ match described at the 
beginning of  the chapter, were not new to Lebanese football. When I started fieldwork in 
2008, I was repeatedly struck by the silence and bareness of  the stadiums. As I sat with a 
privileged few allowed to watch the Lebanese Football Association (hereafter LFA) 
championships, I could hear the voices of  competing players echoing in the huge empty 
space. Scored goals were met with the cheering of  no more than thirty supporters, and 
matches started and ended with little celebration or enthusiasm. Sitting in the director’s 
box, I could clearly hear the conversations between club board members and journalists 
and the cracking of  sunflower seeds between their teeth as they watched the mediocre 
performances of  their teams. By April 2010, LFA’s Football championship had been held 
without fans for five consecutive seasons. Security concerns after a series of  clashes 
between fans in the stadium during a tense political period were cited as the reason. Players 
competing in empty stadiums felt discouraged, and clubs which lost revenue from ticket 
sales were suffering financially. TV coverage was no solution as the interest of  the alienated 
fans declined along with investments in advertisement. The beautiful game, like other 
sports in Lebanon at the time, had lost its charm. In the year 2010 when politicians played 
their friendly game, Lebanon’s national football team was ranked by The Fédération 
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) as number 154 out of  203 national teams – 
the worst year for the team since 1993 when FIFA started its yearly rankings (see table 1). 
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The clubs fared slightly better than the national team, although in the same year, neither of  
the two clubs qualifying for the Asian Football Confederation’s (AFC) Cup went past the 
first round, and only twice have Lebanese clubs competed in the cup since the 
competition’s inauguration in 2004 (see table 2). 
Table 1 - Lebanon’s position on FIFA ranks distributed by year5 
Year Lebanon’s Rank 
2006 126 
2007 134 
2008 150 
2009 148 
2010 154 
 
Table 2 - Performance of  Lebanese Clubs in the AFC Cup2 
Year 
Qualifying 
Club 
Stage  
reached 
Qualifying 
Club 
Stage 
reached 
Qualifying 
Club 
Stage 
reached 
2006 Nejmeh Semi Finals Al-Ahed First Round   
2007 Nejmeh Semi Finals Al-Ansar First Round   
2008 Safa Final Al-Ansar First Round   
2009 Safa Round of 16 Al-Ahed First Round Al-Mabarrah First Round 
2010 Nejmeh First Round Al-Ahed First Round   
 
The statistics are not associated with any generalised lack of  interest or enthusiasm for 
sports, or for football in particular in Lebanon. The World Cup, despite Lebanon’s absence 
from it, is a major event for the Lebanese. It is an occasion when flags of  various national 
teams adorn the streets of  Beirut and huge screens showing the matches live are erected in 
cafes, bars and on street corners. In the same period that the 2008 LFA championship was 
taking place, the 2008 Union of  European Football Associations (UEFA) European Football 
Championship (Euro 2008) was also in progress and many Lebanese were eagerly following 
it. Despite a passion for football in Lebanon, the sports scene as I saw it from the director’s 
box then appeared depressing and an unlikely object of  study. As one of  the spectators in 
the Lebanese sports stadium put it, watching the Lebanese game after having watched the 
                                                 
5  Source: http://www.fifa.com/associations/association=lib/ranking/gender=m/index.html Accessed 
9/11/14 
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Euro 2008 games was like eating a falafel sandwich after having been to a lavish banquet of  
sea food - falafel being the cheapest meal available in Lebanon. 
Yet in discussing the local sports scene, fans and sports enthusiasts would often speak to 
me of  different times, of  golden days when the stadiums were filled and competitions were 
fierce. In the previous decade, Lebanese basketball clubs were competing for and winning 
the game’s Asian cup, and local football clubs attracted tens of  thousands of  fans to their 
games. As they described it, the current bareness of  the stadiums was the result of  recent 
political conflicts, poor leadership and unfair regulations by the association, lack of  
financial resources, and unruly fans. Those same sports fans spoke as if, prior to the year 
2005, football had always been thriving and its stadiums full, and they recounted cherished 
memories of  key events and games when their teams won awards and football reports 
occupied the front pages of  local news-papers. 
Reading through the sports history of  Lebanon, I soon realised that despite the fact that 
times when football fared better did exist, periods when sports floundered in Lebanon 
were not exceptional; they were as recurrent as the country’s periods of  violent conflict. 
Since the establishment of  the LFA in 1933, national championships were repeatedly 
suspended, cancelled, or played without spectators. Over 77 years until 2010, the annual 
LFA’s championship was cancelled 27 times due to political and security considerations. In 
fact, the 20 years of  the post-war period after 1990 constitute the longest stretch when the 
competition took place uninterrupted after being suspended for 12 years during the civil 
war6. Periods of  crisis in the Lebanese football sector, just as in all other sectors, were the 
norm rather than an exception. 
                                                 
6  For details of  years in which the competition was not held, see 
http://www.rsssf.com/tablesl/lebchamp.html Accessed 30/11/2012. 
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Figure 3: Empty stadiums during the final match of  the 2008-2009 LFA Championship. Sidon Municipal 
Stadium. One of  a privileged few allowed to watch the game with the empty stands appearing in the background. 
Nejmeh played against Safa and won the title. 
Poor performance, the emptiness of  the stadiums, and the recurrent interruption of  
national competitions were not the only indicators of  the dismal situation at the time the 
above game was played. In a press conference early in 2010 parliamentary committee 
leader, Simon Abu Ramia, claimed that the Ministry of  Youth and Sports (MoYS) had in 
the previous year received a budget of  merely three billion Lebanese Liras, equivalent to 
around two million US dollars, a sum barely capable of  covering the salaries of  the 
Ministry’s employees (see table 3). The figure given by Abu Ramia accounted for less than 
0.02% of  the government’s total expenditure that year. In Norway for example, to enable a 
comparison, sports expenditure in the year 2003 was 0.32% of  state budget (De Bosscher 
et al. 2008), sixteen times the percentage in Lebanon7. According to the projected budgets 
for the years 2006 to 20098, the Ministry would at best receive an average of  0.12% of  the 
national budget, and there was no clear sports policy beyond the construction of  sports 
grounds in rural areas and covering the salaries of  employees. Beirut, the country’s capital 
                                                 
7  As De Bosscher et al. (2008) affirm, government sports budgets are very hard to compare, especially as 
in many countries sports receive a share of  the local government budget (which is not so in Lebanon's 
case) as well as support from the private sector. 
8  Since the year 2005, consecutive Lebanese governments have only published a yearly ‘public finance 
review’ which covers overall government expenditures and revenue, without a breakdown by ministry. 
The projected budget published yearly is not reflective of  the actual expenditure, and in the case of  the 
poorer ministries is often inflated to match promises for increased government support which are not 
usually fulfilled. 
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provided little space for the practice of  sports. The Cite Sportive, Beirut’s municipal 
stadium, and a few grounds for various kinds of  team sports in Horsh Beirut9 were, at the 
time of  my fieldwork, the only public sports spaces provided for the capital’s two million 
residents. Most premiere league clubs had their own privately owned or rented venues. 
However, a few commercial venues, which rent their spaces on an hourly basis, have begun 
to emerge recently. 
Table 3 - Share of  sports of  Lebanon’s national government budget10 
Year Total Budget 
Proposal (LL Billion) 
Allocation to Ministry 
of Youth and Sports 
(MoYS) (LL Billion) 
Percentage of 
MoYS budget out 
of total budget 
2008 13,360 13 0.10% 
2009 18,337 25 0.14% 
2010 21,742 2911 0.13% 
Another prominent characteristic of  the sports scene in Lebanon was the widespread 
patronage and political control over both individual clubs and the LFA. With almost no 
support from the government, lack of  income from ticket sales, and a decline in revenue 
from TV coverage, clubs were almost entirely dependent on the sponsorship of  patrons 
who were attached to the club via ties of  sectarian and regional allegiance. In attempts to 
mobilise and strengthen ties with their constituencies, many socio-political leaders, or 
zuʿama as they are known locally, would sponsor a club so as to complement the work of 
various social, educational and political institutions which performed community based 
services. 
Seen from a distance, the Lebanese sports scene easily lends itself  to caricatural positioning 
of  every club with a sectarian community and political leader, where X club is labelled as 
                                                 
9  Horsh Beirut, also known as Horsh El Snoubar or Bois de Pins, is the largest green public space in the 
city of  Beirut. Besides the sports stadiums, it has largely been closed to the public. See 
http://horshbeirut.com/ Accessed 8/11/2014 
10  Source: Summary Table of  2010 Budget Proposal vs 2009 Budget Proposal published by Ministry of  
Finance - http://www.finance.gov.lb/en-
US/finance/BudgetInformation/AnnualBudgetDocuments/Documents/Annual%20Budget%20Docum
entation/2010/Budget%20Law/Budget%20Proposal%202010%20Tables%20%20(Inc.%20COM%20A
mdts%20180610).pdf  Accessed 30/11/2012  
Source: “Summary Table of  2009 Budget Proposal vs 2008 Budget Proposal” published by Ministry of  
Finance - http://www.finance.gov.lb/en-
US/finance/BudgetInformation/AnnualBudgetDocuments/Documents/Annual%20Budget%20Docum
entation/2009/Budget%20%20Law/Budgetproposal2009sumarytables.pdf - Accessed 30/11/2012 
11  While total amount allocated to MoYS might appear to have doubled in the year 2010 compared to the 
year 2008, this is due to optimistic budget estimations and the percentage of  total budget remains within 
the same range. 
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the favourite of  Y community, and is governed as well as sponsored by Z leader and the 
institutions affiliated to him. This characterisation resonates with the way some of  the fans 
saw football clubs – especially rival ones – yet it denies observers the opportunity to truly 
understand the complexity of  the entanglement of  sports and politics in Lebanon. The 
linkages between political and sectarian figures and groups, the consequences of  these 
links, and negotiations over how they are defined, created and severed are key aspects of  
this thesis. Understanding such dynamics within the sports community can shed light on 
how broader socio-political clientelistic networks are formed and negotiated in Lebanon, 
and on the changes in such formations during the past two decades. 
 
Figure 4: Graffiti at the entrance to Beirut's Municipal Stadium. 
Sports as a Cultural Map 
Despite often repeated and purist claims by sports associations that sport is, and should, 
remain above or separate from politics and assertions of  sport’s humanitarianism and 
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political neutrality12, the relation between sport and politics is nevertheless a long and 
established one, be it at the local, national or international level. History is full of  examples 
of  the use of  sports as an arena of  political negotiation and expression, be it through 
boycotts and bans of  Olympic games by international actors especially during the cold war, 
targeting of  international sports events by political groups, protesting during sports events 
so as to benefit from media coverage, or use of  sports by nation states to foster diplomatic 
relationships or convey political messages (Cha 2009). For decades social scientists have 
researched the overlap between sports, particularly football, and politics. Some have 
accused sports of  being a de facto opium of  the people and a tool used by the politically 
powerful to distract the masses from higher political activities (Brohm 1978; Hammond 
1993; Lever 1969). Others have celebrated it as enabling protest against political power 
(MacClancy 1996), or have noted the many ways in which sport offers a space for the 
formation, manifestation or ‘spectacularisation’ of  various social, spatial, and political 
identities, especially oppositional ones (Armstrong and Giulianotti 2001). 
The desire for, and perception of, sport as an entity separate from politics, or even a refuge 
from the political is not limited to Olympic committees and international sports 
associations, but is shared by many sportsmen, spectators and administrators. In discussing 
their motivation for joining football clubs and fan associations, many of  my interviewees 
described football as a space where they could escape politics at a time when Lebanon was 
being ravaged by civil war, and they contested politicisation of  the game or clubs they were 
involved with. Yet away from international relations and Politics with a capital P, football 
provided a unique arena where a wide spectrum of  individuals from a variety of  sects, 
political inclinations, and classes could negotiate and argue over their club’s management, 
finances, performance, and identity, particularly at a time when much of  the discussion in 
the public arena was stifled by conflict. 
Giulianotti claims that football provides us with ‘a kind of  cultural map, a metaphorical 
representation’ (1999: xii) which enhances our understanding of  any society. A sports 
                                                 
12  For example, The Olympic Charter (2013) stipulates that members of  national and international 
Olympic committees need to preserve their autonomy from political pressure (charter available on 
www.olympic.org/documents/olympic_charter_en.pdf  accessed 8/11/2014) and FIFA’s Code of  Ethics 
(2012) stresses that all officials and players as well as match and players’ agents need to remain politically 
neutral in dealings with  dealings with government institutions, national and international organisations 
among others 
http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/50/02/82/codeofethics2012e.pdf 
Accessed 8/11/2014. 
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event, according to him, condenses and dramatises the complexity of  a society’s social 
structure. What kind of  ‘cultural map’ then does football in Lebanon provide? Empty 
stadiums and reluctant fans render Lebanese football an apparently unpromising subject 
for anthropological research and an unlikely entry point to understanding the formation 
and negotiation of  political identities and antagonisms. Most of  the anthropological 
literature on football I have read starts by highlighting the popularity of  the game and its 
massive appeal - a popularity that the game in Lebanon enjoyed in the 1990s, but which 
had been lost by the time I started fieldwork. The story of  football in Lebanon now is a 
very different one; it is one that concerns the absence of  passion generated by fans, and the 
marginalization of  fans themselves. It is a story in which some fans switch their football 
loyalties relatively easily, diverting their football passion towards political and economic 
gain. One could claim that there isn’t even a cohesive story of  football in Lebanon, given 
the mediocre national team, little if  any state interest and support for the game, and 
declining revenues deriving from football advertising and broadcasting. Yet it is these very 
features of  the Lebanese football situation that allow it to dramatise and ‘metaphorically 
represent’ the socio-political scene of  a country consumed by its own political differences 
and tensions. 
By examining Lebanese football as a ‘repository of  various identities’ (Armstrong and 
Giulianotti 1997) it is possible to trace both the formation of, and changes in, fans’ and 
administrators’ political and sectarian self-identification as well as their relation to, and 
spatial identification with the capital, Beirut, the city which their clubs claim as home. 
Beirut’s disputed reconstruction process never managed to reconcile the divisions caused 
by fifteen years of  civil war. Research into Beirut-based clubs and the spatial identities 
attached to them allows for an explanation of  the negotiation and reformulation of  the 
city’s spaces, images and identities at a time when renewed crisis was plaguing the country 
and new lines of  division were appearing within it. Through examining the sets of  relations 
within one football club, I show how identities over spatial boundaries are negotiated. I 
also reveal relationships amongst members of  the country’s socio-political elite who led 
these clubs, and amongst the fans and members who supported the clubs. Importantly, my 
study also traces the reception and impact of  some of  late Prime Minister Hariri’s 
involvement in sports patronage, and I document the parallel marginalisation of  the role of  
the Ministry of  Youth and Sports, a body which figured as the arena in which a broad, 
ambitious, and economically liberal reconstruction plan was devised. 
37 
The global football scene that parallels Lebanon’s Hariri-led post war reconstruction period 
is described by Giulianotti as football’s ‘post-modern epoch’ (1999: 168); a period 
characterised by the heightened commodification of  football with more coverage and 
revenue from TV and advertising. Against this backdrop Giulianotti notes a ‘disembedding 
of  local and social political ties between club and community’ - a process which has 
weakened the working class identification with football clubs and increasingly made 
football a cultural product belonging to the middle class. While attempts to steer the 
Lebanese football scene through this global post-modern trend exist, they have not 
managed to successfully commercialise football or recreate it as a middle class cultural 
product. This situation, which I discuss further in later chapters, reveals the resilience of  
pre-existing ties in both football and politics; it also explains their coexistence and at times 
their synergy with modern and post-modern political and economic models of  governance. 
Post-modern global trends may have been adopted - even if  only through mere discourse – 
but they appear to have been remodelled and thus incapable of  redefining long-established 
sectarian and communitarian clientelistic systems. The relationships between the fans and 
the boards and management of  their clubs (particularly Nejmeh Football Club) which this 
research covers offered valuable insights into these clientelistic relations and into their 
transformation over time as well as their negotiation among the various parties involved. In 
fact, Nejmeh football club was one of  the few research spaces in urban Beirut where the 
interpersonal interaction within these relations was readily observable over an extended 
period of  time. 
My research into football in Lebanon also provides insights into spectator culture and 
enriches the broader discussion around one of  the most extensively studied dimensions of  
football. In so doing it reveals the prospect of  a greater and more direct role for politics in 
Lebanese football. Violence – real or constructed by the media – in British stadiums 
mobilised interest (see for example Harrington 1968 the Working Party on Crowd 
Behaviour at Football Matches report of  1969) and, by extension, funding for the study of  
football hooliganism in the 1970s and 1980s. This produced a wealth of  literature that shed 
light on violence in football stadiums (Taylor 1969; Hargreaves 1982; Dunning, Murphy 
and Williams 1986; Dunning, Murphy and Williams 1988; Dunning 1994). The literature 
which examined class dimension and the process of  embourgeoisement of  football and 
which portrayed football violence as a working class response to both the commodification 
of  football and the shift towards middle class patronage (Taylor 1971) are of  relevance to 
the aims of  this research. Also of  relevance is literature that examines a change in spectator 
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culture and the redefinition of  football to target ‘respectable’ passive football fans versus a 
hoped for ‘participatory democracy’ that allows more say to the traditionally loyal working 
class fans (Portelli 1993). My research into football violence in Lebanon enabled me, firstly, 
to transcend a simplified analysis positing violence as an instrument of  the poor, and 
secondly, to examine the role political elites play in framing, recreating and contributing to 
violence. 
A Lebanese football club is typically made up of  several sub communities whose identities 
cannot be reduced to one political or sectarian affiliation. It can safely be said that no one 
club in Lebanon has its patron, board members, general assembly, technical and 
administrative body of  staff, players, or the majority of  its fans belonging to just one 
sectarian or political community. In addition, the reasons for, and levels of, identification 
with a certain sect or political camp vary within any given club’s different components and 
are constantly changing. A club thus functions as a space where political relationships can 
be observed as a performance that is negotiated between the different actors. Seen in these 
terms, the stadium figures as a theatre that can be used not only by star players on the 
pitch, but also for the ‘performances’ of  fans and political elites alike. However, the 
performance of  sports and politics do not consist solely in the publicly performed match, 
but also involve in the back-stage amongst other things the politics of  who manages the 
club, how the club identifies itself, where it gets its money from, and what advertisements it 
accepts. Leaving aside literature presenting the use of  sport as a vehicle for political actors 
to widen their popular constituency (Armstrong and Mitchell 2008), the governance of  
sports clubs is a largely under-researched field. 
Though sport can be used as a lens through which to examine broader social processes and 
structures, it does not necessarily follow that any sport is a mere reflection of  the broader 
socio-political context in which it is played. Following Bourdieu’s (1991) assertion that the 
history of  sports is a relatively autonomous one despite being ‘marked’ by social, political 
and economic events, Giulianotti (1999) stresses its ‘relative autonomy’. Giulianotti’s theory 
adopts Gadmer’s (1989) ‘hermeneutic circle’ as the analytical framework guiding his 
interpretation of  the relationship between football and society: for Giulianotti football, as 
one particular feature of  society, helps explain the wider social context, and in turn the 
broader social context helps in understanding the particular features of  football (p. xv). As 
I will explain in following sections, Nejmeh, in particular, followed a trajectory that is 
relatively anomalous in Lebanese football and its uniqueness serves to support the claim 
for some autonomy for sports history as Bourdieu proposes.   
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Sports Literature on Lebanon and the Surrounding Region 
Documentation of  Lebanese sports history to date has been produced mainly in Arabic by 
sports journalists, administrators, and the athletes themselves who have all invested their 
personal time and effort and have relied on their club’s own funding, or on individual 
donations, to publish. Nejmeh’s contribution is comparatively strong, consisting of  two 
books focusing exclusively on the club. One of  these, written by the club’s Secretary 
General of  the 1980s, documents the establishment of  the club, particularly the era when 
Ghandour was its President (see Hamdan 1993). The other is a recently published history 
produced by the club’s Administrative Director, Ahmad Kobrosly (2011). This work adopts 
a more enquiring approach and relies on material drawn from personal interviews. Both 
Riyadi club, for years Lebanon’s champion basketball club, and Al-Ansar Sports Club 
(hereafter Al-Ansar), Nejmeh’s football rival, have also published their histories (Al-Ansar 
2000; Barbir 2002). A few more publications exist, mostly containing compilations of  
sports data and basic historical information (Sacre 1980; Sakr 1992). Data in the above 
compilations is often incomplete, and at times inaccurate13 requiring verification from 
archival sources. Although these works unfortunately do not adopt an analytical approach, 
they do nevertheless provide an interesting subjective summary of  the sports scene. A 
wealth of  information also exists in Lebanese newspaper content devoted to football. At 
the time of  my research, sports pages were edited by experienced journalists like Berjawi 
(As-Safir) Safa (Al-Akhbar) and Sakr (Almustaqbal) who have followed the sports scene for 
decades and who have been involved in it as players, fans and administrators. Other 
specialised sports publications and websites exist, although contemporary ones are often 
short lived14, and archives of  older publications of  this kind are not publicly available.15 
Academic writing and research on sports in Lebanon and on relationships between sports 
and politics in particular are even more scarce with only a few graduate dissertations 
                                                 
13  For example, Sacre (1980) mentions that Brazilian football player Pele played a friendly game with the 
Nejmeh team in 1973, whereas his visit and the game took place in 1975 (Assafir 6/4/2014, Hamdan 
1993). 
14  See for example http://footballinlebanon.tumblr.com/ (Accessed 25/8/12) which only published in 
October and November 2011. The number one Lebanese magazine at the time of  my fieldwork, ‘Shoot’ 
had a longer life span but published its last issue in April 2011, 17 years after it was launched. Financial 
difficulties caused its demise. 
15  Al-Hayat Al-Riyadieh, a seminal sports magazine was published from 1931-1975 by Nassif  Majdalani. Its 
archives today are not publicly available. In an interview I conducted in 2009 Majdalani's nephew 
expressed his family's willingness to make the archives publicly available, but he explained the problems 
of  maintaining the archive in good condition and mentioned the lack of  options for appropriate libraries 
to donate the archive to. 
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(Tohme Adaime 2002; McClenahan 2007; Nassif  2009), a handful of  articles (Boukhater 
2004; Blanc 2004; Makdisi 2008; Reiche 2011; Lamloum 2011; Stanton 2012; Nassif  and 
Amara 2015) and one book chapter of  note (Montague 2008). Alongside other English 
language journalistic writing on sports and politics in Lebanon16 most deal mainly with 
sports in the context of  Lebanon’s conflict, making the main subject of  interest either 
sectarian and political division within the sports arena or sport’s potential to bridge the 
sectarian divide and contribute to national unity (Makdissi 2008; Reiche 2011; Nassif  and 
Amara 2015). 
A tendency by journalists and some academics to simplify and essentialise the national 
sports scene is not limited to Lebanon, but pervades writing on sports in the Middle East, 
not only in journalistic writings(Montague 2008) but also in academic regional overviews 
(see Al-Rabady 1989; Wagg 1995). This tendency is understandable given the lack of  an 
existing body of  research to use as a basis. While the works I mention provide a simplified 
account, they do succeed in capturing the key issues in the sports scene in the country or 
sub region they discuss. In general, studies of  sports and politics in the Middle East have 
focused on one of  three broad themes. The first theme examines sport as a space in which 
national identities are expressed - a process understood variously as part of  the 
decolonisation process, or as an assertion of  newly established state independence, or as 
post conflict reintegration (as in the case of  the newly united Yemen in the early 1990s; see 
Stevenson and Alaug 2000, 2008). A second theme focuses on sports as a space either of  
dissent and resistance to state oppression or expression of  ethnicity, or as the outward 
expression of  sectarian and political tensions. Alliances or identities are often overtly 
framed as oppositional thereby echoing a duality that football expresses too easily. Besides 
the literature on Lebanon, an example illustrating this strand of  study is Tuastad’s (1997) 
work examining the relationship between Wihdat team supported by Palestinian refugees in 
Jordan and Transjordanian Faisali team. A third theme, in line with a tendency in broader 
scholarship on the region, focuses on women and sports, especially in Iran and the gulf  
countries (Foer 2006). Accompanying the regional transformations effected since the 
Tunisian revolution in 2011, emerging documentation has begun to detail the role of  the 
                                                 
16  See for example: Moussaoui, Rana. 2009. ‘Political Feuds are Own Goal for Lebanon Sport.’. Middle East 
Online 13/04/2009 http://www.jordantimes.com/news/region/political-feuds-are-own-goal-lebanon-
sport; Alami, Mona. 2009. ‘Religious about Football.’ Now Lebanon. 
https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/reportsfeatures/religious_about_football ; ‘Hezbollah shoots? on goal.’ Mad-
East. 27 June 2008;  http://www.madeast.com/HezbollahStory.html All accessed on 12/7/2012. 
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fans and the use of  sports stadia as spaces for dissent - both aspects that have fed into 
revolutions particularly in Tunisia (Chomiak 2013) and Egypt (El-Sherif  2012; Tuastad 
2014). 
That said, most work on sport appears to be a one-off  endeavour or a side activity 
paralleling the more serious academic activities of  the authors. A few exceptions at the 
regional level exist, one being the work of  Sorek on nationalism and Arab fandom in Israel 
(2003; 2007). The work of  Amara is another exception, providing both overview and 
sustained examination of  sports in Algeria (2011; 2012b), sports in Muslim societies (2010; 
2012a), and Arab sports in the global arena (2008; 2005; 2011). 
Despite these recent additions, the subject generally suffers from an absence of  sustained 
and cumulative work and lack of  empirical research reflecting full engagement with sports 
personnel and fans: too many studies are over-reliant on media accounts or are written 
from the distance of  academic offices. Little, if  any, documentation exists either of  the 
micro-politics of  sports in Arabic countries or of  the governance of  sports institutions - 
an imbalance that this thesis sets out to address. 
Introducing the Research Community 
How can a football club be defined? As a novice in the sports world that I entered at the 
beginning of  this research, I assumed that a club could be defined by the star players it 
boasts and the championships it has achieved. Yet if  I did that, Nejmeh club would mean 
little; until the year 2010, and in a sixty-five year period it has boasted victory in only seven 
championships and its current players are not exactly global football stars. For anybody 
who has ever been involved in the game, be it a player, a fan, an administrator, or even as a 
social scientist, the club is a community which extends far beyond the field where the game 
is played and beyond the organisational structure that forms it. To be able to unfurl that 
which constitutes the club, I start by describing Nejmeh in detail so as to show the 
perspective the club provides into the work of  micro-politics in Lebanon and, more 
specifically, in Beirut’s Sunni community. I then describe the core organisational structures 
and the places which legally and materially form both the club and the different social 
groups that constitute it. 
A Popular and Anomalous Club 
Within the dismal Lebanese sports scene, Nejmeh was exceptional in two ways. Firstly, and 
by consensus of  all those I interviewed (including sports media personnel and members 
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and fans of  rival clubs), Nejmeh was Lebanon’s most popular football club. The club’s fans, 
who are said to have once outnumbered the fans of  all other football clubs in the first 
division put together, and who were dubbed by several media commentators as ‘the 
backbone of  Lebanese football’ and ‘the great people of  Nejmeh’, gave football in 
Lebanon its distinctive flavour for most of  the 1990s. 
Secondly, for over two decades the club has managed to escape a compartmentalised 
sectarian identity. As they occupied the stadiums, Nejmeh fans defined what a public 
stadium is and how a body of  fans can occupy it. Through a serendipitous convergence of  
political events, demographic changes and exceptional leadership, Nejmeh managed to 
gather around it a large and diverse body of  fans, as new migrants to the city from the 
country’s impoverished margins found in the club a space they could call home17. The club 
had also triumphed over internal sectarian divisions for over two decades, and managed to 
contest the logic of  politico-sectarian allotment that governed the Lebanese sports scene. 
Though, as individuals, people may have been members of  sects and communities and 
possibly followers of  this or that leader, they were in the stadium football fans of  their own 
will and following their own rules. They spoke with their own voice and chose their own 
chants, and even organised among themselves the officers in charge of  discipline in the 
stadium. 
In the first decade of  the 21st century, the change in Nejmeh’s patronage repositioned the 
club’s political and sectarian identity. The negotiations of  fans, members, and leaders of  the 
club prior to and accompanying that transition period provide a unique and rich record of  
how patronage is perceived and appraised. The diversity of  the club’s community along 
sectarian and class lines at the time of  fieldwork allowed me to observe such negotiations 
between political elites in a way which few other Beirut institutions could have done. 
In July 2008, as I was starting my involvement with Nejmeh, political scientist and football 
enthusiast, Makdisi, in a piece on sports and politics in Lebanon, concluded that it ‘would 
be wise to keep a close eye on the fate of  Nijme [Nejmeh] soccer club and the evolution of  
its support base that may turn out to be the best indicator of  national reconciliation in the 
country’ (Makdisi 2008). 
                                                 
17  See Chapter Three for details on Nejmeh's history. 
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For Makdisi, Lebanon’s ruling elite was bolstering sectarian identity and using Lebanon’s 
football community to strengthen its stronghold on these communities. A close 
examination of  the transformations in the last two decades in Nejmeh allows not only for 
the exploration of  the validity of  Makdisi’s proposition, but also of  the way in which 
power is negotiated, reproduced and subverted. 
 
Figure 5: Electoral Poster of  Zuheir el-Khatib. The slogan champions the diversity of  Beirut and the renewal of  its 
identity. 
 
Figure 6: Electoral poster of  Khodr Taha. Slogan reads 'Elect sports people, for Lebanon’s sake'. 
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An Entry Point into Beirut’s Sunni Communities 
Looking at the host of  candidates that Nejmeh had provided for the 2009 parliamentary 
elections exemplifies ways in which the club offered a unique entry point for studying 
Beirut’s Sunni communities in general, as well as relations existing between the city’s 
residents and its elite in particular. 
Electorally, Beirut in the year 2009 was divided into three districts. The first district 
included the majority Christian areas of  East Beirut and had five allocated seats all reserved 
for Christian parliamentarians. The candidates for this area won uncontested, largely 
through the consensus of  political groups at the time of  agreeing on the distribution of  
the electoral districts. This was also the case for the second area which was a mixed one 
and candidates in it, although not officially uncontested, were already agreed on by ruling 
political groups. 
The third district was the largest of  Beirut’s three electoral areas. The number of  voters 
and parliamentary seats that it included exceeded those in districts 1 and 2 combined (see 
Table 4). The neighbourhoods it covered included Ras Beirut, the area where the club’s 
stadium is located as well as Tariq Al-Jadidah, where the club’s offices are situated. In 
electoral terms, Tariq Al-Jadidah carries special significance for leaders of  the Sunni 
community. It is the repository of  Sunni votes, decisive in conveying who represents the 
Sunni communities in Beirut and represents its leadership more broadly. 
Table 4 - Distribution of  Parliamentary seats and registered voters in Beirut by District 
(2009)18 
Electoral 
District 
Number of 
seats 
Of which reserved 
to members of the 
Sunni sect 
Number of 
registered voters 
First District 5 0 92,764 
Second District 4 1 101,787 
Third District 10 5 252,165  
Of  the 22 candidates competing for the five parliamentary seats reserved for Sunnis in the 
third district, four had connections with Nejmeh. Heading the pro-government list which 
won all of  the district’s seats, was Saad Hariri, the club’s Patron, and leading the opposition 
                                                 
18  Source: http://www.elections.gov.lb/Elections-Results/2009-Real-time-Results.aspx?lang=en-us – 
Accessed 1/10/14. 
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list was Omar Ghandour, the club’s president for 33 years, until 2003 when the club moved 
to the patronage of  Ghandour’s electoral opponent’s father, late Prime Minister Rafic 
Hariri. Also competing for one of  the five seats was Zuheir el-Khatib, who was on the 
club’s board and coordinated the relationship with the Fans’ Office between 2003-2005, as 
well as Khodr Taha who played for Nejmeh back in the 1960s. (See table 5). 
Table 5 - Nejmeh linked candidates in Beirut’s 3rd district and number of  votes received 
(parliamentary elections 2009) 
Candidate Number of Votes 
Saad Rafic Hariri 78,382 
Omar Ghandour 
(Leading opposition candidate in terms of number of votes) 
21,703 
Zuheir Khatib 314 
Khodr Taha 86 
Total number of voters in the third district 103,243 
Of  course, among the club’s members and fans there were voters for this candidate or the 
other as well as members of  Hariri’s electoral machine. It was thus no surprise, that in May 
2008, Saad Hariri chose the grounds of  Nejmeh Sports Club to announce the names of  
candidates running as part of  his electoral bloc in Beirut’s election, all of  whom 
subsequently won their seats.  
Nejmeh: The Organisation and Community 
The Organisational Structure 
The bylaws of  the club stipulate a General Assembly and an elected board of  11 members, 
a structure which complies with regulations of  the Ministry of  Youth and Sports, the 
official governmental body entrusted with monitoring the administration of  sports 
institutions in Lebanon. At the time of  this research the General Assembly comprised 
around 200 members19 and was legally the highest authority in the club. It was supposed to 
meet yearly to review the club’s budget and plan, and every three years to elect a board. 
Voting rights were conditional on a person being a member for at least one year before 
election date, and paying a yearly fee. During fieldwork in the years 2009-2010, this fee was 
                                                 
19  Based on news reports in Almustaqbal newspaper, the number of  voting members in the club’s elections 
of  November 2008, there were 217 members, of  which 100 attended the elections meeting.(Almustaqbal 
newspaper 17/11/2008). 
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set at 1,000 US dollars20. The board distributed responsibilities among its members, 
assigning a President / Chairman, Vice President, Secretary General, and a Treasurer. The 
board was responsible for overseeing the overall management of  the club and in principle 
required to meet on a regular basis. Officially, all its posts are voluntary. 
This simple organisational structure is the same one followed (possibly with minor 
amendments) by all other sports clubs in Lebanon. In principle the bylaws are closely 
adhered to, but often they are a mere formality and a facade to the actual governance 
process that I discuss in the following chapters. Elections did take place, for example, while 
I was doing fieldwork, but the members of  the board nominated by the club’s Patron were 
elected uncontested. 
On the executive level, the club employed less than a dozen staff: four administrative 
employees who worked from the club’s offices in Tariq Al-Jadidah, and a technical team 
that varied in size during my fieldwork (see table 6). However it always included a coach, 
his assistant and a stadium supervisor. Most staff  were employed under precarious 
conditions, or on a part-time basis, with few, if  any, guarantees in terms of  social security 
and health insurance. A recurrent problem for all employees during fieldwork was the delay 
in receiving their monthly salaries which were sometimes late 4-5 months in a row. 
A number of  the club’s staff  had other jobs, often with little connection to their posts in 
the club. For example, the office messenger also worked in a security firm, and the PR 
officer organised tourist trips. Added to that, the majority were connected to the club by 
means other than their employment, often as fans. 
Table 6 - Nejmeh Club Personnel (2009) 
Office Staff (Tariq Al-Jadidah) Technical/Stadium Staff (Ras Beirut) 
Administrative manager Sports team manager 
Public Relations Officer Coach 
Admin assistant Assistant coach 
Messenger Coach – youth team 
Media Officer (not based in the office, performs 
media duties alongside his regular job as a 
journalist) 
Stadium supervisor 
Messenger 
                                                 
20  The formal organisational structures and regulations do not by necessity reflect the spirit by which the 
club is led and governed. As I will explain in chapter five, control over the club is maintained through a 
process of  subverting the regulations 'through legal means'. 
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Financial Management and Funding 
The figure I was repeatedly given as the club’s yearly budget was one million dollars. The 
truth of  that figure, based on what I have seen, is open for debate, but a concocted figure 
suited the Patron’s interest in presenting himself  as a generous donor as much as it assisted 
the club’s management in positioning Nejmeh as a larger, better-funded club. 
According to the club’s Media Officer, a third of  the budget covered monthly salaries to 
players and staff. Other major expenditures included the purchase of  players, yearly 
training camps that take place outside Lebanon, costs of  participating in regional and 
international championships and hosting teams for games in Lebanon, yearly insurance, 
medical and kit expenses for the team, as well as daily administrative, communication, 
transportation and repairs costs. 
The club’s main sources of  income included revenue from ticket sales at games, 
remuneration for television broadcasting, sale of  advertising space in the stadium and on 
the player’s shirts, the sale of  players, rental of  its stadium to other Lebanese and Arab 
teams, membership fees and of  course the donations of  the Patron, Saad Hariri, (son of  
assassinated Prime Minister Hariri) who was Lebanon’s Prime Minister from 2009 to 2011 
when this research was conducted. The club also possessed sizeable assets, particularly a 
long-standing rental contract for the stadium which is situated by the sea in an area where 
land prices are amongst the highest in the country. 
Hariri’s patronage of  the club was to a great extent channelled through GroupMed SAL, a 
shareholders company in which Saad Hariri, Nazek Hariri21 and Saad’s brother Ayman were 
key stakeholders22. GroupMed for example is the main shareholder of  BankMed which 
provides sponsorship to the club through its corporate social responsibility programme23. 
Another member company of  the BankMed SAL group, GulfMed, provides insurance for 
the club and its players. 
At the time of  my research, income from ticket sales was negligible, given the ban on fans 
attending local football games. Ticket sales had traditionally been a major source of  income 
                                                 
21  Wife of  Saad Hariri’s late Father Rafic Hariri. 
22  Information on BankMed SAL's shareholders is from the website of  the Dubai International Financial 
Centre (DIFC) http://www.difc.ae/groupmed-international-holding-ltd Accessed 1/10/14. 
23  According to BankMed's Annual report for the year 2009 – available on 
http://www.bankmed.com.lb/Publications/AnnualReports.aspx Accessed 1/10/2014 
48 
for Nejmeh due to its huge fan base. Revenue from television broadcasting had also fallen 
by around half  what it was a decade ago. In part, this fall was caused by the deterioration in 
the level of  Lebanese football, given the internal problems in the clubs and the lack of  
enthusiasm among both players and fans due to the absence of  audiences in the stadiums. 
On a day-to-day basis, small expenditures were dealt with by administrators. For example, 
teams who rented the stadium paid the administrator who managed the stadium’s cash box. 
Because of  the lack of  cash flow caused by delays in payments, the administrator diverted 
the amounts received to cover expenses incurred in the stadium - a practice often 
undertaken without the board’s permission. Procedures for handling larger payments, 
especially those coming from the Patron appeared relatively vague. A couple of  times, 
when I witnessed the payment of  salaries, these were received directly from a contact 
person in BankMed on an ad hoc basis, as were the salaries of  many Hariri Establishment24 
employees. 
The Players 
The raison d’être of  the club, the players, were probably its weakest link. Football in 
Lebanon still exists in a shady area between amateur and professional sports. While not all 
football players in Lebanon were designated as professional and thus did not receive 
salaries, players of  Nejmeh club’s first team did and their salaries were set at a value of  
around 1,000 USD per month, only slightly above the average wages in Lebanon in the 
same period (CAS 2008). At times they too worked for several months without payment. 
The regulations under which they played afforded them little room to improve their 
situation; once a player signed with a club, he was bound by a contract for his whole 
working life and only able to leave if  the club signs what are termed ‘release papers’. Often, 
a club would ‘sell’ or ‘buy’ team members in the summer before the beginning of  the new 
season, acquiring players from African, Arab or Eastern European countries where similar 
employment conditions applied. 
The recruitment of  new players usually followed a period of  screening and involved the 
intervention of  many middle men, at least two per player, one representing the selling 
                                                 
24 I use the term the 'Hariri Establishment' when speaking about the political and familial institution lead 
by late prime minister Rafic Hariri, and by his son Saad Hariri after him, particularly when discussing 
issues and actions that cannot be clearly attributed to one person or institution within the establishment. 
For terminology used by participants when speaking about any of  the constituting parts of  the Hariri 
establishment, I translated the exact words used including 'Hariri family', 'Hariri people', 'Future 
Movement', and 'Hariri's parliamentary block'. 
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team and the other the buying one, both of  whom got a significant share of  the value of  
the ‘transaction’. Players were bought and sold for prices equivalent to, if  not more than 
what they could make throughout their years with Nejmeh. Their hopes and aspirations 
were related to the possibilities of  being spotted by an international team so as to secure 
a better paid career, or at best receiving a percentage of  the amount they had been sold 
for. Those involved as middlemen were often close to one of  the clubs, possessing good 
knowledge of  the local and global football scene, and some had pre-existing professional 
relationships with the players. These middlemen could be journalists, Lebanese Football 
Association (LFA) members, or even club board members, who made financial profit 
through the process of  brokering sales and purchases. Some clubs, and especially those 
in poor rural areas invested in recruiting young players in their teens, developing their 
talent, and then selling some of  them later as a way of  financing the club.  
Low monthly pay and difficulties in leaving the club rendered players relatively helpless and 
made them dependent on charitable initiatives run by the management, individual board 
members or even the club’s Patron if  they won a significant game. For players who wanted 
to transfer, the most effective way of  controlling the process was by refusing to cooperate: 
failure to attend the daily training sessions rendered player contracts meaningless. 
I observed that most players came from lower or lower-middle class backgrounds, and had 
chosen football because of  a lack of  other career options. During the time of  my research 
and throughout the past decade, the majority of  professional football players in Lebanon 
were Shiites, predominantly from South Lebanon. While most clubs were clearly identified 
through sectarian and political alliances, these identifications seemed to have little effect on 
the process by which players were chosen. The dominance of  Shiite players was attributed 
by one of  my informants to their rural background and lower economic status. This does 
not suffice to explain the reluctance of  poor youth of  other sects to professionally play 
football which merits further exploration beyond the scope of  this thesis. One contributing 
factor, could be that with little on the government’s agenda in terms of  improving sports 
facilities and the lack of  readily accessible sports spaces, players almost always originated 
from the furthest suburbs or the rural areas where population density is still low and space 
for football playing is available. Nejmeh had two other teams for aspiring younger 
enthusiasts who competed on its behalf  but received no payment other than occasional 
financial rewards. These younger players represented a significant pool from which the club 
could in due course promote junior members to its first team without needing to pay large 
purchase fees. A recent example was in the transition between the 2009 / 2010 season to 
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the 2010 / 2011 one, when most players stopped showing up to train because they were 
not receiving their salaries, and the club eventually resorted to competing for the 
championship with the eldest members of  its youth team. 
Every year over a couple of  months the management of  the club organised a free summer 
football academy for young boys aged 9-15. Through the school, boys received daily 
football training, accompanied by recreational activities. Often, at the end of  the summer, 
the club selected the star trainees to join its youth teams who continue weekly training 
throughout the year. Summer schools were implemented by many other clubs, and were 
used not only as a way of  early training and recruitment of  new talent, but also as a way of  
solidifying a club’s fans base. 
The children who joined the summer school were mostly sent by parents who were fans of  
the club and who chose Nejmeh regardless of  the quality of  the training or the location of  
the stadium. The mother of  two boys in the school I met on one of  the training days, 
explained in an irate tone that despite the summer school of  another team being only 
meters away from her house in Beirut’s suburbs, her husband would not allow his boys to 
be trained anywhere but with Nejmeh, a decision which forced them to make a daily one 
hour commute.  
 
Figure 7: Closing Ceremony of  the Nejmeh Sports Club summer school. Parents and family members of  the young 
participants in the football summer school take souvenir photos in Nejmeh club’s stadium. 
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A further interesting extension of  the player cohort is a team of  former Nejmeh players, 
who train once a week and play informal games, sometimes in Nejmeh’s stadium. 
The Fans 
This aspect of  the club is probably the hardest to encompass, as being a Nejmeh fan – or 
that of  any other club - is not quantifiable in any way other than the individual’s own 
inclination or choice. In theory, the fans could be a community of  over 40,000 people who 
have cheered in the past for Nejmeh in stadiums or carried its flag. The fans were many 
and they came from a variety of  backgrounds, though more often than not, from the lower 
class ranks. Among that vast number, there was a core group that took on organisational 
and leadership responsibilities, again on a voluntary basis. 
Today the size of  this community is decidedly reduced, since fans have been excluded from 
stadiums by the security forces’ decision, and distanced from their club by its internal 
conflicts. Officially there is still a ‘Central Office of  Fans Unions’ - better known as the 
Fans’ Office - a volunteer based structure under the board’s administration which aims at 
improving communication between the fans and the club’s board. The Office has a 
manager, and a number of  specialised committees responsible for fan membership, 
discipline in the stadium, ticket sales and other issues. The Fans’ Office was established in 
1995, to replace a fans’ union originally established by the fans themselves independently 
from the club management in 1970. The Fans’ Office – and the union before it – have 
done a great deal of  work to strengthen the Nejmeh fan community, facilitating 
transportation to the games, organising cheering by the crowds, and maintaining order in 
the stadiums. Over the years they have extended membership and opened over 40 branches 
all over Lebanon. 
During the period of  this research, the Fans’ Office was little more than a room in the 
club, to which only one or two of  its committee members came in the afternoons, and a 
shack selling refreshments in the stadium. Fans themselves could not come to the games 
without special LFA permission which was difficult to obtain. A small group did come to 
training sessions, especially when new players were being tried or when negotiations about 
which new foreign players to buy were in progress. The office was closed for about two 
years, by management decision, after clashes took place at a Nejmeh game in 2006. 
Yet despite their exclusion from matches, many of  the people I interviewed for this 
research described themselves as Nejmeh fans. I met many people who offered the club 
long-term dedication: as many told me ‘once a Nejmeh Fan, always a Nejmeh fan’. The 
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number and loyalty of  Nejmeh fans were unmatched by any other Lebanese football club. 
For a long time, fans were what defined Nejmeh Club’s strong reputation, and more 
recently its current sorry situation has been defined precisely by their absence. 
The Spaces the Club Occupies 
Nejmeh’s stadium is relatively small, with 4-5 rows of  seating on three sides, and offices, 
players’ changing spaces, and a small cafeteria operated by the fans office on the fourth 
side. During the day, the stadium is often deserted, except for the administrator in charge. 
In the afternoon, players come for training, and so do some of  the fans who are still 
interested and on good terms with the management. These people are curious to know the 
level of  their team and to meet other fans. Board members also arrive, and this is a time 
where conversations and meetings are possible between board members and fans or 
players. A decade ago, a game played by Nejmeh in either the north or south of  Lebanon 
caused congestion back in the Ras Beirut area where the stadium is located. Fans gathered 
there to go to games, or came back there after a win. At the time of  my research, the 
stadium had its doors open most of  the time, but those who entered were few, and the 
inquiring looks of  those inside drew a line that outsiders did not cross. 
The Club’s office shares the same feeling of  emptiness. It is not adjacent to the stadium but 
located on the first floor of  a residential building in the Tariq Al-Jadidah area, a crowded, 
predominantly Sunni, and relatively poor neighbourhood of  Beirut. Four administrative 
staff  worked out of  that office from 8:30 or 9:00 till around 2:00 pm Monday till Saturday. 
It was also, in theory, the space where the meetings of  the elected executive committee 
took place and where the Fans’ Office was hosted and their elected representatives could 
meet. The space consisted of  a big meeting room and reception area with leather couches, 
three rooms serving as offices – though one is for the board and is mostly closed – and 
two outdated computers. In the hallway the trophies of  club trophies are flaunted behind 
locked glass doors, and there is a notice-board on which the dates of  upcoming games and 
other announcements are displayed, for almost nobody to see.  
Yet despite the apparent emptiness, the office has a presence in the neighbourhood. During 
my first visit to the club in May 2009, I arrived to find the offices closed and the Nejmeh 
member I was supposed to meet unaware of  our pre-arranged meeting. The nearby fruit 
seller who doubles up as a parking attendant, possibly out of  sympathy for my wasted trip, 
offered alternative sports related suggestions to me. Indicating a radius of  around 100 
meters, he started pointing out the houses of  football players belonging to both Nejmeh 
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and Al-Ansar clubs, and the homes of  active fans, suggesting who might help and offering 
his son to show me the way to these houses. The owner of  the clothes shop in the same 
building was a fan, as was the barber around the corner. Many fans sat in front of  the 
barber’s shop waiting to see if  a member of  staff  or the board would come along on his 
way to or from the club and be willing to answer their questions or relay their complaints. 
The actual space occupied by the club extended far beyond the immediate vicinities of  the 
stadium, the office, and their surroundings. Most of  my interviews did not take place on 
club premises, but in people’s offices and work-places; even the current President and 
Secretary General asked me to come to their personal offices. Fans also had particular 
spaces were they met - for example, Café Abo el-’ezz in Beirut’s Southern Suburbs. Such 
meeting places were sometimes mentioned in newspaper articles announcing the activities 
of  the now ‘dissident’ fans. 
The different elements described above are but a sketch of  the club’s make-up which I 
expand on in later chapters. Nejmeh is all of  the above, but it has a wider existence located 
variously in the Lebanese football scene, in its rivals, in the presence it has in other 
stadiums where its team plays, in the articles written about it and in the tears shed for it. 
Besides this sketch of  what it is now, Nejmeh is also all that is remembered of  the past in 
terms of  people who were once members and fans and the spirit that made it so popular. It 
is also an entity whose presence and promise extend forward into the future. 
Research Methods 
My fieldwork took place in Beirut, Lebanon between November 2007 and December 2009. 
My interest and entry into football research began in May 2008, and only a month later I 
gained access to the Nejmeh Sports Club which became my primary research community. 
Starting in the summer of  2008, my research was mainly with Nejmeh club staff, members 
and fans. Focusing on Nejmeh allowed me to have a focal point around which my 
ethnographic explorations revolved. The club represented a hard to define ‘community’ in 
Beirut’s urban context and a nucleus selected from within its two million residents. In 
practice my research neither covered all of  the activities of  the club nor was it exclusively 
confined to them. As I explained earlier, defining a sports club is neither an easy nor an 
objective endeavour. Its essence and limits as a community vary depending on the 
perspective one takes, and given my interest in it as space for interaction between the 
political elite and the residents of  Beirut, I focused on the club’s management, members, 
and fans in leading positions but did little, if  any, work with the players. To complement my 
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club-based work I made connections with other Hariri-affiliated sports and political 
entities, a strategy which enabled me to become attuned to the broader socio-political 
changes in the country as I explain in the following elaboration of  the methods I used for 
data collection. 
Participant Observation 
Field notes of  my observations during fieldwork covered several spaces and themes, and if  
anything these notes highlighted the difficulty of  limiting where and when fieldwork begins 
and ends, especially in an urban context during a time of  crisis. I regarded watching a local 
sports programme from the comfort of  my couch or going out for drinks with friends who 
had nothing to do with sports as valid and informative ‘research activities’ that I relied on 
as much as time spent in the stadium and the club. Fieldwork was further complicated by 
the fact that I was implementing research in the city where I have lived for the majority of  
my life. As I will explain in the next chapter, I was not always readily perceived as a 
researcher within my home city. In practice ‘participant observation’ often meant exercising 
an increased sensitivity to, and a critical examination of, certain issues. It also included the 
practice of  keeping field notes about incidents and conversations – even with close friends 
- that in earlier times would have gone unnoticed as parts of  my usual day-to-day life25. I 
lived in west Beirut, in an area neither particularly close to the sites of  the Nejmeh club 
stadium and office nor of  relevance to the sports scene. My position as a city insider 
exerted its own effects on the research process: whenever I finished an interview, or when 
the working day at the Nejmeh office ended, people automatically assumed that I would 
have other business to attend to or family that I needed to spend time with. Accordingly, 
my time with research participants had to be meticulously planned and carefully justified to 
them. ‘Community’ as well as ‘fieldwork’ were loosely defined and encompassed broader 
aspects of  my life in Beirut at the time. Bearing the above in mind, I can highlight some of  
the more easily defined ‘spaces’ where my participant observation activities took place: 
- Nejmeh Sports Club office and the surrounding neighbourhood: For the majority 
of  my fieldwork, the office was rarely used by board members and fans, but was 
                                                 
25  I obtained the consent of  all friends I engaged in discussion about the social and political context in 
Lebanon. That said, the boundary between ordinary day-to-day conversations and research as a 
‘participant observer’ in a city where I habitually resided is almost impossible to define. In addition, 
many of  those friends were also researchers, writers, and activists who have provided feedback and 
advice as I was doing fieldwork and writing beyond that provided by a ‘research participant’. 
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mainly a space used by administrators. Occasionally players, or fans from the 
neighbourhood, visited if  they had administrative concerns. These uses meant that 
it was not very easy for me to justify my presence there, unless I had interviews to 
conduct. Later, to get around this problem, I invented for myself  the responsibility 
of  supporting one of  the staff  members’ efforts to publish a book about the club’s 
history. My presence was legitimised by the hours I spent every day scanning this 
man’s old photos of  the club and its members. The office was located in Tariq Al-
Jadidah, a predominantly Sunni neighbourhood and a stronghold of  the Hariri 
Establishment at the time of  my fieldwork. It was also home to the municipal 
stadium, the offices of  rival Ansar football club, and the residence of  several 
football fans I regularly encountered. Although I did not live in the neighbourhood, 
I kept note of  developments I could observe and of  the posters and banners its 
residents displayed, as well conversations I had with shopkeepers and residents. 
- Nejmeh Club stadium was another place I visited regularly. It was open daily until 
sunset, and Anis, the staff  member responsible for team logistics and the stadium 
lived on-site. I also spent some time there during the day, mostly in the afternoons 
when daily training took place, as at these times some fans and administrators were 
present. I also visited during special events like friendly matches or football summer 
schools. 
- Other sports stadiums and spaces: I attended the majority of  games played by 
Nejmeh during the time of  my research, but such games were predominantly 
played in the absence of  fans and I was only allowed in with LFA’s special 
permission26. I also paid regular attention to local TV sports programs, sports pages 
in daily papers, Nejmeh and Lebanese sports Facebook groups and related 
websites. In researching sports fandom, one might assume that matches would 
provide primary research spaces, yet since fans were banned from attending games 
between Lebanese teams, matches instead offered opportunities for connecting 
with the privileged few administrators allowed to attend and for meeting media 
personnel. The same stadiums and spaces also figured as vibrant research sites 
                                                 
26  Although the matches were being broadcast live, local sports matches were not publicly screened in 
sports bars and cafes, unlike for example European and world championship and I have not been told 
of  any form of  collective viewing of  the matches while doing fieldwork. 
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when they hosted events like political rallies or the surrounding community’s daily 
exercise routine. 
In parallel to the research methods mentioned above, and for the duration of  my fieldwork, 
I undertook part time work as a freelance consultant in the fields of  human rights, 
development and peace-building. This work gave me access to information my football-
based research alone would have not provided. In this role I conducted interviews and 
focus groups with members of  Hariri owned institutions, Islamic charities and 
fundamentalist groups and arranged site visits to Sunni communities across the country. 
These activities allowed me to better situate what I observed at Nejmeh club in Beirut 
within the country-wide changes that Lebanon was witnessing. 
Interviews 
I conducted over forty semi-structured interviews with past and present fans, members and 
administrators of  the club, sports journalists and political analysts. These can roughly be 
divided into the following categories: 
- Members and fans who had left the club before I started my research. These 
included, for example, Omar Ghandour, club president for 33 years from 1969 until 
2003, Zuheir Baroudi, the Club’s Secretary General until 2003, and Ahmad Fleifel, a 
board member until 2005. I also interviewed members of  the Fans’ Office, some 
of  whom were also members of  the General Assembly, who had distanced 
themselves from the club in the past decade for various reasons, often related to the 
change in the club’s management in 2003. These interviews were always conducted 
in a place that the research participant chose, often their own work space. Although 
this allowed me access to that person’s social and professional realm it did not give 
me the opportunity to observe how these interviewees situated themselves within 
the Nejmeh community. Interviews were usually recorded with the consent of  
interviewees. In a few cases I was allowed to take notes, but not to record, or was 
asked to turn off  the recorder, or to agree that certain issues were not to be shared 
in my published material. In most cases the interviews were the only opportunity I 
had to meet with those individuals as research participants. I was not able to make 
any subsequent contact with those who had left the club or were not active in the 
sports scene. In most of  these cases, the interviews were only conducted during the 
later stages of  my fieldwork, by which time I had some knowledge, based on other 
fieldwork activities, about who to interview and what kind of  questions to ask. 
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Delaying the interviews proved useful in terms of  the questions I could raise, but it 
also meant that I had little time or chance to arrange further meetings if  needed. 
- Interviews with current members, fans and administrators: these interviews 
paralleled other data collection activities and were often an opportunity for the club 
administrators and members I met to give their ‘official’ version or understanding 
of  how the club worked. Their accounts were rendered ‘official’ by the very fact 
that these were recorded conversations and not informal ones. These included 
several interviews, for example, with club administrator Ahmad Kobrosly, who 
recounted to me the history of  the club as well as his own personal, professional 
and political trajectory. They also included one-off  interviews with club officials, 
including the club’s President at the time of  my research, its General Secretary, and 
the coordinator of  the Fans’ Office. These one-off  interviews were necessary first 
steps; in them I clarified my intentions and research plans, explained what I had 
done so far, and outlined what my writing and publishing plans were. This was very 
important in helping me tie loose ends and gave club officials assurance that their 
version of  the story was heard. 
- Sports journalists, fans and administrators of  other clubs, and Ministry of  Youth 
and Sports officials: Interviews with sports journalists were mostly conducted early 
on in my research, and were often used to develop my then very sketchy 
understanding of  the sports scene in Lebanon, the main players, and the key critical 
events in Lebanon’s sports history. These interviews were also conducted in 
interviewees’ offices. I often ran into the same journalists in sports stadiums and 
matches, where they introduced me to other reporters and gave me pointers on 
what was happening in the matches - both on the field and off  it. 
- Political activists and analysts: I conducted a small number of  interviews with 
journalists or members of  the Future Movement, so as to understand their 
perspective on the political context, particularly the conflicts in the leadership and 
operation of  the Hariri establishment. These interviews also gave important 
insights into the history of  Rafic Hariri’s ascent to power. 
Archival Research 
To complement the accounts given to me by research participants, particularly concerning 
the period of  crisis the club experienced between 2003 and 2006, I also carried out basic 
research in the archives of  newspapers including the daily Hariri-owned Almustaqbal, and 
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the pro March 8 As-Safir, as well as those of  Al-Akhbar, Annahar, and the Daily Star where 
relevant. 
Both Al-Akhbar and Almustaqbal had comprehensive, easily searchable archives online, but 
Al-Akhbar was first published in 2006 and thus did not provide information to cover the 
time span I was interested in. As-Safir, with the longest history, was only accessible in print 
copies in the paper’s headquarters or in certain libraries. While As-Safir took great care to 
classify and archive its past issues, the sports pages were not included - an omission which 
testified to the perceived insignificance of  sports matters. 
Summary of  Thesis Chapters 
Each of  the chapters in this thesis begins with an ethnographic vignette. All the events 
described in these vignettes - with the exception of  that in the second chapter - take place 
in one of  Lebanon’s stadiums. The theatrical performance of  both sports and politics in 
the space of  a stadium paves the way for my analysis of  underlying sets of  social structures 
and dynamics. Such events also serve to reaffirm the importance of  the performative in the 
workings of  clientelism (Auyero 2000). While most of  these vignettes are based on field 
notes and direct observations made during fieldwork in Lebanon between 2007 and 2009, 
in some instances, the ethnographic accounts are compositions which assemble material 
derived from the recollections of  research participants, biographies, and both written and 
televised media accounts. This compositional tactic has been necessary because the thesis 
covers a historical timeframe that extends beyond the period of  fieldwork. I have clearly 
indicated the sections where ethnographic accounts have been thus constructed rather than 
observed first-hand. I trust that these offer helpful perspectives of  the events described 
because most of  them deal with a relatively recent period which was well documented in 
the media. Each vignette is followed by a short introduction summarising the key themes 
presented in the subsequent ethnographic sections. 
Chapter One briefly introduces the research questions and research community. It outlines 
the data collection methods used, and grounds the discussion within sports literature as 
well as in relation to anthropological literature dealing with clientelism and elites. I explain 
that the thesis builds on and seeks to contribute to a growing anthropological literature 
concerning elites, and I describe how the thesis explores in particular the relationship 
between political elites and their constituencies. Taking account of  an extensive body of  
research which has explored political clientelism in Lebanon, the thesis also makes use of  a 
relatively recent line of  research in anthropology inspired by Bourdieu (Rutten 2007; 
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Auyero et al. 2009). These sources propose that clientelism encompasses instrumental 
dimensions of  material and political exchange, as well as a symbolic dimension. The latter 
involves a ‘clientelist habitus’, or system of  dispositions which guides or dictates the socio-
political behaviours of  individuals: both elite members and the masses contribute to the 
formation of  this habitus. 
Chapter One further argues for the study of  the political as seen through the sports scene 
given this context’s  utility as a space for the formation, manifestation or ‘spectacularisation’ 
of  various social, spatial, and political identities, especially oppositional ones. It shows the 
many ways in which Nejmeh was distinct in escaping compartmentalised sectarian identity. 
The chapter  explains how through a serendipitous convergence of  political events, 
demographic changes and exceptional leadership, Nejmeh managed to gather around it a 
large and diverse body of  fans which enabled it to triumph over internal sectarian divisions. 
In so doing it contested the logic of  politico-sectarian allotment that governed the 
Lebanese sports scene. The club’s history, and more importantly, negotiations 
accompanying the change in its patronage into the hands of  the Hariri establishment in the 
year 2003, provided a unique and rich record of  how patronage is perceived and appraised. 
Chapter Two discusses my field work experience and reflects on how my positionality 
influenced the research I conducted. I discuss the choice of  research topic and explain how 
my ‘insider’ status firstly affected my motivation to implement research in Beirut and 
secondly how it shaped the questions I raised. I then describe the fieldwork experience 
itself; a highly emotive, sensory and memory-laden engagement. I end the chapter with a 
reflection on the epistemological contribution my research makes to the literature 
concerning a region and a field which continue to suffer from the effects of  an orientalist 
gaze. 
Through a narration of  the history of  Nejmeh in the third chapter, I introduce the social, 
demographic, and political context in the city of  Beirut. I trace the historical development 
of  an ambivalent relationship between Beirut and its suburbs showing how this has fed 
into the current political crisis in Lebanon and into a parallel schism within the club which 
is split along sectarian, political and spatial lines. The club’s own development mirrors the 
evolving political sentiments of  Beirut’s residents, starting with anti-colonial nationalism in 
the 1940s, through the rise of  Arab nationalist and leftist parties, the Palestinian resistance 
movement, and later Shiite political bodies. Nejmeh’s evolution highlights the complexities 
of  inclusion and exclusion amid historical and politically driven claims of  rootedness in the 
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city and representations of  the immigrants from the rural communities as intruders on 
urban living. Nejmeh, which for decades was an inclusive space for members of  several 
religious communities of  Lebanon and had striven to be a club for ‘the whole of  Lebanon’, 
was at a crucial turning point in the years 3006 -2006 which for many fans was a time of  
rupture which split club fandom and membership and confined the club within one 
political leader’s faction.  
Chapters Four to Seven present both accounts and analysis of  ethnographic research 
implemented with Nejmeh members and fans. The chapters follow a rough chronology of  
events which took place in the club since 1990 in the post civil war period. The same 
chapters also go down the hierarchy of  the clientelistic relations woven around the Hariri 
Establishment, starting with the patronage or the top rank of  the elite, moving to discuss 
the position of  the bourgeoisie and then the clients or member of  the lower class. 
In Chapter Four, I describe the transition of  the club into the patronage of  the Hariri 
Establishment and I show the economic and social conditions of  the late 1990s and the 
early twenty-first century which necessitated such a transition. I present what I call the 
‘Hariri model’; large scale performative use of  wealth in politics, business, and philanthropy 
which have continued to characterise the leadership style of  Lebanon's post war 
entrepreneurial elite. The model weds neoliberal economic policies and the myth of  the 
ability to make dreams a reality with the long established clientelistic and sectarian 
networks. Together these work to establish the emergent leader's constituency and support 
base and to produce what Baumann calls a 'super za’im' (2012a). The chapter reveals how 
Hariri emerged as the only possible candidate who could ensure the viability of  the club as 
its management struggled with the demands posed by increasing commercialisation of  
sports and the dwindling of  economic resources. 
Chapter Five moves away from examination of  the club's patrons and focuses on the next 
tier down in the hierarchy, the management which consists predominantly of  members of  
Beirut’s bourgeoisie. I trace the difference in both the power and the attitude of  board 
members in the pre and post Hariri periods before briefly presenting two contrasting 
models of  club presidents. The pre-Hariri model of  board members who I call the 
'charitable industrialists' belonged to the industrial bourgeoisie and I argue that they 
exhibited relative independence from the political and financial patronage of  the za’im. The 
second model, present under Hariri patronage, is that of  the 'professional entrepreneur' 
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who is at the service of  the za’im and dependent on him for both club funding and access 
to lucrative business opportunities.  
In the following two chapters I look at the relationship between the Hariri establishment 
and their constituency at the popular level. In Chapter Six I explore both the practice and 
the understanding of  elections and the functioning of  the tools and structures of  
‘democracy’. Tracing the voting process for electing board members within the club, as well 
as the national parliamentary elections, I argue that far from being tools to ensure 
democratic representation, elections are instruments for elite consolidation. I show how the 
2009 parliamentary elections were used to consolidate clientelistic ties through the 
provision of  one-off  opportunities for the disbursement of  money by the patrons.  I 
suggest that the distribution of  funds also strengthened the clientelist habitus by creating 
affective and performative bonds that tied Hariri to his constituency. I argue that the elite 
benefited from a fantasy of  the state constructed around the neoliberal ideology of  ‘the 
good life’ and the bureaucratic performance of  democratic elections. In parallel, the two 
elections which took place in the club during the ‘Hariri Era’ also rhetorically adhered to 
official bureaucratic democratic systems, which were effectively used to ensure the Hariri 
establishment’s complete control over the club.  
In Chapter Seven I discuss in more depth the incongruity which existed between the 
rhetoric of  state institutions and the real life prevalence of  corruption. Against the 
backdrop of  escalating violence in Beirut, the chapter explores the rhetorical and symbolic 
aspects of  the vocal (and at times violent) performance of  loyalty by football fans within 
Nejmeh as well as the role played by strong-arm men in their support of  the Hariri 
Establishment. I highlight the duality of  the Hariri Establishment’s approach of  adopting a 
discourse which publicly rejected sectarianism and violence whilst relying heavily on armed 
men who worked under the guise of  being legitimate employees of  a private security firm. 
The result of  this duplicity was rupture along sectarian lines within both the club and the 
city. 
I conclude the thesis by summarising the ways in which apparently contradictory practices 
and rhetoric hold within them the inherent potential to sustain a seemingly fickle political 
system. Against the backdrop of  a dystopic sports and political scene in Lebanon, I 
highlight the key transformation in the relationship between political elites and their 
constituencies brought forward by the emergence of  the new model of  entrepreneurial 
elite. I summarise ways in which the consolidation of  power, facilitated by the spectacular 
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use of  wealth in politics, and promises of  a better future has reshaped the clientelistic 
hierarchies in the post-war period. I end by presenting some prospects for further related 
research. 
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2 
The Researcher within the Context 
 
‘Every theoretical explanation is a reduction of  intuition’ 
(Høeg 1993: 39) 
‘There is no Escape 
Said the fugitive when the roads closed-on on him 
Oh God, where can I hide 
When the city is full of  my friends?’ 
Mourid Barghouti (1997: 144)27 
 
Beirut Streets: Snapshots of  the Political Scene 
Saturday night, during the first week of  February 2008. Saad Rafic Hariri was on TV mobilising his 
followers to join the demonstration planned to take place a few days later in the central Martyr Square. As 
had been the custom since 2005, huge demonstrations were planned for February 14 to commemorate the 
third anniversary of  the assassination of  late Prime Minister Rafic Hariri. 
This was one of  the ‘ordinary’ Saturday nights of  that turbulent time in Beirut. I was planning to go out 
with friends for a drink, but I delayed leaving to listen to the televised speech by the young wannabe zaʿim. 
From less than 100 meters away outside, I could hear gunshots being continuously fired into the air by 
supporters celebrating their leader’s on-screen appearance: a practice which was becoming a standard 
accompaniment to every speech of  every Lebanese political leader. 
The politico-sectarian allegiance within the neighbourhood I was living in was not clearly defined at the time; 
we, the residents, expected bullets to be fired not only when Hariri spoke, but also when his political 
opponent Nasrallah appeared on TV. Qanṭari, my neighbourhood which borders downtown Beirut, had a 
                                                 
27  Poem by Palestinian poet Mourid Barghouti is originally in Arabic – translation is mine.  
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mostly Christian Armenian and Muslim Sunni population before the war. As in many west Beirut 
neighbourhoods, a significant percentage of  the Christian population was displaced, by will or by force, 
during the civil war and the space they abandoned was subsequently taken over by predominantly Shiite 
families who had also been displaced from their own southern Lebanese villages by the war with Israel 
(Beyhum 1991). While the majority of  the Shiite families left after being compensated during the post war 
period, the Christian population did not return. Instead, most of  the members of  the Christian community 
sold the now valuable town centre properties to developers who replaced small scale antiquated buildings 
with hideous new residential apartment blocks now inhabited by mostly Sunni and Shiite Muslim families. 
On one side of  the street I lived on stood the run down houses of  mostly Sunni Muslims; inherited humble 
dwellings whose sites could offer the residents a chance of  prosperity if  sold for high rise residential 
redevelopment. On the other side of  the street were houses still inhabited by a small mostly Shiite 
population who remained in the shabby houses whose owners never reclaimed them after the war28. 
Heavy firing continued after the speech was completed, its sound oppressing the neighbourhood residents who 
had endured many years of  civil war. For them the sound of  bullets and fireworks in Beirut inevitably 
reawakened the memories and fears of  many past wars. I heard the sounds immediately audible that 
moment as well as remembered sounds that lingered in my memory from the Lebanese civil war which ended 
in 1990. That February night in 2008 I heard the cacophonous rhythmic firing, caught the smell of  gun 
powder, felt the acuteness of  the silence of  everything but the bullets once the firing started, and was aware 
of  the increase in my heart rate. All my other senses joined in the listening, and I heard the bullets not 
through my ears alone, but through my whole body. 
After suffering this auditory agony for more than fifteen minutes, one of  my neighbours went on to her 
balcony and shouted at the exultant young men: ‘Do you not have any manners, don’t you know that there 
are people who would be troubled by the firing?’ The young men took this as an opportunity to further 
establish their authority by asserting their masculinity: ‘Do you not have any men who could come and talk 
to us? Is it only women who speak in your household?’ Those firing the bullets won, as the single young 
woman retreated to her empty house. 
I left the house after the speech ended, and came back late that night to find the same group of  men, who 
were in their early twenties, standing at one of  the corners as is the habit of  young men in Beirut who have 
little else to do. Yet this time I felt their dominance and the threat of  their presence. In a few months they 
had transformed from the familiar young kids of  the neighbourhood to become its menaces. They had 
                                                 
28  While the description of  the neighbourhood is based on my personal observations and conversations 
with residents, it is in line with literature on the demographic changes in Beirut, particularly in areas 
adjacent to Beirut Central District. See for example Gebhardt, et. al (2005) and Sawalha (2010). 
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succeeded in putting the neighbourhood under their control, using the authority of  weapons even if  not firing 
at any particular person; they dominated the place by displaying violence and masculinity. Much of  their 
power was achieved through the production of  noise, just as a police car gains power through the sound of  
its sirens. 
The war’s memory gave potency to their intimidating gunfire despite local peoples’ implicit knowledge that 
none of  the neighbours in particular were direct targets. The fear people lived with then was not of  the 
bullets themselves or of  the threat of  being subjected to violence then and there, but more of  the growing 
power of  those trigger-happy young men on the streets and the possibility that the country might descend into 
chaos, again. 
Introduction 
I describe this incident which took place early in my field work so as to give the reader a 
glimpse of  the political scene on the streets of  Lebanon when I embarked on this research. 
Although not an incident directly related to football or one where I had a central role, the 
events of  that evening are useful in introducing the key elements that have shaped how I 
defined my research and how I have approached it methodologically. 
In the sections that follow, I make use of  the concept of  ‘relational positionality’ proposed 
by Crossa who argues that a ‘researcher’s identities are shaped by multiple mobile and 
flexible relations’ (2012: 115). My research also recognises that ‘the insider/outsider binary 
in reality is a boundary that is not only highly unstable but also one that ignores the 
dynamism of  positionalities in time and through space’ (Mullings 1999: 340). While aware 
of  the fluidity of  identity and the limitations of  a simplified labelling of  my position in the 
field as ‘insider’, I still posit myself  as an insider in the research I conducted. I was born in 
Beirut and spent most of  my adult life there and knew the city and its people more than 
any other place in the world. Critical to my research experience though, were a number of  
themes that speak to the concept of  relational positionality and seek to complicate what 
this positing entails and the dynamism that it incorporates. 
A key theme is that of  distance. I knew Beirut well, not only at an intellectual level, but also 
in an intimate, sensory and emotive way. At different stages of  the research I negotiated the 
distance between myself  and the city. I was mindful of  the ways in which this distance 
could either enlighten or obscure my understanding of  the place and its people. In 
conducting research I sought intellectual distance that would allow me insights that might 
have been obscured by my intimacy with the city, yet I also recognised that my intimate 
knowledge of  the place often contributed directly to my understanding. At other times I 
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was distanced not through my intellectual effort as a researcher, but by the armed men on 
Beirut’s streets, or by youths in my neighbourhood as I described at the beginning of  this 
chapter. Beirut then was not the city I perceived as mine, and it often appeared alien and 
obscure as I was pushed out to its margin. Although less familiar to me then, I found in 
ethnographic research a path that enabled me to approach the transformed space of  the 
city. Beyond fieldwork, I struggled when I wrote about Beirut. It was difficult to condense 
my knowledge of  the city or choose only a snippet to narrate, in English linear prose as a 
background chapter for this thesis. 
A second theme concerns the temporality of  the research. While fieldwork was conducted 
within a clearly defined time-frame constructed around my need to travel to Beirut to start 
fieldwork and then to return to the UK to start the writing process, the actual temporality 
of  the research extends well beyond the fieldwork phase itself  and touches on both the 
past and the future. Having lived in Beirut for most of  my life, I inevitably drew on a fund 
of  memories which tinged both the research process and my relationship to the city. My 
knowledge of  Beirut and of  past events there influenced the way I came to understand the 
city during fieldwork. Similarly, as an ‘insider’, I was embroiled in the city’s future and 
present concerns; the perceived consequences of  any given event affected how I 
interpreted and valued it. My insider status therefore guided my choice of  topics to 
research, and it also influenced my intention that this research might contribute to the city’s 
future. 
A third theme related to my positionality involves the degree to which I, as a researcher, am 
implicated in the research and the research site. While closely related to both distance – or 
lack of  it in this case – and the historical knowledge, identification with the malaise of  and 
concern for Lebanon highlights an added emotional layer. I had decided Lebanon was the 
site of  my research before I even formulated the questions with which I was concerned. 
The knowledge I produced had to contribute to a process of  knowledge production about 
Lebanon and the Levant; it in fact had to provide answers that contribute to its betterment.  
As I will explain, in all stages my engagement in this research was highly emotively charged, 
sensory, and historically laden. It was influenced by an overriding desire to contribute to 
knowledge relevant to the society I was living in and, more broadly, to understandings of  
the crises Lebanon has been experiencing. The research was largely shaped by a sense of  
‘we-ness’; I lived and experienced this sense of  belonging to a collective in which memories 
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and concerns for the future were shared among a larger community whose parameters are 
difficult to define. 
In his examination of  the researcher’s emotions in the field, Hage stresses the importance 
of  subjecting emotions to the ‘rational analytical order’, but without ‘reducing them to 
“analysable” data’ (2010: 152). He argues that a process of  vacillation needs to take place in 
regard to emotional immersion, where ‘ethnographers have to continuously negotiate the 
terms under which emotions are subjected to “observation” and constantly “safeguard 
them in their savage state” in the very process through which they are experienced’ (Hage 
2010: 152). As a researcher and anthropologist, I found it necessary to bring to the surface 
not only my emotional and temporal involvement with my research community, but for the 
duration of  the research process, to also embrace the process of  ‘ethnographic vacillation’ 
that Hage describes. This process applied not only with regard to emotions, but also 
extended to the degree of  my implication with, and distance from, the context and 
communities of  the people I was researching. 
This chapter is divided into three sections which parallel the three stages of  knowledge 
construction proposed by Altorki and El-Solh (1988), namely (i) choice of  topic, (ii) 
acquisition of  data, and (iii) data analysis and interpretation. I use this model to elaborate 
on my own field work experience, to consider my positionality as a researcher, and to 
reflect on how that positionality influenced the research I conducted (England 1994; 
Crossa 2012). The first section explains my motivation for choosing to implement research 
in Beirut. It outlines the growing antagonism between Beirut’s political and sectarian 
communities, and describes how my knowledge of  the city and its history, as well as my 
intellectual investment in its future has shaped the research questions I raised. In the 
second section I explore ways in which the researcher as an ‘insider’ experiences - rather 
than conducts- the ‘participation’ side of  participant observation, participation being a 
sensory, emotive, and memory-laden engagement. In the third section I consider some of  
the limitations of  writing within a field, and about a region, that continues to struggle with 
the effects of  being the subject of  an epistemological orientalist gaze. 
Choosing the Research Topic: Reframing What is 
‘Already Known’ and Felt 
Narayan, in her critique of  the classification of  the native anthropologist, notes a 
difference in the researcher’s starting point when she is studying her own society; a critique 
that resonated well with my own experience in approaching this research: 
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‘In some ways, the study of  one’s own society involves an inverse process from 
the study of  an alien one. Instead of  learning conceptual categories and then, 
through fieldwork, finding the contexts in which to apply them, those of  us 
who study societies in which we have preexisting experience absorb analytic 
categories that rename and reframe what is already known.’ (Narayan 2003: 
678) 
Although not of  Lebanese origin, I have lived in Lebanon for the best part of  my life 
including ten years during the civil war as a child, and consider Beirut my home city. At the 
outset of  research I was in search of  conceptual explanations that would help me analyse 
the fractures and changes taking place in the already fragmented Lebanese socio-political 
situation - changes that I expected to make a direct impact on my day-to-day life and 
future. Engaging in this research was thus motivated by the need to make use of  academic 
literature to disambiguate a long, personal, and intense experience of  living through 
conflict. While this aim echoes the ideas of  Narayan, my personal motivation involved an 
additional emotional layer, meaning that my quest was not purely cognitive, but heightened 
by a sense of  urgency and importance which was driven by the growing possibility of  
Lebanon returning to civil war. 
Before I focus more closely on the particular concerns that have shaped the formulation of  
my research questions, it might be useful to briefly situate the incident described at the start 
of  this chapter within the broader political dynamics in Lebanon at the time. As I will 
explain in Chapter Three, the country was divided politically between two camps; firstly, the 
March 14 political camp, represented by Hariri, leader of  Future Movement, and secondly, 
the March 8 camp led by Hezbollah. 
On the afore mentioned Saturday night, Hariri’s speech was unexceptional and his TV 
appearances were not scarce. Fireworks and bullets as a show of  force on almost every 
street corner where Hariri had supporters had been the usual accompaniment to each of  
his speeches. Parallel sets of  bullets accompanied the speeches of  his political opponents, 
fired by their own supporters. On my street there was yet another group – a dozen young 
men who lived down the road and cheered for Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s chairman, whenever 
he appeared on TV.  With the tightening of  the political debacle, the competition between 
the political groups and their supporters’ shows of  force became worse. 
On the narrow streets of  Beirut, firing in the air was only one of  many manifestations of  
the re-militarisation of  the city. Young men dressed in civilian or military clothes, some 
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openly and some covertly carrying weapons, occupied every corner. There were check-
points at every intersection manned by the army, the internal security forces, and by private 
security firms around the houses of  political leaders. Every day I passed two army tanks on 
my way to an internet cafe which was a mere five minute walk from my house. My friends 
joked that one day, they would wake up to find a check point between their bedroom and 
the bathroom; a joke that shows just how intrusive and imposing that militarised presence 
felt. 
In that same period early in 2008, and for about a year previously Beirut had also been 
witnessing street clashes between - and at times within - the conflicting political factions. 
While some escalated into gunfights and caused death and injury that papers reported, 
many never made it to the news. Militarisation of  the streets and ensuing street clashes 
meant that discussion in that period was dominated by speculation about how and when a 
new civil war would break out, and if  it did, who would control which area of  the city29. 
Especially important were the questions of  which party would control the area where you 
lived, and whether or not your political or sectarian allegiance coincided with that of  that 
party. To answer such questions people examined the sectarian composition of  their 
neighbourhood’s population and the militias that dominated it during the war. More 
current factors were the allegiance of  the armed groups on its streets, and if  they were 
many groups, which of  these groups fired more loudly and / or prevailed when street 
clashes occurred. Also of  prime importance was the visual marking of  the space, and the 
examination of  which zaʿim’s, or faction’s, graffiti, banners and pictures prevailed on the 
street. Posting a picture of  a certain zaʿim or removing that of  another was often enough 
to spark a clash. 
Ironically, the public discourse of  all political parties was against militarisation. At the core 
of  the political conflict ravaging the country was the dispute as to who had legitimate 
authority to hold arms, particularly after the 2004 UN Security Council resolution 1559 
which centred around Hezbollah disarmament. Hezbollah’s public message was that its 
arms were justified as they were only for the ‘legitimate resistance against Israel’. Hezbollah 
claimed that the Israeli occupation continued in the disputed Chebaa farms, and that past 
experience with Israel made a military presence near the mostly Shiite border areas 
                                                 
29  See for example Ghaddar, Hanin (2008). “A Recipe for War?” NowMedia 
https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/a_recipe_for_war  - Accessed 9/11/2014. 
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necessary for its own protection - a task they rightly argued that the Lebanese army had 
never been able or willing to take responsibility for. The political argument used by the pro-
Hariri camp was that since the withdrawal of  the Israeli army from South Lebanon in 2000, 
there was no longer a need for any armed resistance in Lebanon. They argued that one 
party holding on to its weapons undermined the sovereignty of  the state and endangered 
civil peace and members of  other sectarian groups. Hezbollah pledged that its arms would 
never be used internally, but accused the Future Movement and its March 14 allies of  
secretly attempting to form a militia. In a similar way, Hariri and March 14 denied such 
accusations and maintained a rhetoric that affirmed state sovereignty and emphasised both 
the history of  the Hariri establishment in social and educational philanthropy and its non-
involvement in the Lebanese civil war. 
It was from this context of  escalation and increased militarisation of  the Lebanese 
conflicts that my research questions emerged. My questions were motivated by ‘personal 
anguish over social and political conditions’ in the country I normally called home (Altorki 
and El-Solh 1988: 10). The situation instigated my quest for answers, and as questions 
emerged, I was at that stage not looking conceptually at writing on clientelism, power, and 
corruption and I could not readily identify that this was the body of  literature best suited 
for my inquiries - nor could I see how my research might contribute to this literature. I was, 
as Narayan points out, in the middle, looking from the opposite direction; looking out 
from a live and fluid situation and searching for conceptual frameworks with which to 
understand it. This process though was not a linear one with a conceptual starting point 
and an empirical end point – or vice versa - but a dialogical one that continues to vacillate 
between the two poles in anthropological scholarly work.  
The sections below further explain some of  the background for this research, providing a 
sense of  the context from which research questions emerged. I shall explain how I engaged 
with events, and show how events themselves shaped my enquiry.  
The Zaʿim and His Strong-Arm Men 
As the antagonism and division within the city grew, one area that I questioned was the 
negotiation of  relationships between political leaders, the loud youths on the streets, and 
other residents of  Beirut who were affected by the conflict and militarisation 
Peteet in her work on Palestinian graffiti during the first intifada, asserted its role as a 
‘territorial marker’ (1996: 149). She explains that ‘territorialisation read through political 
signs encoded an ability not only to be there but to mobilise youths in an area to undertake 
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risky actions’ (1996: 149); political signs - like bullets fired in the air – are ways of  showing 
power within, and hegemony over, a certain area. Who was it though that chose the streets 
of  Beirut as the site where power would be displayed, and who or what was behind this 
territorialisation? 
On the one hand, it was safe to say that the militarisation I saw was an organised process; 
political groups were arming youths despite their public anti-violence rhetoric. I knew 
those squabbles on the street were not accidental; they did not happen only because there 
was tension between the various politico-sectarian groups but because some leaders were 
paying and arming their supporters. While youths on the street were the ones in arms, few 
of  them actually bought the bullets they wasted, the guns they fired from, or even the 
fireworks that lit up the neighbourhood. The Lebanese zuʿama had reserved an appropriate 
budget to ensure they were heard. While some youths took part because of  financial 
compensation from political leaders and because of  a lack of  other economic 
opportunities, they still were supporters of  the leader they cheered for, be it Hariri as a 
Sunni leader or any of  his opponents. Without such political and monetary support they 
would probably not have joined because their loyalty was not sufficient in itself  for them to 
pay for arms to hold on their leader’s behalf. 
Yet there were incidents that indicated more of  a bottom-up dynamic. As with domination 
through the production of  noise, which only needed one or two young men with a gun and 
sufficient bullets, domination through pictures and banners required neither wide approval 
from the population nor the efforts of  many supporters. The day after the May 2008 street 
clashes in Beirut, on a visit to the contested and mixed neighbourhood of  Muṣaytịbah, I 
was surprised to find the flags of  one political faction on top of  every column. Knowing 
well the sectarian and political diversity of  the small neighbourhood, I asked my local 
friend who put up the flags, and was told that it was a single young man, who bought the 
flags himself  and went about putting them up. He was a young trouble-maker who had 
previously covered one of  the walls with graffiti and made sure to paint over any other 
graffiti he did not like. Single-handed he imposed his loyalties on the neighbourhood and 
gave the impression that a more powerful group dominated the area. After my friend made 
contact with the political party that the trouble-maker advocated for and advised that the 
flags would cause unnecessary tension, the same young guy eventually took them down. 
The incidents in both my own and my friend’s neighbourhoods encapsulate a key set of  
questions that this research raised. They also provide relevant insights into the context 
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from which the questions emerged, and into the relationship between political elites and 
their constituencies at times of  conflict. My questions specifically explore the role of  actors 
at various levels of  political power in shaping or resisting the growing antagonism in 
Beirut. I questioned how power was negotiated by the young men in arms, by the agents 
trying to recruit them, by the neighbour who tries to silence them, by my friend who used 
his political contacts to minimise their power, or by the political leader whose smile 
radiated out from the posters and over the tense streets. 
Private Sector Led Militias 
Another aspect which characterised the context in Lebanon in the period before and 
during my field work was what appeared to be a novel model adopted by the Hariri 
Establishment for ‘building a militia’. This model relied on ‘subcontracting’ a private 
company to recruit, arm, and train youths, an arrangement which did not fit with how 
those of  us who had experienced the Lebanese war knew militias to be formed, but which 
was nevertheless in line with the establishment’s approach to the private sector’s role in 
governance – apparently in both war and peace. 
At the time, the media reported on shipments of  arms entering the country and young 
men being trained for this or that militia. While Hezbollah was clearly armed, its allies and 
opponents alike were rumoured to be establishing militias. The Hariri establishment, like 
other political groups, was rumoured to be arming and training groups recruited from 
members of  the Sunni sect. Some of  this was obviously true, but there were also many 
exaggerated semi-truths. Yet the Hariri establishment, in keeping with its economic and 
institutional approach, had commissioned a private security firm to implement its ‘security’ 
tasks. The company chosen for that task was Secure Plus, which provided security services 
to private firms and individuals. Secure Plus recruited personnel in both Sunni urban 
quarters and rural villages. In a visit to Bab al-Tabbaneh, a poor urban quarter of  the 
predominantly Sunni northern Lebanese city of  Tripoli, I heard about this recruitment 
process. Applications were being received from young men in the area for positions as 
security personnel with monthly salaries of  less than 500 USD. I heard the same on trips to 
other Sunni, mostly rural areas, for example in the north Lebanese villages of  the Akkar 
district, in the south eastern village of  Chebaa, and amongst residents of  the villages in the 
Iqlim al-Kharub district. All of  these were areas where poverty was acute. Young men from 
these villages who lacked other employment opportunities were attracted by the promise of  
‘good’ monthly remuneration. 
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While I did not study the Secure Plus security company, its activities shaped another key 
research question. A neoliberal mode of  operation was characteristic of  the Hariri 
Establishment, in which the private sector was granted a greater role not only in how it 
approached national policy, but also in its internal management. With respect to the Hariri 
model in which business and politics were mutually entangled, I asked ‘how do economic 
modes of  operation shape the ways in which power is negotiated, and how are political 
relations and alliances constructed?’ It seemed that reliance on the private sector in militia-
building, (an approach in line with a global trend towards privatisation of  security), was 
incompatible with the parallel use of  sectarian discourse, along with kinship and territorial 
ties, in strengthening the establishment’s popular support base. These factors encouraged 
me to also direct my research towards exploring continuities that existed between seemingly 
distinct institutional or modern modes of  governance and long-entrenched sectarianism 
and clientelistic modes of  governance. 
Beyond the Moment of  Crisis 
The moment of  crisis that Lebanon was going through was not the country’s first, and like 
others around me who had lived in Lebanon for decades, I could connect the present 
political tension with longer term trends and socio-political changes which the country had 
experienced in the post war period. While the assassination of  Rafic Hariri in 2005 
signalled the escalation of  the political crisis, I chose not to limit my research to covering 
this timespan alone. The combination of  these events certainly affected my choice of  
research community and topic, but I wanted to identify a space or a group that would allow 
me to explore events and relationships that predated the current crisis and to observe how 
they have shaped it. 
I had already ‘started’ fieldwork when I decided on the football community as my main 
research interest. I originally went to the field to study mobility patterns of  service drivers 
within the city’s growing territorial divisions. One of  the drivers I interviewed referred to 
football and to conflict within and between clubs and fans over the past decade, well before 
the overt political crisis, and his remarks led me to football. After one interview with a 
sports journalist, I realised that the set of  relationships and power structures that existed in 
football clubs would enable me to achieve some historical depth - an approach that I 
thought would protect my analysis from becoming constrained to current allegiances and 
formations alone. At any moment in time political and sectarian antagonism can appear 
wholly rigid and divisive, yet my examination of  the same sets of  relationships over a 
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longer period allowed me to avoid reproducing any simplistic binary division between the 
two political camps, March 8 and March 14. By adopting an approach that took account of  
historical dimensions I was able to explore how flux and transformation were continuous 
and on-going processes. 
To return to Peteet’s (1996) work on graffiti: in Lebanon, unlike the West Bank, battles 
involving competitive displays of  graffiti, banners, and territorial control achieved via the 
use of  aggressive sound were waged between two relatively equal actors who had various 
arenas of  competition. These spaces included the media, elections and broader political 
processes. The clashes and competition staged on the streets were not separate from the 
national level electoral competition and regional political disputes. Searching beyond the 
moment of  crisis, I sought to understand the relationship between public and exceptional 
moments of  political crisis which were often characterised by violence, on the one hand, 
and often unseen dynamics and relationships operating in other institutional and political 
arenas, on the other.  
Acquisition of  Data: Studying Nejmeh Football Club 
(and Beyond)  
Crossa stresses that recognising positionality as a ‘central component in the production of  
knowledge entails a self-introspective or critical reflexive exercise which is necessary to 
identify power relations embedded in the research process’ (2012: 115). In the first 
subsection I reflect on my positionality at the time of  data collection, looking at how 
different identities – and / or perceptions of  such identities – have influenced my access to, 
and role within, the field especially as a woman in a mostly male context (Altorki and El-
Solh, 1988). In the second subsection I also seek to expand this reflexive exercise further, 
by discussing how being an insider influenced what I perceived as ‘data’ and how, as an 
insider, I ‘experienced’ the field. 
Questions of  Access and Positionality 
I did fieldwork in what I defined as my home city. My ‘research community’ was even 
closer; Nejmeh club stadium was situated a mere ten- minute walk from the house where I 
was born and had spent my childhood. It was in the electoral district where I voted, that is 
the one in which Hariri was elected as a member of  parliament. I knew Beirut well and I 
have studied, worked and lived in different neighbourhoods within it. As such I could easily 
be categorised as an ‘insider’ researcher, yet defining oneself  as an insider is merely one of  
the identities that have influenced my position in the field. 
75 
With reference to the stage of  data acquisition for the ‘indigenous’ researcher, Altorki and 
El-Solh (1988) discuss issues of  ‘access’ as being influenced by kinship ties. They also 
consider how a ‘role in the field’ can be influenced by class origin, education, indigeneity 
and gender in addition to a multiplicity of  variables including age, marital status, religious 
affiliation, ethnic/minority status, topic, location, political realities, personality and sex 
segregation. 
My access to the sports community and my role within it were no doubt shaped by several 
of  the variables better summarised as a web of  relations and connections that I was part of  
or had access to. While kinship ties were of  importance to many of  my research 
participants, I had little recourse to such ties as I am of  Palestinian origin with no extended 
family in Lebanon. Instead I found that my network of  personal and professional 
relationships was far more instrumental. To give a few examples, my first sports related 
interview was secured for me by a football referee who I had previously worked with; this 
man also worked as a driver in a non-governmental organisation in which I was employed. 
Access to Nejmeh was through another ex-colleague, whose work with the Ministry of  
Youth and Sports on youth-related legislation put him in contact with a Nejmeh official to 
whom he introduced me. I had not realised the power of  such personal networks until I 
tried to get access to Al-Ansar Sporting Club, Nejmeh’s rival football club. After months of  
unsuccessfully trying to get access to the club management, I discovered that the club’s 
Vice President at the time, Karim Diab, attended university with the husband of  a close 
friend of  mine. This connection meant that I was granted access to the club from the 
highest authority: the Vice President’s personal email address and phone number were 
made available to me almost immediately following a one line email sent by that friend. 
Reflecting on such networks is important to both ‘identify power relations embedded in the 
research process’ as Crossa suggests (2012: 115), and to understand how I as a researcher 
became part of  the web of  clientelist relationships that I ended up studying. Returning to 
the example of  Al-Ansar sporting Club, it was my educated middle class background and 
not my family ties that allowed me access to Karim Diab and through him to Al-Ansar 
club.  
The implications of  these relationships on my perceived role in the field were only evident 
later. Having such informal access to Diab led club members and fans to assume that I had 
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the same political views as Diab30. This might have been the result not only of  my choice 
of  gate-keeper, but also how I related to that gate-keeper. For example, during one of  the 
earliest Al-Ansar football games, making use of  the small size of  the stadium we were in, I 
left my seat in the ranks with the fans to thank Diab for allowing me access and to update 
him on the progress of  the research. Still new to the football community at the time, I only 
noticed later the performative aspect of  that move, and the impression that it projected of  
me and my ability to casually approach and talk to Diab. 
While my access to Diab was possible because of  class and personal relations, it was 
perceived by fans as representing political and sectarian belonging and, by implication, 
placed me in a position of  power, as a broker who has direct links to people with authority, 
that I did not necessarily have or use. I soon realised that some fans were trying to send 
messages to Diab about the performance of  the club or the politics of  Future Movement 
through me; messages that I not only missed at the beginning of  my research, but that were 
never relayed. 
The second key element that influenced my role in the field and is worth elaborating on is 
my position as a female researcher studying a predominantly male community in a relatively 
sex segregated cultural context. This has at times meant easier access to some research 
participants, but it has also required me to be vigilant about maintaining the limits of  
relationships with the mostly male research participants. The period at the beginning of  my 
research was mired by too many unwanted sexual advances and continuous scrutiny of  the 
‘appropriateness’ of  my behaviour to the perceived gender roles I was supposed to play. 
Looking at day-to-day conflicts within the football community that I have witnessed or 
been told about, I know that often these were small inter-personal power struggles that 
were deliberately exaggerated or staged as performances of  ‘masculinity’ for my benefit. 
My limited knowledge of  football was another element which situated me as an outsider in 
the Nejmeh community. Until I started this research I had not been to a single football 
match and did not know much about the rules, technique, or history. I did not know the 
names of  star players nor those of  the Lebanese Football Association members, but most 
important of  all, I did not know what football fandom really meant and how is it that an 
individual comes to love a club so deeply. 
                                                 
30  Karim Diab was politically aligned with Sunni leader Saad Hariri and is the son of  the coordinator of  
the Future Movement at the time Salim Diab. 
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A fourth element to take into consideration was the familiarity of  research participants 
with anthropological research and their past experiences with inquiring visitors. Within a 
community that was little researched, my interest in the club and my research participants’ 
experiences and perspectives were a source of  pride for many. Most fans were eager to 
speak to me about the club they cherished despite not fully comprehending what it was I 
was attempting to do. My role approximated to that of  others they knew, like reporters and 
filmmakers. I was often introduced by them as a journalist, who as one fan expressed it ‘has 
been trying for two years to do a reportage about Nejmeh’. My presence reinforced for 
them the value of  the club; it was worthy of  research and documentation. 
The above are but a few of  many examples of  the web of  relations that I was entangled in, 
and they show some of  the factors which influenced both my access to the field and 
perceptions of  my role within it. These examples support Crossa’s affirmation of  the 
importance of  the ‘relational aspect of  a researcher’s position’, or ‘how researchers’ 
identities are shaped by multiple mobile and flexible relations and how that makes a 
difference to the research process.’ (2012: 115). I was perceived by some as insider, a 
Beiruti, Lebanese, Arab, who was assumed to share similar world views and beliefs, while 
for others I was also an outsider to the world of  football, a Palestinian, an academic, a 
woman, and a member of  a higher social class. There was no one role that was assigned to 
me unanimously by all research participants nor one that lasted for the duration of  my 
fieldwork. The implications of  my many supposed roles and perceptions varied from one 
research participant to another as I worked across various social classes as well as different 
political and sectarian affiliations. Bearing in mind anthropology’s reflexive tradition, I was 
constantly engaged in negotiation and reflection both on these roles themselves and on the 
influence they exerted over the ways I perceived the context within which I was doing 
research. 
The ‘Participant’ in Participant Observation 
As I sat down that night in February to write ethnographic notes on the incident described 
at the beginning of  this chapter, I wondered to what extent it could be described as an 
ethnographic encounter and I questioned myself  about its value in my research. What I 
wrote about was personal, subjective, and largely experienced in my own mind and body 
and not in my encounters with research participants. The value of  the incident only 
emerged as I discussed it with friends who had lived in Lebanon during the war and 
experienced shooting in the city in a similar way. They also spoke of  the way that hearing 
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gunfire simultaneously evoked memories of  the civil war and fear of  its return. This was a 
subjective experience, and I needed not only to be reflexive about it as a researcher and 
understand its limits, but also to appreciate its value in problematising how war and 
violence are lived over time. It seemed that the experience might assist me in expanding 
understanding of  the ‘participation’ of  the researcher when she is an insider. 
Following Adorno, Bull and Back assert that ‘sounds are embedded with both cultural and 
personal meanings; sounds do not come at us merely raw’ (2003: 9). The noise of  gunfire 
on that night carried with it cultural meanings that I could understand, interpret and work 
with in my writing. My flatmate at the time, who was raised in Germany and had little 
direct experience of  war, heard the bullets as mere noise. For her the shooting did not bear 
the burden of  significance that it did for me, nor the threat of  an imminent war, or the 
possibility of  daily life becoming constrained by the whims of  young men in arms. 
The experience also heightened my awareness of  how I ‘take in’ the world around me as I 
do research, and the importance of  ‘broadening the senses of  sense’ as Bull and Back 
suggest (2003: 2). The soundscape of  not only my neighbourhood, but also that of  the 
stadium and the offices of  sports clubs became important parts of  my research. As I will 
describe the silence of  the stadiums during football games, much more than the sight of  
the empty seats, encapsulated what the sports scene in Beirut looked like. In their 
introduction to ‘The Auditory Reader’ (2003) Bull and Back argue that research dependent 
on sight and vision objectifies the world, and that the ‘engulfing multi-directionality’ of  
sound allows us ‘to perceive the relationship between subject and object, inside and 
outside, and the public and private altogether differently’ (2003: 4). Adding to that, the 
authors describe the ‘states of  ‘we-ness’ or ‘being with’ which are inherent in experiencing 
sound. 
They propose that ‘sound connects us in ways that vision does not’ and argue for the 
existence of  a ‘we-ness’ beyond the present moment that connects past, present and future 
in just the way my experience of  the shooting indicates. Bull and Back again argue that ‘it 
may be that within the registers of  aural culture that memories are carried’. In the case of  
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Lebanon, that register of  aural culture extends beyond music and song, to a soundscape of  
bombs, bullets and chaos31. 
That ‘state of  we-ness’ extends beyond sound and is at the heart of  some of  the lived 
experiences of  conflict and war. Doing research in Beirut at the time was like being on an 
aeroplane that is about to crash; there was imminent danger and you were scared and so 
were others around you. Brought together by these feelings of  insecurity the people on the 
plane are a collective of  a sort even if  a temporary one with little besides the plane travel to 
connect them. The fear itself  is collective, for everyone asks themselves ‘what will happen 
to us?’ knowing that individual survival is not possible. Unlike a plane journey where the 
members and boundaries of  the collective are known, in Beirut the ‘we’ or collective was 
difficult to define. Yet a great part of  the experience of  fear is collective and cannot be 
lived individually. Whatever choice you personally made you were bound to be greatly 
affected by the war if  it took place and the gravity of  the events. Even if  you had the 
choice to protect yourself  or your family, your community would be affected, and so would 
your spaces of  memory and your expectations for the future. In this sense, ‘participant 
observation’ gains a different meaning; participation here extends well beyond taking part 
in the here and now and comes to involve too the sharing of  memories, as well as future 
expectations and concerns. 
Data Analysis and Engaging with Anthropological 
Theory 
Moving forward through the cycle of  knowledge production I described previously and 
benefiting from anthropological theory prompted another set of  reflection and questions. 
For example, what body of  knowledge am I as a researcher making use of  and contributing 
to? How has my ‘insider’ status as well as my professional background impacted on analysis 
of  the data I obtained in the field and the conceptual frameworks I chose to relate to? 
While Crossa affirms that ‘the literature on positionality says little about how the selection 
of  a research topic and theoretical framework is also a positionality issue’ (2012: 117), 
feminist as well as postcolonial literatures have long affirmed the importance of  critical 
reflection on the epistemological field within which one writes. While engaged in fieldwork 
                                                 
31  It is no coincidence then that Ziad Rahbani, in the 1987 song 'Oudak rannan’ ('Your Lute is Resonant' – 
my translation) sung by the Lebanese diva Fairouz finishes the lively song with an emulation of  the 
sound of  firing bullets to accompany other musical instruments, recreating in part the country's 
soundscape during the war. 
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the researcher might be capable of  maintaining a consciousness of  her own positionality, 
but this practice is a much more difficult one to sustain once one starts analysis and writing. 
In the two short sections below I present the difficulties I encountered in the analysis stage 
of  my work. I show how these issues sometimes limited my theoretical engagement with 
the material - a problem that I am aware I have yet to overcome.  
Beyond Policy Oriented Research and Analysis 
At the beginning of  this chapter I noted how my research questions were motivated by my 
concern about political developments within Lebanon and by my desire to comprehend 
existing experiences. This ‘concern’, alongside the pressure exerted by informants for 
research to produce remedies to the ills of  the sports scene and to the increasing violence 
and the derelict Lebanese political system, often cast a shadow over the analysis process. 
With reference to the concept of  relational positionality, my professional background 
further exacerbated these difficulties and impacted on the perspective with which I 
approached the work I was doing. Working in the fields of  human rights, development, and 
peace-building for over a decade, I had been accustomed to a perspective that asks for 
research to provide ‘recommendations’ and ‘policies’. I was used to the idea that 
understanding needed to be closely followed by providing answers that allow for 
intervention. 
The chosen subject matter itself  contributes to this compulsion. Clientelism has been 
central in policy literature which has dealt with Lebanon’s predicaments in terms of  good 
governance and peace-building. Such literature has presented clientelism as a key element 
of  sectarian antagonism (Picard and Ramsbotham 2012) and as an obstacle to 
democratisation and horizontal mobilisation (Abou Assi 2006). Critiques of  the concept 
have long paralleled the production of  scholarly literature about it, and anthropological and 
social writing have further problematised the concept, noting its ubiquity and its endurance 
even in so called modern democratic societies. Yet policy writing remains entrapped in a 
dominant trope of  the literature, which sees clientelism as an ill of  ‘traditional’ societies 
and fundamentally opposed to the construction of  the ‘modern’ state and its institutions. 
Clientelism, according to reports, was one of  eleven core problems leading to conflict in 
Lebanon (Kraft et al. 2008), one of  four building blocks which reinforce communal 
tensions (ESCWA 2009) and one of  the main causes for any financial crisis (Abou Assi 
2006). 
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Such understandings of  clientelism in Lebanon at the time of  my research were also 
popular ones, reflected in the media and the discourse of  politicians, and even shared with 
me by informants. The evolutionary understanding that ‘clientelism’ was a disease that is 
sure to be remedied by a modernisation process which includes systems of  accountability, 
the rule of  law and popular democratic elections, is a notion that is backed by generously 
funded development and democratisation organisations working under economically and 
politically liberal agendas. 
Although findings from my research supported extant anthropological analysis that blurred 
the boundaries between the so called ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ forms of  socio-political 
organisation, deconstructing this discourse32 was only possible through engaging with other 
literature that has examined the development agenda more critically. What I needed during 
my analysis, was not only to work with compelling anthropological literature and findings 
from field research, but also to deconstruct the widespread discourse that simplified this 
network of  power relations and restricted its understanding to clientelism’s instrumental 
value. 
Epistemological Field 
Approaching the literature from ‘the other side of  the table’ as mentioned earlier, that is 
through a path that starts with experience and searches for conceptual explanations, two 
limitations are apparent in relation to the epistemological field on which I am as a 
researcher relying on and contributing to. 
One limitation is that anthropological contributions committed to the ethnographic, to 
‘everydayness’, are still limited in a region where the political - in particular - has often been 
studied from an international relations perspective, and / or in academic departments in 
distant campuses. In fact, today, possibly the best ethnographic material on Arab countries 
is available in Arabic novels33. It was necessary therefore to adopt a broad multidisciplinary 
approach and make use of  regional literature from other disciplines, including literature, the 
arts, urban studies, in addition to the fields of  sociology and political science. 
                                                 
32  It is important to note that myself  and most other social science graduates working in the not-for profit 
sector in Lebanon – and across many other countries – work within this discourse regardless of  whether 
or not we adhere to it, or have ever reflected on it to start with. 
33  Possibly the best examples of  such novels are the books of  Saudi writer Abdul Rahman Munif, 
particularly the Cities of  Salt quintet, the many novels of  Egyptian writer Naguib Mahfouz and 
Palestinian writer Ibrahim Nasrallah. For Lebanon the work of  Rabih Jaber, particularly his Beirut Trilogy 
and that of  Hoda Barakat have been of  particular value for this research. 
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Another limitation is related to anthropology as a field of  study. Critical perspectives on 
anthropology’s orientalist gaze have long been available (Said 1978; Asad 1973), yet the 
quest of  Arab anthropologists for an ethnographic voice is only just materialising. While 
indeed, ‘an anthropological approach is needed to claim the present tense of  Arab 
everydayness in all its cultural manifestations, to bring it to the fore so that it is assured of  
its time, its being (...)’ (Sabry 2011: 11), the potential for anthropology in the Arab 
countries to produce knowledge of  relevance to its societies is still largely untapped, so is 
its contribution to broader anthropological explorations. 
Deeb and Winegar assert that in the past two decades, ‘scholarly and geopolitical 
developments have inspired new research agendas [within “Arab-majority societies”] and 
approaches that are poised to make significant contributions to anthropology as a whole’ 
(2012: 538). These sources affirm the significant growth in both quantity and scope of  
anthropological work on Arab countries and by Arab anthropologists (Deeb and Winegar, 
2012). Deeb and Winegar also elaborate on significant shifts away from the ‘metonyms’ 
which dominated literature on the region, namely ‘tribes’, ‘gender’ and ‘Islam’ as 
summarised by Abu-Lughod two decades earlier (1989). 
Anthropology of  societies of  the Arab countries has yet to escape both ‘orientalist’ 
perspectives and ‘reverse orientalist’ ones, and to become epistemologically ‘conscious of  
itself  or its parts-of-the-whole’ and ‘conscious of  the historical and conjunctional moments 
to which it is responding’ (Sabry 2011: 2). As a researcher, this ‘epistemological 
consciousness’ or in other words, and according to Sabry again, identifying ‘the plane upon 
which one writes and creates’ is necessary lest the researcher ‘unconsciously, naïvely and 
glibly offer one’s services as a native orientalist’ (2011: 20). This consciousness requires 
effort that is at once critical and creative (Hage 2013), and is, I think, by necessity a product 
of  collective endeavour rather than a merely personal one. Attempting to bring to 
consciousness the mental or intellectual plane upon which this Phd thesis has been written, 
although a necessary endeavour, is a project beyond the scope of  this chapter (or even the 
entire thesis). Awareness for its need and a commitment to contribute to claiming ‘the 
present tense of  Arab everydayness in all its cultural manifestation’ is not. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have discussed how my positionality, in its several manifestations and 
forms, has influenced the way this thesis has been written, and I have also shown how the 
research that it covers has been implemented. I have highlighted how personal and 
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academic investment in a society’s future has impacted not only on the research questions 
raised and on my methods of  analysis, but also on the emotive and sensory dimensions of  
fieldwork. Left unfinished is a reflection on the epistemological field one makes use of  and 
contributes to. 
In the next chapter I return to the football stadium, introducing both Nejmeh club and its 
history, as well as the history of  the club’s home city, Beirut. The context for the 
mobilisation and tension described at the beginning of  this chapter is further explained, as 
are their manifestations within Nejmeh football club, my main research community. 
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3 
Contested Club, Contested City 
 
‘Just as none of  us is outside or beyond geography, none of  us is completely free from the 
struggle over geography. That struggle is complex and interesting because it is not only about 
soldiers and cannons but also about ideas, about forms, about images and imaginings.’ 
Edward Said (1994) 
‘Have you ever entered an empty stadium? Try it. Stand in the middle of  the field and 
listen. There is nothing less empty than an empty stadium. There is nothing less mute than 
stands bereft of  spectators.’ 
Eduardo Galeano (1998) 
 
Hariri and Tariq Al-Jadidah vs Nasrallah and Al-
Dahiyah 
2009, Beirut Municipal Stadium; I am there with the municipal employee responsible for the sports 
stadium. Guarding all entry points are army officers and vehicles - they have been stationed around the 
stadium for years now. In one corner, young boys are playing football, not on the pitch itself but on an open 
space at the edge of  the stadium. In another corner two men are performing the Muslim prayer in what 
appears to be a break from work. Men and veiled middle-aged women in sports shoes are walking around 
the ranks as part of  their daily exercise routine. In the densely populated area of  Tariq Al-Jadidah, tall 
residential buildings surround the stadium. Their balconies look like extensions of  the stadium’s terraces; 
the flags of  favourite teams hang there and residents have the luxury of  watching matches free of  charge.  
As we stand in the directors box, where sports and state officials as well as media personnel usually sit, my 
host points towards the middle block of yellow seats within which a few blue seats form the words ‘Beirut 
Municipal Stadium’. He then points to the blue coloured chairs in the middle saying ‘It is there that they 
used to sit, there where the word ‘Beirut’ is’. He is talking about Nejmeh fans, particularly the ‘zuʿran’ 
(thugs) of  the Chiah neighbourhood.  According to him, they are the troublemakers of  the club, the loud 
fans who create havoc in the stadium and in the neighbourhood on their way out. They would come early, 
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hours before the match, not just to book that place but in anticipation and excitement for the game. The 
space they chose in the centre of the stadium allowed them a good view of  the game. It was also in full sight 
of  sports officials, their club’s administrators and the media: fans knew that the messages that they sent 
from here would be seen and heard by all.  
There was a time when Nejmeh matches, particularly those held in Beirut’s Municipal Stadium, defined the 
football scene in Lebanon. Today, the stadium which was established in the 1930’s no longer hosts sports 
matches between local teams as it does not provide minimum safety standards for either players or officials 
on their way out or in. There is a long-standing ban on the matches of  Nejmeh Sport Club in particular 
because the misbehaviour of  fans proved too difficult to contain in such a densely crowded residential 
neighbourhood. Indeed for five consecutive seasons, fans were banned from attending all local football 
matches, no matter which team was playing in any stadium. 
I try to imagine a day back in the nineties when a Nejmeh match against its long term rival, Al-Ansar, 
took place in the municipal stadium. I construct an imaginary game from the many stories I heard, the news 
I read and the images I saw. Some Nejmeh fans would have walked from the many poor neighbourhoods of  
Al-Dahiyah, Beirut’s Southern Suburbs, making their way along the Souleiman Bosutani road through 
the Tariq Al-Jadidah neighbourhood, home of  both their club and that of  its rival, Al-Ansar. Other fans 
of  both Nejmeh and Al-Ansar would have come from close by. Nejmeh’s fans would have always 
outnumbered those of their rivals no matter which team the club was playing against, and they would come 
well prepared with flags and banners, and yelling or singing many slogans and chants. Some fans would pay 
a donation to the club in addition to the price of  the ticket, while others with little money to spare would 
find ways to climb into the stadium. Some would elicit the sympathy of  the ticket officer and persuade him 
to let them in.  
The stadium would reverberate with the cheering of  the ‘Great Fans of  Nejmeh’ who have impressed sports 
media personnel and other sports teams by their number, their devotion, and their creativity in the stadium. 
The chants would not all be to the media’s taste. Some of  the Shiite Nejmeh fans would chant - to the 
dismay of  some of  the other fans of  the same club -’Allah, Nasrallah, and Al-Dahiyah’ (the Southern 
Suburbs) declaring triple loyalties, a religious one to Allah, to Nasrallah the leader of  the political and 
militant group Hezbollah and to the mostly Shiite neighbourhoods of  the suburbs. The predominantly 
Sunni fans of  rival Al-Ansar club would chant for their leader and neighbourhood: ‘Allah, Hariri, Tariq 
Al-Jadidah’. These two slogans anticipated the division which the city experienced a decade later and were 
used in many later demonstrations, although it was at sports matches that they were first heard. 
Nejmeh fans would probably not leave the stadium as winners, especially not when facing Al-Ansar, the 
club that won all of  Lebanon’s Football Association’s (LFA) championships in the 1990s. Al-Ansar’s 
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success was often attributed by many Nejmeh fans to the LFA’s favouritism towards Al-Ansar which was 
at the time under the patronage of  Prime Minister Rafic Hariri. Departing en masse from Tariq Al-
Jadidah, home of  their rival club, Nejmeh fans’ anger was expressed in the destruction of shops and cars 
presumed to belong to Al-Ansar fans, acts which earned them the title of  the zu’ran, or the mischievous 
football fans. 
 
Figure 8: School children watching an Asia cup match. The words 'Beirut Municipal Stadium' appear in the 
background, spelled out by blue seats amongst yellow seats. 
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Figure 9: Map of  Neighbourhoods in Beirut and the Southern Suburbs. Location of  offices and stadiums of  
selected clubs is indicated. 
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Figure 10: Map of  the 2009 distribution of  electoral districts in Beirut and the Southern Suburbs. 
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Introduction 
In this chapter I introduce Nejmeh Sports Club and its history, a Beiruti institution through 
which the social, demographic, and political changes that the city has experienced can be 
observed. The chapter also introduces the background necessary to contextualise the 
remainder of  the chapters of  this thesis. In particular, it describes the political crisis 
Lebanon was experiencing at the time of this research, showing the tension between the 
Shiite and Sunni communities of  Beirut. I highlight how Sunni communities’ historic 
claims of  rootedness in the city, together with the representation of  Shiite communities as 
alien to – and even unsuited for - urban living, have been used by both factions to lay claim 
over Beirut. The chapter explains how these issues have fed into the dynamics of  inclusion 
and exclusion in the city. 
As noted, sports stadia and clubs – and Nejmeh in particular – are some of  the few spaces 
that can condense the socio-political conflict that Beirut, and Lebanon more broadly, 
experienced in the post civil-war period, particularly in the period preceding the conflict’s 
political escalation in 2005. To explain that conflict, we might start with the two slogans 
that competing sports teams, and later, opposing militant groups and political activists 
adopted, namely ‘Allah, Hariri, and Tariq Al-Jadidah’ and ‘Allah, Nasrallah, and the Al-
Dahiya’. In voicing these chants, fans brought together the three pillars around which the 
conflicts were constructed; first is Allah, through which they affirm their religious identity, 
then the name of  the political leader with whom they are allied, either Nasrallah head of  
Hezbollah or Rafic Hariri (and after his assassination Saad Hariri, his son) leaders of  the 
Future Movement, and finally their spatial and territorial claims over Beirut’s 
neighbourhoods, either the predominantly Sunni area of  Tariq Al-Jadidah or the 
predominantly Shiite Southern Suburbs or as the Lebanese call it ‘Al-Dahiyah’.  
At the time of  this research both Nejmeh Sport Club and Beirut, the city, appeared to be 
contested between two seemingly well defined groups. The first is that of  the March 8 
political camp led by Hezbollah and made up of  predominantly Shiite members and fans 
who, spatially, belong to the Southern Suburbs. The second group consists of the March 14 
political camp, led by Hariri of  the Future Movement, and made up of  predominantly 
Sunni members and fans who spatially belong to the city of  Beirut. The following 
background seeks to provide a more nuanced and historically deep understanding of  these 
‘divisions’.  
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Spatially, the city of  Beirut has always had an ambivalent relationship with the rest of  the 
country, not least with its suburbs. The uneven development policies of  pre-civil war 
Lebanon marginalised the rural areas and resulted in mass rural to urban migration which 
brought about the development of  ‘misery belts’ around Beirut. These migrations thereby 
contributed to the growth of  the city of  Beirut as a capital city or a ‘head’ that is bigger 
than the ‘body’ or the rest of  the country (Kassir 2006: 468). The growth in Nejmeh’s 
popularity in the 1950s and 1960s was, to a large extent, a result of  this rural-to-urban 
migration. The post-civil war reconstruction reinforced the division between Beirut, its 
suburbs, and the rest of  the country - as reflected in the slogans of  football fans. The 
process of  division took place at the planning stage which designed the city centre as an 
‘island’ devoid of ties with the rest of  the city itself and the countryside beyond – that is, 
excepting the highway that links Beirut to the airport (Sarkis 1993). The reconstructed city 
centre appears as a ‘separate enclave, abruptly severed from the rest of  the city by a 
network of  highways that constitute solid physical barriers’ (Ghandour and Fawaz 2010: 
unpaginated). These changes were due to economic and urban policy as well as 
demographic changes, but some writers have discussed the role of  the political dynamics 
within the suburbs themselves which were understood to have ‘withdrawn from the state’ 
of  Lebanon (Toufiq 2005). The current control of  the Al-Dahiya by Hezbollah presents 
the Southern Suburbs as ‘a largely autonomous, strong, self-sufficient and self-governing 
state’ which ‘can easily survive outside or without the Lebanese state’ (Toufiq, in 
NowLebanon 2007, see also Charara 1998).  
The spatial divisions I describe were paralleled by political divisions which preceded both 
the ascent of  Hezbollah as a political force and the strengthening of  the current March 8 
and March 14 camps. In the following sections I trace the popularity of  Nejmeh, positing 
the club as a representative voice of  leftist and Arab Nationalist political consciousness in 
the pre civil-war period. At this time as the club representing the political underdog, 
Nejmeh had only brief  moments of  sports glory. In the post war period, it is once again 
represented by its fans as the ‘oppressed club’, victim of  the marginalising policies of  the 
Prime Minister at the time, Rafic Hariri. This division became more problematic for club 
fans as the line of  political antagonism was drawn between the predominantly Shiite 
Hezbollah and the predominantly Sunni Future Movement, both of  whom had supporters 
within Nejmeh’s body of  fans. 
The political and spatial lines of  division reflected what Mermier termed the 
‘territorialization of  communitarian affiliation’ (2013: 383), where the Southern Suburbs 
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became synonymous with membership of  the Shiite communities, whereas other areas of  
Beirut, particularly Tariq Al-Jadidah, became known as Sunni enclaves. Looking at the 
broader social and sectarian elements, these labels are connotative of  associated social, 
and at times degrading, stereotypes. Depicted by the leftist movement at one point as the 
‘barefoot in the city’34, (bare-footedness being the symbol of  the proletariat), the Shiites 
were also seen by some of  Beirut’s residents as the uncivilised rural population that had not 
managed to integrate into city life (see Mermier 2013). Within the ranks of  Nejmeh fans, 
this translated into Shiite fans from the Southern Suburbs being labelled as the zuʿran (the 
thugs and troublemakers) fans. While ‘many Sunni Muslims and Christians tended to regard 
Shi’i as socially inferior’, the Sunnis, particularly in the post war period, were represented as 
the original inhabitants of  the city, following a conception of  Beirut’s urban life that ‘ranks 
the degree of  the urban affiliation of  the Beirutis according to their religious affiliation’ 
(Mermier 2013: 377). Nejmeh moved early in the twenty first century into patronage of  the 
Hariri establishment which redefined the club as a ‘Beiruti club’. This definition brought 
with it a redefinition of  the club as a Sunni one, exclusive to the Sunni fans. 
The following sections of  the chapter provide a chronological overview of  Nejmeh, 
situating the club’s fortunes within the national and regional events of  the time35. Each time 
period describes the three cross-cutting elements noted above which the fans themselves 
highlighted in their chants; namely, the spatial, the political and the social/sectarian. 
Football in Lebanon before Nejmeh (1900 - 1945) 
In contrast to the situation in the majority of  neighbouring Arab states, football – and 
organised sports more broadly - were not introduced in Lebanon by European territorial 
colonial rule. They were, rather, introduced by the Syrian Protestant College (hereafter 
SPC), now the American University of  Beirut, when Lebanon was still part of  the 
Ottoman Empire (Loughran 1972). Founded by American missionaries in Lebanon and 
Syria, the SPC started its operation in Beirut in 1866. McClenahan (2007), drawing on 
research in SPC’s archives, describes football and basketball games attended by thousands 
in the college’s annual field day as early as 1903. He presents a history of  the development 
                                                 
34  As described in a 1970s poem by Abbas Beydoun sung by Marcel Khalife, who was at one point the 
musical voice of  the Lebanese Communist Party. 
35  The historical overview provides no information about the players of  various clubs as the focus of  the 
thesis is on the political side of  the development of  Nejmeh and football more broadly and not on the 
athletic aspect. 
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of  organised sports as one rooted in the Christian religious missions of  both the SPC and 
the YMCA – hosted by the College since 1913. A few decades later, both the SPC and the 
YMCA – in Lebanon and internationally - started to divert from their religious tradition 
and took a more secular turn, under the pressure of  the religiously diverse student body 
that they accommodated or, as McClenahan puts it, ‘the relative valuations and plural 
identities demanded by the modern industrial cosmopolitan cities from London to Beirut’ 
(2007: 86). The genesis I describe prompted  football’s competitive development within 
other missionary and communitarian contexts, for example the Université Saint-Joseph 
(USJ), a Jesuit university established in Beirut in 187536, and schools of  The Makassed 
Philanthropic Islamic Association (hereafter Makassed), established in 187837; both 
institutions imprinted the game with the communitarian and sectarian mark that defines it 
today.  
It was two decades after the 1903 SPC game described by McClenahan that Lebanon was 
to be recognised within its current borders. The end of  World War I brought about the 
formalisation of  the French mandate on Syria and Lebanon in 1923. Lebanon’s borders 
were set by the mandate to ensure a delicate 50/50 balance between its Christian and 
Muslim inhabitants. However, these borders were problematic to some of  the Muslim 
communities which nurtured Arab Nationalist sentiments. They did not see Lebanon - 
which until then had been part of  a greater Arab East Mediterranean area under Ottoman 
and then French rule - as a nation state separate from its Arab surroundings. It was only 
after the adoption by some Muslim leaders, notably the al-Sulh family, of  a position that 
promoted an ‘Arab, but fully independent Lebanon’ (Salibi 1965: 187) that the emergence 
of  this new Lebanon became possible, governed by ‘a full partnership between the various 
Christian and Muslim sects in which no one sect alone could determine policy’ (Salibi 1965: 
188).  Lebanon finally gained independence from the French mandate at the end of  1943.   
Football in the same period witnessed significant growth. Many new clubs were registered, 
which led to the establishment of  the Lebanese Football Association (LFA). The LFA was 
founded in 1933 and was made up of  13 clubs (Sakr 1992). Several prominent figures in 
the LFA’s establishment had been introduced to football within the above mentioned 
missionary and communitarian institutions. Mr Hussein Beik Saj’an whose home was the 
                                                 
36  http://www.usj.edu.lb/en/files/history.html Accessed 9/11/2014. 
37   http://www.makassed.org.lb/home.html Accessed 9/11/2014. 
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site of  the LFA’s first meeting, for example, was elected the association’s first President. He 
represented the Riyadi Club, which was supported by the Makassed. Sheikh Pierre 
Gemayel, a former student of  the Saint-Joseph University, representing the ‘Cercle Jésuite’ 
club, was elected the LFA’s Vice President, and became its President for a second term 
starting in 1937. 
The establishment of  these new clubs was not necessarily encouraged or moderated 
through the missionary institutions themselves: some clubs were founded precisely because 
of  religious sectarian, or nationalistic opposition to missionary institutional influence. The 
novelist, Najjar, in his ‘Beirut Novel’ comically sketches a game in the late 1930s between 
AUB and USJ, as the Catholic priest and trainer of  USJ resorts to whatever means he can 
to win over AUB’s  varsity, in the certainty that in a game with the Protestant school, ‘God 
will be with the good Catholics’ (2010: 180).  
With some exceptions, the Lebanese football scene was dominated by Christian and 
Armenian teams, with only two of  the thirteen club representatives who established the 
LFA in 1993 belonging to Muslim sects (Sakr 1992). This could possibly be because 
Christian communities in Lebanon, through enjoying stronger relations with colonial 
France and having been educated in the Christian missionary institutions, had come to 
football much earlier than their Muslim compatriots. Just as Najjar describes the 
enthusiasm of  the team of  the Catholic USJ to beat the perceived Protestant team of  AUB, 
sports in Muslim institutions were introduced in reaction to, but often emulating,  Christian 
missionary ones (McClenahan 2007).  
Clubs emerging from the Muslim communities did not readily position themselves as 
‘Muslim clubs’, but as Arab Nationalist or anti-colonial ones. Nahda Club for example, 
described by sports journalist Ali Hamidi Sakr as the most popular in the early 1930s, was 
established in 1926, in the words of  one of  its founders, by a youth group as a national 
sports club free of  any foreign hegemony (Sakr 1992). Renowned sports journalist 
Majdalani, echoes that spirit in a 1976 article where he recalls watching the game in 1929 
when Nahda team ‘snatches the representation of  Lebanese football from the French 
associated club Union Sportive, attracts fans from various social classes, and writes with 
letters made of  light the first pages of  the glorious history of  Lebanese football’ (Majdalani 
1976 – in Hamdan 1993: 152).  
One member of  the football community in that period, who exemplifies the entwinement 
of  the sports and political communities is the aforementioned Sheikh Pierre Gemayal. He 
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was the second President of  the Lebanese Football Association and at the same time, 
founder of  the Lebanese Kataeb Party (the Lebanese Phalange Party, hereafter Kataeb), a 
Christian party, and at times a military group, which has been a key player in Lebanese 
politics through to today. In fact, inspiration for founding the party in 1936 came from 
sports, after the founder’s visit to the 1936 Berlin Olympics38. The Kataeb had a Lebanese 
Nationalist agenda which, was vehemently opposed to Arab Nationalist sentiments as well 
as to armed Palestinian presence in Lebanon, seeing in both these political positions a 
threat to Lebanon as a nation state. In contrast, both the Arab Nationalist sentiments and 
the Palestinian cause enjoyed significant support from amongst Lebanese Muslim 
communities, particularly in Beirut and the South. Disagreement over Lebanon’s position 
vis-a-vis its Arab identity and the Palestinian cause later became key issues of  national 
discord which underlaid violent political conflict in the country, particularly the Lebanese 
Civil War which started in 1975.  
Nejmeh, the rising star (1945 - 1975) 
Shortly after Lebanese independence in 1945, Nejmeh Sport Club was established. The 
club emerged from the union of  two informal football teams who played and competed in 
the Ras Beirut neighbourhood. Officially licensed in 1947, the club’s first board included a 
group of  Muslim Sunni and Druze members (Hamdan 1993). According to Hamdan 
(1993) the establishing board was constituted primarily of young team players who sought 
to institutionalise their passion for football. These players resided and played mostly in the 
Ras Beirut area, a religiously mixed neighbourhood39 close to the city’s centre. The area was 
also home to the American University of  Beirut, a location which is now at the heart of  the 
crowded city, but which was then still considered to be a suburb with enough open space in 
which to practice the game.  
Nejmeh’s popularity grew rapidly in Beirut and across Lebanon as the club rose to the 
LFA’s first division in 1951, winning its first championship in 197340. Nejmeh fans began to 
                                                 
38  In an interview reported in journalist Robert Fisk's 'Pity the Nation' (Fisk 2001: 65), Gemayal elaborates 
on this inspiration to establish the Kataeb: 'I was the captain of  the Lebanese football team and the 
president of  the Lebanese Football Federation. We went to the Olympic Games of  1936 in Berlin. And 
I saw then this discipline and order. And I said to myself: "Why can't we do the same thing in Lebanon?" 
So when we came back to Lebanon, we created this youth movement.' 
39  At the time Ras Beirut included predominantly Sunni, Druze and Greek Orthodox residents. 
40  Second in the LFA's championship ranks for that year was Racing Club. See http://www.nejmeh-
club.com/?page_id=2134 Accessed 9/11/14. 
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organise themselves in the same period. In 1970 the Union of  Nejmeh Fans (hereafter 
Fans’ Union) was established. This body organised the transportation of  fans to and from 
Nejmeh matches and orchestrated supportive cheering for the club (Hamdan 1993). On a 
broader political level, Nejmeh’s rise occurred at a time when the football scene was 
dominated – possibly because of  its original emergence from within missionary institutions 
- by clubs that emerged from the Christian communities. Looking at the list of  clubs which 
have held the LFA championship title from 1951, when Nejmeh rose to the first division, 
until 1973 when it first won the championship, we find that seven out of  the eleven 
championships were won by Armenian teams, and the rest by teams originating from the 
Christian communities.   
One reason for Nejmeh’s growth in popularity was that, against the backdrop of 
demographic and political changes in Lebanon and regionally, Nejmeh was posited as a 
‘Muslim’ club, or at least the only one in the first division which members of  the Muslim 
community could claim as their own. Although its fans were drawn from a variety of  sects 
and political affiliations, the club’s board members mostly belonged to Muslim sects –
Sunni, Shia, and Druze. In addition to territorial and kinship ties that rooted the club in the 
Muslim community, Nejmeh also cultivated strong links with the successive Lebanese 
Prime Ministers – a position traditionally reserved to members of  the Sunni sect, especially 
the prominent Sunni leader of  Beirut, Mr. Saeb Salam, who was the club’s Honorary 
President for many years. The speeches of  club President Omar Ghandour, elected in 
1969, often included religious references and quotations from the Qur’an as well as Islamic 
Sunni and Shiite tradition, confirming the importance of  sports in the Islamic tradition. 
The club even celebrated Islamic occasions, including for example an Iftar in the holy 
month of  Ramadan in 1971, which was attended by the two highest Muslim religious 
authorities in the country41. 
However, classifying Nejmeh Club as ‘Muslim’ misleadingly simplifies the construction of  
sectarian communitarian identities in Lebanon. The reality was that although the club was 
defined by its religious identity during my research in 2007-2009, I have no evidence to 
indicate the club was perceived in the same way in the 1960s and 1970s prior to the 
Lebanese war. In the Iftar held in 1971, Ghandour himself  took pride in the fact that the 
                                                 
41  Namely Sunni Mufti of  the Lebanese republic, Sheikh Hassan Khaled who was assassinated in 1989, and 
head of  the High Islamic Shiite Council, and Imam Musa al-Sadr, who disappeared in 1978. 
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majority of  people found representation and a safe haven in the club at a time when clubs 
in Lebanon ‘associated themselves, one way or the other with political parties and religious 
sects’ (quoted in Hamdan 1993: 112). In a 1970 speech, Ghandour heads his list of  the 
club’s achievements with a mention of ‘keeping the club away from political movements’ 
(quoted in Hamdan 1993: 91). In addition, the meaning of  ‘Muslim’ as an identity is 
susceptible to many interpretations particularly as the political disposition of  the Sunni 
communities varied and changed over time. For example, the club’s Honorary President, 
Saeb Salam, was historically in the pro Saudi Islamist camp, which opposed the growing 
Arab Nationalist sentiment. At the time the country was politically split between the 
Lebanese National Movement (LNM), the leftist pro-Palestinian secular Arab Nationalist 
coalition with a large following from Muslim communities on the one hand, and on the 
other, the Lebanese Front, compromised of  Lebanese national parties and spearheaded by 
the Kataeb party.  
The popularity of  Nejmeh then can be explained in broader demographic terms and in 
relation to the political discord that the country was experiencing. To explain Nejmeh’s 
growth in popularity I will briefly introduce the situation of  the Muslim communities in 
Beirut and the ways in which the various socio-political changes fuelled their loyalty to 
Nejmeh.  
The Shia community, which was marginalised by the political system but nevertheless 
undergoing various socio-economic shifts and gaining in power, probably saw in the club 
an image of  success that emulated their own political rise within Lebanon. Since the 
establishment of  Nejmeh, Beirut’s population, traditionally composed of  members of  the 
Sunni and Greek Orthodox communities, grew rapidly as the result of an influx of  
refugees and the arrival of internal and external migrants42. The majority of  new residents 
in the growing city were rural migrants, in particular the mostly Shiite residents of  the 
Bekaa and South Lebanon, who were attracted to the city by the centralised development 
policy, which had marginalised agriculture and rural areas (Kassir 2006). The proportion of  
the country’s population living in Beirut rose form 22% in 1930 to 50% in 1975 (Kassir 
                                                 
42  These migrations included the waves of  Druze and Maronite residents of  Mount Lebanon following 
conflict in 1860, then in 1917, Armenian refugees from present day Turkey fleeing the Armenian 
genocide, followed in 1948 by Palestinian refugees from present day Israel, as well as affluent families – 
and their capital – escaping nationalisation policies in Syria and Iraq in the 1950s (Kassir 2006). 
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2006: 468)43, a trend that continues until the present day making the capital, Beirut, the 
centre of  development policies and host to at least 50% of  the country’s population. This 
influx of  migrants from the south and the Bekaa to Beirut signified and caused more than 
demographic changes. The Lebanese Shiite communities, who in 1948 accounted for only 
3.5% of  Beirut’s population and were peripheral in social, economic, cultural and political44 
terms, have grown significantly in political and economic power. By 1975, the Shiite 
community figured as a ‘new migrant bourgeoisie, a layer of  middle-level salaried workers 
in the cities, an industrial proletariat in the suburbs of  Beirut and a community of  migrant 
workers in the Arab oil producing countries’ (Nasr 1987: 154)45. 
These developments fuelled Nejmeh’s popularity. The new migrants to the city found in 
the club an anchor and a space  which fostered a sense of  belonging in the city; a space that 
provided relief  from ‘the impersonality of  urban existence’ (Giulianotti and Armstrong 
1997: 6). In other words, the club helped to ‘counteract the feelings of  atomisation and 
alienation that corrupt individuals within large, impersonal cities’ (Giulianotti 1999: 15). 
The sentiment of  ‘belonging’ was echoed repeatedly by fans I spoke to. They portrayed the 
club as ‘home’, an idea especially prevalent among the older fans who had remained loyal to 
the club for decades. One fan, born in 1952 to a family that had recently migrated from the 
South of  Lebanon to the Chiah neighbourhood of  the Southern Suburbs, recalled how he 
had loved Nejmeh from the age of  seven. In part fascinated by Nejmeh because one of  the 
players lived on his own street, he recalled being a ‘ball boy’ in some of  Nejmeh’s games 
and spoke of  the many times police caught him trying to sneak into games because he did 
not have the money to pay. Similarly, other fans I interviewed told me that those who 
joined Nejmeh in that period (the 1950s and 1960s) chose it over other clubs because it was 
the one that that ‘belonged to their neighbourhood’, the one that their families and 
neighbours belonged to, or the one where a footballer familiar from their own 
neighbourhood played. 
                                                 
43  40% of  the rural population had migrated to Beirut by the same year, a number significantly higher in 
the south of  Lebanon out of  which 60% of  the population had migrated (Nasr 1987: 154). 
44  The Shiite were a largely rural community which lived off  subsistence farming in land plots they did not 
own, and suffered an illiteracy rate at 68.9% in 1943 (Nasr 1987: 154). Their political representation was 
monopolised from the 1920s to the 1950s by a handful of  feudal landowning families (Nasr 1987). 
45 Politically, Shiite communities organised primarily within one of  two broad camps, first they 'provided 
the cannon fodder for leftist parties and fought alongside the Palestinians' (Mermier 2013: 379) and 
soon after organised politically and militarily under the Amal Movement which rose as a primarily Shia 
movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Nasr 1987), and soon after under Hezbollah. 
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For supporters of  Arab Nationalism – the group to which most of  Beirut’s Sunnis 
belonged - and members of  leftist political groups, the club symbolised popular ‘working 
class’ success and stood in symbolic opposition to the right-wing political camp, 
represented by the Racing Club46. Regionally, Arab Nationalism was at its peak. Nasser, 
with a strong Arab Nationalist agenda, came to power in Egypt in 1956 when the 
Palestinian political and military organisation was growing fast, especially amongst refugees 
in Lebanon. Arab Nationalism, along with strong pro-Palestinian sentiment, dominated the 
popular political disposition of  the Lebanese leftist and Muslim, particularly Sunni, 
communities.  
In 1969 Nejmeh Sport Club established its office in Tariq Al-Jadidah, a neighbourhood 
which until recently was a suburb of  Beirut. The area is a predominantly Sunni 
neighbourhood and, not surprisingly, home to the Beirut Arab University which was 
founded in1960 by a Muslim charity47 and funded by Egypt’s Presidnet Nasser. The district 
is also home to the offices of  the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, founded in 1964, as 
well as to the city’s municipal stadium.  
The same period witnessed the establishment, in 1954, of  Al-Ansar Sporting Club, 
(hereafter Al-Ansar) by a group of  football enthusiasts who were also based in the Tariq 
Al-Jadidah neighbourhood. Al-Ansar rose to the first division in 1967 and displayed a 
clearly defined Muslim identity, not least through the choice of  its name Al-Ansar (Arabic 
for Patrons) after the Patrons of  Prophet Mohammed48. Although at the time still a 
budding club, it became Nejmeh club’s main sports rival a decade or so later.  
The peak of  Nejmeh’s popularity came when the club won its first championship in 1973 
and its second in 1975 - the last championship held before the Lebanese civil war 
interrupted the official championships through to 1988. Nejmeh’s achievement at the time 
of  the growing local political tension which ignited the civil war in 1975 remained etched in 
the memory of  fans for decades to come, as a symbol of  what Nejmeh was and could have 
been.  
                                                 
46  According to some Lebanese sports pages the Racing Club had Pierre Gemayal as its Honorary 
President in the year 1960 – see 
http://www.abdogedeon.com/volleyball/NOUJOUM/racing%20club%20beirut.html Accessed 
21/10/14. 
47  http://www.bau.edu.lb/History1 Accessed 20/10/14. 
48  According to Al-Ansar club's official website http://www.alansar-
club.com/Template_En.aspx?PageId=9  Accessed 21/10/14. 
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Figure 11: Nejmeh club stickers on the windscreen of  the infamous ʿayn al-rummaneh bus. The shooting on the bus 
on 13th April, 1975 marked the beginning of  the fifteen year Lebanese civil war.49 
Nejmeh as a Haven in War-Time (1975 - 1990) 
In 1975 Nejmeh was at the peak of  its glory, or in its ‘golden age’ as the ex-Secretary 
General of  the club described it (Hamdan 1993). Only one week before the shooting at the 
ʿayn al-Rummaneh bus on 13th April, 197550 by members of  the Kataeb Militia (Traboulsi 
2007) – the incident that has come to mark the beginning of  the fifteen year Lebanese civil 
war - Nejmeh club played against the Universities of  France Team. Amongst Nejmeh’s 
                                                 
49  Picture widely circulated online and is used here as made available under a ‘fair use’ liscence by Ashoola 
on https://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D9%85%D9%84%D9%81:Bus_massacre.jpg#filelinks Accessed 
12/10/2015. 
50  Incidentally, this bus, which became the symbol of  the war, displayed Nejmeh club stickers which were 
clearly evident in the many pictures taken of  it. In fact, according to the son of  the bus's driver, that 
same bus had transported Nejmeh players to Sidon only hours before it was shot at (Almustaqbal: 
13/4/05). 
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ranks was Pele51, the most popular international player of  the period – although by then he 
was retired and past his prime. It was said that the match drew around 50,000 spectators to 
the Cite Sportive (As-Safir 7/4/75) - a huge number of  fans for that time in Lebanon. One 
year earlier, Nejmeh had beaten the Ararat Club, national champion of  the Soviet Union in 
1973, in a much celebrated match that made the headlines of  most Lebanese papers. Ararat 
had until then played 24 times in Lebanon, and this was the first time they had lost 
(Hamdan 1993). I only realised the significance of  those two matches after interviewing 
fans who were active in the Fans’ Office. A good number of  them had been in their early 
teens when these matches took place, and they recalled one or the other match as the first 
football game they ever went to. In addition to the two recent LFA Championships, the 
above described matches have etched themselves into the memories of  football fans as 
moments epitomising the glory and grandeur of  Nejmeh.  
The club’s ascendancy was abruptly halted with the start of  the Lebanese civil war and the 
ensuing interruption of  the national LFA championships. There were several area-specific 
tournaments, some of  which were organised under the names of  specific leaders or 
political groups, but the talents of  Nejmeh club team members seemed to be going to 
waste during the war which prevented the club from realising its full potential. Fans speak 
of  Nejmeh in that period as if  it was suspended in time. While the championships were 
halted and the war raged, the club kept its title as champion for thirteen years. Nejmeh 
continued to inspire fans and many of  them adopted it as a space of  refuge separate from 
the militarisation and antagonisms of  the war. Yet the war brought changes to Beirut and 
to the communities from which many of  these fans hailed. In the summer of  1982, Israel 
invaded Lebanon, in a war that was devastating to Beirut as the city was under siege for 
seven weeks. The Tariq Al-Jadidah neighbourhood, home of  Nejmeh and now also of the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), was devastated. The invasion, which was achieved 
with the complicity of the USA, some Arab countries and Lebanese factions, brought 
about the withdrawal of  the PLO from Lebanon.  
The 1982-1983 period marked important transitions in both the Lebanese political scene 
and in Beirut’s social fabric - changes which formed the basis of  the crisis Lebanon lived 
through from 2005. West Beirut, separated from its east side early in the war, underwent 
                                                 
51  Although I have not managed to collect first hand information about Pele's visit or his willingness to 
play on Nejmeh's team, he probably played in return for significant sums of  money paid by the club in 
an effort to boost its popularity. 
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demographical changes. The majority of  the area’s Christian residents left the now 
predominantly Muslim side for the city’s east side. The central areas of  the city where the 
Christians used to reside were taken over by members of  the Shiite sect who had been 
driven out of  the poor suburban neighbourhoods they occupied in east Beirut (Beyhum 
1990). Cantonization of  various regions of  Beirut and Lebanon, based on sectarian lines, 
had been achieved (Traboulsi 2007). Until the 1980s the ‘Sunnis were the leading Muslim 
Community, in terms of  both their political influence and their control of  key economic 
resources’ (Johnson 1986: 1) but the second half  of  the 1980s witnessed a sharp decline in 
their power in favour of  the rising political and military power of  Shiite parties. PLO’s 
withdrawal in 1982 and the defeat of  the Al-Murabitun52 in 1984 by the mostly Shiite Amal 
Movement53 and the predominantly Druze Progressive Socialist Party marked the end of  
any military group that could have claimed to represent the Sunnis in Beirut. This military 
defeat created, according to one political analyst I interviewed in 2009, an atmosphere in 
which the Sunnis were cast a weak and battered community in Lebanon. At the same time, 
both the Amal Movement and Hezbollah – officially established in 1984 - were growing 
powers which, backed by the Syrian regime, gained the military upper hand. 
In 1985 the LFA, like Beirut, was split into two; one part made up of  predominantly 
‘Muslim’ clubs in the west, and the other of  ‘Christian’ clubs in the east. According to my 
interviews with club administrators, Nejmeh club did not take a clear side with either 
association, a stance which put the club out of  favour with the Muslim LFA.  The 
disagreement – along with a long-established custom of  the LFA being made up of  
predominantly Christian members – was later resolved via FIFA intervention. The west 
Beirut association was recognised as the official one in 1988, and key figures who came to 
power in 1985 were still in office in 2010 when this research was under way. The war-time 
disagreement between Nejmeh and the LFA continued and deepened in the post war 
period adversely affecting Nejmeh Sports Club’s position in the football scene. 
Injustice and Nejmeh club’s popularity (1990 - 2003) 
The civil war came to an end in 1990. Under the Ta’if  agreement the warring militias 
agreed on a power sharing system which kept the same militia leaders in control and 
                                                 
52  Al-Murabitun, is the military wing of  the Independent Nasserist Movement. 
53  Amal Movement (Haraket al-Mahrumin or the Movement of the Dispossessed) was established in the 
early 1970s by Imam Musa Sadr, Head of  the Supreme Shi'i council at the time (Nasr 1987). 
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reinforced the sectarian political arrangement - albeit with some redistribution of power. A 
large post-war reconstruction project was initiated, spearheaded by businessman, Rafic 
Hariri, who entered politics and then became Prime Minister in 1992. At this time Nejmeh 
club embarked on its own process of  internal reorganisation54. The club had been worn 
down by a combination of  factors; the many years of  fighting, an inability to recruit and 
train a team of  the standard it had enjoyed before, and an ageing management team. New 
young board members from various religious backgrounds were recruited to complement 
the existing board who had governed the club since the late 1960s. Many of  the pre-
existing board members were well established businessmen or industrialists, who, besides 
governing the club, contributed significantly to it financially. The Fans Union, which had 
ceased operations in 1975 when the war started, was also rekindled with new elections 
taking place in 1991. In 1995 the Fans Union was integrated into the club’s organisational 
structure as part of  the Fans’ Office. This body was governed and supported by the club’s 
board, and organised its work through regional offices and central committees which 
promoted the idea of  fans having a stronger presence in the stadiums. 
The institutional situation did not affect the club’s fan base and Nejmeh was as popular as 
ever. The French film director, Laffont, arriving in Beirut in 1991, was fascinated by the 
abundant graffiti of  Nejmeh’s star logo emblazoned on the walls of  the devastated city. In 
his 1992 film, ‘Beyrouth: des Balles et des Ballons’ about ‘a people’s hope for 
reconciliation’, he documented the popularity of  the club, as well as its unique ability to 
bring together so many Lebanese from a variety of  backgrounds (Laffont 1992)55. Nejmeh 
continued to be the country’s most popular team and the one that brought the largest 
number of  supporters to the stadium when it played. 
According to sports journalist Hussein Hijazi in a 2009 interview I conducted with him, 
organised sports in Lebanon flourished in the 1990s with the advent of  live television 
broadcasting of  matches and greater potential for financial return from advertising. 
However, Nejmeh club’s popularity grew not because of its victories, but through the 
perceived discrimination it faced, particularly from the LFA. Fans claimed that the LFA 
unjustly penalised the club and its fans on several occasions and that it favoured Nejmeh’s 
                                                 
54  History of  the club in the 1990s is based on interviews with Nejmeh's President at the time, Omar 
Ghandour, club board members Zuheir Baroudi and Saadeddine Itani and Nejmeh's administrative 
manager Ahmad Kobrosly. 
55  For further information about the film see Hamdan (1993) and 
http://www.allocine.fr/film/fichefilm_gen_cfilm=8412.html Accessed 9/11/14. 
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rival, Al-Ansar, which competed against Nejmeh in Beirut’s local derby throughout the 
1980s and 1990s56.  
In 1988, the West Beirut LFA organised the first officially recognised tournament to have 
taken place since 1975. The war was in its last days, but clubs from Christian areas 
boycotted the championship until September 1991 when they rejoined the LFA (Sakr 
1992)57. For the first time in its history Al-Ansar won the title58. From that first 
championship in 1988 until 2000, Al-Ansar won Lebanon’s title eleven consecutive times, a 
feat much boasted by its fans as the only such achievement in the world and documented as 
such by the Guinness Book of  World Records. The Nejmeh fans I interviewed spoke of  
these consecutive championships being a result of  LFA’s favouritism because, as they 
claimed, the LFA Secretary General was close to Al-Ansar’s President. Newspaper reports 
of  the time assert that Nejmeh was often penalised by the LFA, mainly for fans’ 
misbehaviour during the games; penalisation of  Nejmeh which was often unjustified. 
Nejmeh’s large and enthusiastic fan-base, built up over these years a reputation for 
hooliganism and fans were often forbidden from attending the games, especially those 
taking place in the municipal stadium in Tariq Al-Jadidah59. Every penalisation of  this kind 
doubled the financial losses suffered by the club: it not only had to pay the fine, but lost the 
substantial revenue that it usually secured from ticket sales. This perception of  injustice had 
significant appeal to the club fans, especially those from lower economic classes or those 
who felt that the political system discriminated against them. In the words of  one fan, ‘the 
more injustice it [Nejmeh] suffered, the more we loved it’. The idea that the club was 
discriminated against was nothing new though, as the perception is clearly documented by 
one of  the club’s Secretary Generals in a book charting the club’s history. Among other 
                                                 
56  In the 1960s and 1970s, it was matches between Nejmeh and Racing Club that were cheered as Beirut's 
local derby. The move for the competition to take place between Nejmeh and Al-Ansar signalled shifts 
in the nature of  the competition for spatial control over the city. 
57  With the boycott of  clubs based in Christian areas during the 1988 championship, and many reported 
disputes in that championship that led to several clubs, including Nejmeh, pulling out, the championship 
ended with only three clubs competing for the title. See Sahmarani (2006). 
http://www.elaph.com/Web/ElaphGuys/2006/6/152665.htm Accessed 21/10/14. 
58  Information about Al-Ansar club is based on interviews with the club's manager in 2009, Mr Bilal 
Farraj, and with its 2009 Vice President (and current President) Mr Karim Diab, as well as information 
on the club's official website http://www.alansar-club.com/ Accessed 21/10/14. 
59  Examples of  the source of  such a reputation are two incidents that the LFA had flagged in a press 
conference in 1999, one that took place on December 28, 1997 after a match against al-Ansar when 
several cars in the Tariq Al-Jadidah area were destroyed and again after a match against Safa Club on 27 
February 1998 – despite Nejmeh's victory over Safa with a six goals difference (As-Safir 4/1/99). As-
Safir's press coverage of  these two games only mentions in passing some damage to cars after the 
December 1997 game, and records nothing about hooliganism in the second game. 
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examples, Hamdan (1993) claims that Nejmeh could have won the 1961 LFA 
championship had the LFA not cancelled the rest of  the games in the very season when 
Nejmeh was in the lead. The 1973 and 1975 victories materialised the club’s ability to 
overcome the discrimination practices which were finally halted in the 1990s.  
Yet the Nejmeh – Al-Ansar rivalry had broader socio-political dimensions that reflect some 
of  the key issues of  political contention in the post war period. Al-Ansar’s President from 
1977 until 2008, Salim Diab, belonged to Hariri’s political establishment. He was elected to 
parliament in 1996 as part of  Rafic Hariri’s political camp and led both Rafic Hariri’s 
electoral campaign in 2000 and that of  his son Saad Hariri in the years 2005 and 2009 (Al-
Akhbar 14/7/2009). Al-Ansar club received significant funding from the Hariri 
Establishment in the 1990s and was perceived as the club representing Beirut’s Sunni 
community - not least because of  its name. Because of  these loyalties Al-Ansar fans chose 
the chant ‘Allah, Hariri and Tariq Al-Jadidah’60, tying their religious belief  to Hariri as a 
political patron and to the mostly Sunni neighbourhood that is home to their club.  
Nejmeh’s history as well as its rivalry with Al-Ansar - perceived to be the club of  possibly 
the most powerful political individual in Lebanon at the time; Rafic Hariri – made it ‘home’ 
for many of  the country’s discontented youth. Some of  that discontent dated back to the 
period of rural to urban migration at the time of  Nejmeh’s golden era and to the war-time 
demographic changes that brought the once rural population into Beirut’s neighbourhoods. 
The largest portion of  this mostly Shiite population had, by the 1990s, been in the city for 
decades and their youngest generation had even been born in Beirut. Yet, in great part they 
continued to be presented as outsiders to the city. For sociologist, Waddah Charara, ‘those 
who had moved to the city did not really live there, neither as residents nor as a culture’ 
(Charara 1985: 13 quoted in Mermier 2013: 379 ), and for sociologist, Samir Khalaf, they 
were ‘strangers to city life’ (1993: 119). The Southern Suburbs, or Al-Dahiyah, home of  the 
majority of  the Shiite migrant community in Beirut was also stigmatised as a ‘misery belt 
characterised by illegal urbanisation, squatters and underdevelopment’ as well as a ‘Shiite 
ghetto’ and ‘Hezbollah’s suburb’ (Harb 2001: 114).  
Shiite Nejmeh fans from Al-Dahiya were then doubly stigmatised, firstly by virtue of  being 
hooligans and then again by being from Al-Dahiyah. In parallel, many of  the Shiites who 
                                                 
60  Of  note is the fact that Al-Ansar has had 7 different offices to date, but all of  them have been located in 
the Tariq Al-Jadidah neighbourhood within an area of  less than one kilometre in radius. 
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had lived in Beirut during the war were later evicted by programmes for the resettlement of  
the displaced and by the ambitious Beirut Central District reconstruction project 
spearheaded by Hariri and implemented by The Lebanese Company for the Development 
and Reconstruction of  Beirut Central District s.a.l (Solidere). 
A ‘tendency to tie the urban entity to patronymic groups’ in Beirut (Mermier 2013: 378) 
was reinforced by Solidere’s motto, ‘Beirut, an Ancient City of  the Future’. Key to the 
above described tendency is the Arabic word ʿaraqah, translated as ‘ancient’ in the motto 
‘an ancient city for the future’, though more accurately translated as the city having 
‘rootage’. Describing the city as ‘rooted’ is not a mere temporal adjective, but one that 
assumes a connection with a certain familial, ethnic or cultural ‘origin’. In that sense the city 
is not in the possession of  all of  its inhabitants, and definitely not in that of  the new rural 
immigrants. 
The reconstruction process I describe reinforced a long existing ‘incongruity’ and a lack of  
balance in the distribution of  resources between the city and the rest of  the country (Sarkis 
1993), especially as Project Elyssar61, the reconstruction project planned for parts of  Al-
Dahiya faltered. Socially, it further alienated the city’s Shiite population reinforcing their 
feeling that there was no space for them in the city, except within Nejmeh. 
In 1999, Nejmeh’s conflict with the LFA escalated62. After a series of  games which Nejmeh 
fans were not allowed to attend because of  yet another LFA penalty, Nejmeh pulled out of  
an Asian Cup match because of  a last minute change in location dictated by the LFA which 
made it almost impossible for the fans to attend. The penalty on Nejmeh for this 
withdrawal caused a loss of  over 200,000 dollars. Further escalation involved a series of  
press conferences given by Nejmeh and the LFA, along with an LFA-imposed prohibition 
on Yahia Jrab practicing in his role as Nejmeh’s Secretary General for six months. 
Additionally, the club’s President, Omar Ghandour, was banned from attending any sports 
games for a year. Following a management appeal, the fans marched in a 15,000 strong 
demonstration to the house of  the Prime Minister requesting his intervention in the face 
                                                 
61  For information on the Elyssar Project see Harb 2001, who claims that in contrast to the Down-town 
reconstruction project, Elyssar received little public and scholarly attention in part because of  the 
stigmatisation of  Dahiyah and its residents who 'inspire strong negative sentiments related to their 
presumed rural roots, their supposed squatter status, and the notions that they should “return to their 
village” ' (Harb 2001: 112) 
62  Information in these paragraphs is based on As-Safir's coverage of  the conflict during December 1998 
and January 1999, as well as on interviews with several members and fans who were active in Nejmeh at 
that period. 
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of  the perceived injustice of  the LFA. These incidents were rooted in the much older 
conflict between Nejmeh and the LFA that started in 1985 and was described in the 
previous section, when key current LFA figures where elected without the support of  
Nejmeh. The conflict also had a political character, as it took place at the unique time in 
that decade when Hariri was not Prime Minister following a dispute and escalation in 
political conflict with Lebanese President Lahoud who was backed by the Syrian regime. 
Lahoud, and the appointed Prime Minister Hoss, promoted a reform agenda and vowed to 
rid the country of  the corruption that the Hariri era had brought. The slogans of  the 
Nejmeh demonstrators appealed to that agenda, demanding that any reform should start 
with reformation of the LFA itself. 
Despite the dispute, Nejmeh club won the title of  Lebanon’s champion in 2000 - a long 
awaited victory that increased Nejmeh’s popularity. The LFA was eventually forced to 
resign in 2001 – not because of  Nejmeh’s efforts, but due to disputes with a South 
Lebanon team whose ‘patron’ was Nabih Berri, head of  the parliament and the Amal 
Movement. Still, Nejmeh’s long conflict with the LFA and the club’s internal financial 
problems left the club, as ex-Secretary General Baroudi recalls, ‘completely worn out’.  
 
Figure 12: Side wall of  Beirut’s Municipal Stadium. The banner of  Al-Ansar Sports Club appears on the balcony 
of  the club’s headquarters, on the third floor of  the building across the street (to right of  the photo). 
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Fig
ure 13: Leisurely time at Beirut’s Municipal Stadium. Balconies of  the high-rise adjacent buildings, typical of  
Beirut’s dense urban landscape, become an extension of  the stadium during some games allowing local residents to 
watch matches for free.  
 
Figure 14: Taking time off  to perform the Muslim prayer at Beirut’s Municipal Stadium. 
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Nejmeh under new patronage (2003 - 2009) 
In 2002, to the unknowing eye, Nejmeh club appeared to be doing really well. It had finally 
ousted Al-Ansar from the top of  the league, and won the country’s championship for the 
years 2000 and 2002. The club’s long battle with the LFA had concluded in a satisfying 
outcome, and its popularity remained as robust as ever with fans filling the stadiums in 
every match. For many years the board had managed to sustain itself  financially whilst 
treading the tightrope of  cooperating with the political elite without being completely 
under their wing, yet upholding the club’s motto - which its fan base no doubt reflected; 
‘from Beirut, for the whole of  Lebanon’. 
Yet internally, according to Nejmeh’s management at the time, the board had reached a 
point where it could not continue to sustain the club financially. At the economic level, 
Hariri’s economic policy had weakened the financial standing of  many of  Beirut’s 
traditional families and industrialists – the very people who provided the majority of  the 
club’s funding. In parallel in the local football scene, the Olympic Beirut club was rising 
fast, with a budget that far exceeded that of  other clubs. Led by Taha Klaylat, an aspiring 
businessman who bought out the licence of  a marginal club, Olympic Beirut had managed 
in one year to climb its way up the premier league and, in the spring of  2003, won the 
national championship. The salaries paid by the newly emerging club to its players were 
double and triple the salaries paid by Nejmeh or any other Lebanese team, and thus raised 
the bar of  what a club budget should be. In the stadiums, Nejmeh fans had gained 
themselves the reputation of  being trouble makers. The fans were highly susceptible to 
being mobilised by various intermediary leaders within the club and the Fans’ Office, and 
the problem of managing the fans was wearing the club down. Throughout the 1990s, the 
security forces and the LFA were doing little to make this task easier.  
In 2003, the thirty-four year reign of  Omar Ghandour, club President since 1969, came to 
an end primarily because of  his financial inability to sustain the club. Surprisingly, the 
person chosen to take on patronage and leadership of  the club was Hariri himself, patron 
of  long-time rival club, Al-Ansar. This transition and the period that followed is the main 
subject of  this thesis, and I elaborate on these issues in detail in later chapters. 
Nevertheless, it is useful at this point to give a brief  overview of  the transformations that 
have taken place in the club in the twenty-first century and to situate these changes within 
the broader political context. 
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With the aim of  securing the club and ensuring its viability, from the late 1990s the board 
discussed many options and approached several funders and patrons, including various 
members of  the Hariri family, for support, but most of  these approaches were unfruitful. 
Hariri, who was a successful politician and businessman, with the required financial 
resources, was one of  the few who were, according to Ghandour, ‘up to that responsibility’. 
On Nejmeh’s board, members were varied: some were supporters of  Hariri, but several 
others were not, yet at the beginning no real objection to acceptance of  Hariri’s support on 
political grounds was voiced so long as the club could be sustained financially. Following 
the decision to approach Hariri, negotiations began between Nejmeh board members and 
Hariri’s representatives. The initial intention was to create a team which combined some of  
the old board members with a group chosen by Hariri’s negotiators. As the negotiations 
proceeded, discontent started to arise among some of  the board members, but despite this, 
the deal was completed. In March 2003, elections of  a new board representing the new 
patron took place with only a minor quibble (see table 7). As these arrangements were 
being made the second Gulf  War was on the horizon. While the country was divided 
politically in its own position towards the war, Saudi Arabia, a long time supporter of  
Hariri, was backing the US in the war that started in March 2003, only two weeks after the 
change in Nejmeh’s management took place. 
Table 7 - Leadership of  Nejmeh Club (1969 - 2011) 
1969 – March 2003 Omar Ghandour – President 
Zuheir Baroudi – Secretary General (for term ending 
March 2003) 
9 March 2003 – 26 July 2005 
(resigned before end of term) 
Mohammad Fanj - President 
Abdulhafiz Mansour - Secretary General 
23 October, 2005 -  
16 November 2008 
Mohammad Amin Daouk - President 
Abdul Latif Farshoukh - Secretary General  
16 November 2008 – Present 
(Serving a second term - First 
term ended 2011) 
Mohammad Amin Daouk – President 
Saadeddine Itani – Secretary General  
 
The process of  organising the club in a form that suited the new patron followed. New 
members joined the General Assembly, membership fees were raised and the Fans’ Office 
was restructured. In a much publicised move, the Nejmeh stadium was renovated soon 
after the club changed hands, most of  its debts were cleared, and in  both 2004 and 2005, it 
won the national championship again. The period witnessed various club conflicts between, 
on the one hand, older fans and some board members who had for decades been part of  
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the club, and the new management on the other. Once again these conflicts were resolved 
in favour of  the new patron and his appointed management. At this time Lebanon was also 
experiencing internal division in reaction to parliament agreeing on an unconstitutional 
extension of  term for Syrian-supported President Lahoud in 2004; a decision which Hariri 
opposed.  
In February 2005, Hariri was assassinated by a car bomb, an event that marked the 
beginning of  a period of  intense political division and turmoil. As a result of  the 
assassination, the political scene, and a large part of  the Lebanese population were sharply 
divided into two camps, the March 8 Alliance and the March 14 Alliance, names adopted 
from the dates on which protagonists of  each of  the groups led massive popular marches 
in Beirut’s city centre in March 2005.  
In exacerbating the pre-existing political tensions, the division I describe only crystalized in 
the two months following the assassination of  Prime Minister Rafic Hariri. I elaborate 
further on this situation as it was instrumental in dividing Nejmeh club and its fans. 
The March 14 Alliance was headed by the Future Movement, and composed of  political 
groups who accused the Syrian regime of  being behind Hariri’s killing: it also protested 
against Syria’s presence in Lebanon. Regionally, March 14 allied itself  with the Saudi 
political agenda. According to members of  the alliance, military resistance to Israel had not 
been a priority since the liberation of  the south of  Lebanon in 2000, therefore calls for 
disarming Hezbollah were made. Besides the mostly Sunni Future Movement, members of  
the alliance included some of  the Christian political groups, namely the Lebanese Forces, 
and the Kataeb. 
The March 8 political camp, represented by Hezbollah, adopted a strong pro-resistance to 
Israel position and allied itself  with the regimes of  Iran and Syria. It contested the claims 
that the Syrian regime was responsible for Hariri’s assassination and saw in it support for 
the resistance against Israel. It also refused calls for disarmament of  Hezbollah’s resistance, 
asserting that Israel continued to be a threat to Lebanon and that some areas of Lebanese 
land continued to be occupied. Its members included another Shiite political group, the 
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Amal movement, the Free Patriotic Movement as well as some of  the communist and 
nationalist parties.63 
Despite the involvement of  most political actors in one camp or the other, the poles of  the 
two groups remained the predominantly Shiite Hezbollah, and the predominantly Sunni 
Future Movement64, giving the divide a sectarian as well as a political character. At the same 
time, and although this political conflict appeared as ‘a conflict between two incompatible 
visions for the country’ (ICG, 1) close examination of the key sectors of  public concern to 
voters and the political discourse around them, reveals that the differences, besides the 
regional allegiances, between the two competing camps were not flagrant. Saad Hariri and 
the March 14 political camps promoted a capitalist economic agenda, heavily reliant on 
privatisation, international aid, and stability of  the Lebanese currency - all continuations of  
late Prime Minster’s Rafic Hariri’s policies. Saad Hariri’s political opponents criticised the 
focus on the services and financial sector as opposed to agricultural and industrial sectors, 
and called for decentralised development beyond the capital, Beirut. That said, none of  
them truly provided an alternative economic vision, nor did they fundamentally disagree 
with the country’s free market economy or the massive external debt it had accumulated. 
During the June 2009 elections, March 8 championed an anti-corruption agenda and then 
accused the Hariri camp of  corruption, despite the fact that ‘corruption in the country was 
pervasive at all levels of  society and state’ (Daily Star 18/11/2009) and was well 
documented and publicly acknowledged65. Both the accusations of  corruption, as well as 
the denial of  such accusations by Hariri, were mere performances. Politically, despite their 
diverging agendas, both parties voiced support for the ‘Palestinian Cause’, the legitimacy of  
resistance to Israel, and the centrality of  Lebanon’s Arab identity.  
After Rafic Hariri’s assassination, contrary to established traditions, Saad, his second son, 
took on the political leadership of the Hariri Establishment. The role entailed leadership 
                                                 
63  Some changes did occur in the composition of  each of  the groups with parties and political groups 
changing alliances. The FPM which stood with Future Movement in their opposition to the Syrian 
regime in 2005 and secured the return of  its leader, General Aoun, from exile in the same year, switched 
political sides and signed a memorandum of  understanding with Hezbollah in February 2006. The 
Druze leader and head of  the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) changed sides on several occasions and 
was often key in tipping the balance in favour of  one or the other of  the alliances. 
64  Future Movement is the political group led by Saad Hariri, and the largest political group within the 
March 14th coalition. Although long-standing, it was only officially established in 2007. For details see 
the movement's official website http://www.almustaqbal.org/ Accessed 21/10/14. 
65  Leenders (2012) provides a summary of  numerous studies concerning the prevalence and perception of  
corruption in Lebanon. 
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not only of  the Sunni communities and the parliamentarian coalition his father had 
brought together, but also Almustaqbal newspaper, Future Television, Future Movement - 
the political movement established by Rafic Hariri - several social and philanthropic 
organisations, and, of  course, Nejmeh club. In view of the numerous heirs and entourage 
members surrounding the inexperienced young leader, the transition took time and was 
embroiled with internal conflicts.  
In the period that followed, violent clashes took place within Nejmeh club and on the 
streets of  Beirut. The city centre, the cherished reconstruction model of  the slain leader 
Hariri, was the site of  demonstrations and extended sit-ins by hundreds of  thousands of  
people. The country was overwhelmed by reports of  the assassinations of  politicians and 
journalists, of  bombs in commercial and residential areas, street clashes between followers 
of  different camps, violent confrontations in the north between the Lebanese army and an 
Islamic militant group based in the Palestinian refugee camps, and most significantly, the 
2006 summer war with Israel. The 2006 war, besides causing over a thousand deaths and 
leaving a million people displaced, served to worsen the rupture between conflicting 
Lebanese parties, as well as inflicting significant damage in certain neighbourhoods of  
Beirut. Less than two months after the end of  the summer Israeli war on Lebanon, and in 
one of  the first sports matches to be played in the war shattered country, Nejmeh fans, like 
the country, demonstrated their own internal divisions. In two of  the Asian Cup games 
played in Beirut in September and October 2006, Nejmeh fans exchanged political and 
sectarian insults. The response of  the club’s management at the time further widened the 
divide and placed the club squarely in the pro-Hariri camp, thus alienating a great number 
of fans.  
It was after this series of  events that many Nejmeh fans claimed that ‘Nejmeh Club was 
dead’. Fans told me it was a time when fans who did not belong to the pro-Hariri camp felt 
that they no longer belonged to the club that they had for decades called home. The club, 
according to the Hariri appointed club President, was a ‘rooted’ Beiruti club - it had 
ʿaraqah (rootage) like the city in Solider’s motto - and no longer championed the motto 
‘from Beirut, for the whole of  Lebanon’. The conflicts in the club emerged against the 
background of  a city already experiencing a sharp divide between a Beirut depicted as 
Sunni, and the Shiite Southern Suburbs. The long-standing stereotype of  Shiites as socially 
inferior and intruders on the city’s urban life was best exemplified by the jokes popular 
during the sit-in by March 8 forces protesting at the policies of  the March 14 led 
government in the city centre from December 2006 until 25 May 2008; the jokes claimed 
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that the city centre was now ‘smelly’ and they mocked the cheaper services now available to 
the hundreds participating in the sit-in. For many participating in the sit-in, this was the 
first time that the city centre, until then an expensive neighbourhood attracting tourists 
from Gulf  areas, appeared to be a welcome space. For many of  Beirut’s Sunni, the sit-in 
was an ‘occupation’ of  the city by the Shiites, who were regarded as not belonging in it to 
start with.  
In 2007, due to the recurrence of similar clashes, the Internal Security Forces decided that 
football games were to be played without spectators in the stadiums, a ban that remained in 
force throughout the period of  my field work and lasted for four consecutive seasons. This 
decision distanced the club even further from its fans and significantly weakened the 
football scene in Lebanon.  
 
Figure 15: Pro-Hariri and Salim Diab electoral banner in Tariq Al-Jadidah. The banner reads ‘Beirut of  
Arabism, Beirut of  Rafik Hariri says “thank you Salim Diab”’. The banner is signed by the ‘sons of  Beirut’. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced Nejmeh Sport Club’s long history and its contested spatial, 
social and political positioning within the city. About sixty years after its establishment, the 
club’s identity was being disputed and many of  its fans were finding themselves distant 
from the club that they had identified with for decades. The turmoil which the club and its 
host city were going through was the result of  longer processes of  invention and 
reinvention of  the city’s identity, and of  the  processes of  inclusion and exclusion that 
defined who had the right to belong to the city and who didn’t. I have described how the 
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club was for decades an inclusive space for members of  the various religious communities 
of  Lebanon, one that had striven to be a club for ‘the whole of  Lebanon’, yet at the time 
of  the research was at a crucial turning point and more clearly confined within one political 
leader’s faction. 
In the following chapter I examine the first stages of  transformation within the popular 
club, particularly the process by which Rafic Hariri established his position as a political and 
communitarian leader. The chapter examines specifically the transition of  the club from the 
thirty year reign of  Ghandour into a new era – one which brought a new model of  
leadership to the club and to Lebanon. 
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4 
Philanthropy and the  
Performance of Wealth 
 
‘He who has no big-man, should buy himself  one’ 
Lebanese proverb 
‘Philanthropy is the gateway to power’ 
Bert Cooper in Mad Men (Season 2, Episode 7) 
 
Bulldozers in the Municipal Stadium 
September 198266. Around 300 heavy-duty vehicles occupied the municipal stadium of  Beirut. The 
vehicles, thirty of  which have been ordered brand new from Saudi Arabia at a cost of  thirteen million 
dollars and delivered within the same day, manoeuvred their way out of  the stadium’s only exit with 
difficulty. Every day, as early as six in the morning, the vehicles accompanied by around 700 ‘volunteers’67, 
begin their daily mission of  cleaning up the rubble on the streets of  a war-torn Beirut68. As the vehicles 
                                                 
66  The description of  the cleaning project in this vignette is based on the memoir of  Al-Fadel Shalaq 
(Shalaq and Farshakh 2006), manager of  the cleaning project at the time and for a long time a key figure 
in the Hariri Establishment. Shalaq managed many of  the establishment's institutions including Oger 
Liban, the Hariri Foundation and Almustaqbal newspaper. He acted as a minister in Hariri's government 
as well as being head of  the Council for Development and Reconstruction. 
67  While Shalaq described the workers as 'volunteers', he indicated that they were given remuneration, the 
amount of which was not specified. Of  note is that those 'volunteers' included Ahmad Kobrosly, who 
was both a Nejmeh fan and the club's administrative director for decades. He was still in office at the 
time of my research. 
68   The text provides an uncritical account of  the events as narrated by Shalaq himself. It is essential though 
to point out the broader political context within which the project was taking place. The project 
officially started on 6th September, 1982, but according to Shalaq's memoir (Shalaq and Farshakh 2006: 
50-68) Hariri first proposed the idea on September 1st, while Beirut was still under siege by the Israeli 
Forces for over two months. Hariri's proposal was made only two days after PLO leader Yasser Arafat 
left Beirut, and a week after Bachir Gemayal was elected, with Israeli support, as Lebanon's President. 
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find their way in and out of  the stadium, in what Hariri’s close aid at the time and the engineer responsible 
for the work, Al-Fadal Shalaq describes in his memoir as a ‘fascinating daily spectacle that could have been 
in the best of  Hollywood movies’ (Shalaq and Farshakh 2006: 110), they are watched by the amazed eyes 
of  the stadium’s neighbours, the residents of  Tariq al-Jadidah. The cleaning project is Rafic Hariri’s first 
engagement in a public project in the city of  Beirut, and for it he has the blessing of  Saeb Salam, the city’s 
zaʿim at the time, as well as Saudi funding that he acknowledged in the stickers on the sides of  all the 
vehicles. It is the ‘project of  a lifetime’ as Hariri repeatedly tells Shalaq.  
The budget of  the cleaning project has no limits. Shalaq claims that an account was opened in his name in 
a local bank, which he used without once monitoring how much he spent nor checking what the balance was 
(Shalaq and Farshakh 2006). The demands on the tempo of  the performance are high; at the time when 
160 truck loads per day are being moved, Rafic Hariri requires that they reach a target of thousand loads. 
In narrating the events of  that period and the spirit by which the project was implemented, Shalaq speaks 
of  it as a charitable one motivated by devotion for the city and an interest in its welfare as well as that of  
its people69. 
The handling of  the project did not always follow these high ideals. When for example one of  the many 
warring militias requested that the vehicles or project workers carry out certain services for it, the drivers 
usually obliged. Similarly, when the Lebanese President needed to install a tennis court at the presidential 
palace, the same team of  workers and engineers, using the same funding, unquestioningly complied.  
The project provides an example of  the model that Hariri, and his establishment more broadly, adopted 
later on in their business, charity and political enterprises. In addition to signalling Hariri’s entry into the 
public domain, the importance of  this early phase of  contracting and philanthropic work is that it marked 
the moment when Hariri built a network of  workers who later formed the core of  his team when he 
embarked on his political career. Amongst those, interviewed and employed by Shalaq himself  in 1980, 
was engineer Muheib Itani who later acted as Hariri’s ‘client representative’ in the negotiations for the 
change in Nejmeh’s patronage and the transfer of  its management into Hariri’s hands in 2002 – 2003. 
I met Muheib Itani many years ago when he was director of  Electricite du Liban (EDL) in the mid 
1990s. Talking about the EDL’s most recent achievement of  installing thousands of  new electricity poles 
across Lebanon, Itani described how he was advised by Hariri to paint the poles the same colour as his 
                                                 
69   The same ‘cleaning efforts’ are argued by sociologist Nabil Beyhum and several of  Beirut’s intellectuals 
to be part of  a pretext for the demolition of  large areas of  downtown Beirut. Clearances in 1983 made 
way for the later implementation of  Beirut’s city centre reconstruction plan under Solidere, which in 
practice allowed Solidere to seize ownership of  all the land in downtown Beirut. These events are 
documented in an untranslated work by Beyhum et al., I'amar Beirut wa'l fursa al-da'i'a [The 
Reconstruction of  Beirut and the Lost Opportunity] (1992:16). 
117 
bright orange lighter. He took that lighter out of  his pocket to show the flashy colour, and explained that 
this way, both the new poles and the achievements of  the Prime Minister at the time, Rafic Hariri, were 
made highly visible. In the following weeks, as I drove through the villages of  South Lebanon, I saw the 
newly erected bright orange poles everywhere – an army of  them dominating the arid hilly landscape. 
 
Figure 16: Poster celebrating Rafic Hariri as the ‘man of  construction’.70 
 
Introduction 
When I first began my research, I was repeatedly told, not only by random fans who might 
have known little about the legislation of  football clubs, but also by sports journalists and 
football referees, that Rafic Hariri had ‘bought’ Nejmeh Club. The significance of  the use 
of  the term is that, in people’s general opinion, Hariri had obtained the club in direct 
                                                 
70  Source: RaficBHariri Instagram account https://instagram.com/p/ymnB8HtLmu/ accessed 
19/9/2015. 
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exchange for financial payment rather than following the route for club presidents or 
patrons who are more usually chosen or nominated before undergoing formal election or 
appointment processes. Given that the club, like all other sports clubs in Lebanon, was 
registered as a sports association and therefore could not be legally bought, the use of  the 
idiom of  ‘buying’ is indicative of  the key factor that gave Hariri control over the club. 
‘Buying’ in the broad sense of  the term, and not merely the legal or technical term, is 
descriptive of  many of  Hariri’s engagements in the public sphere. The instrumental use of  
wealth was key in forwarding Hariri’s public and political career.  
According to political scientist El-Husseini, Hariri was ‘representative of  a new trend in 
politics – the importance of  wealth’ (2004: 249); he belonged to a category of  elite which 
she calls ‘the entrepreneurs’. Members of  such entrepreneurial elites enjoy ‘international 
experience, attitudes, and behaviour different from those of  traditional politicians’ and are 
surrounded by ‘teams of  experts educated in the west’. These people establish 
philanthropic foundations specifically to create the clientele base and networks which they 
would have otherwise inherited (El-Husseini 2004: 249). This chapter provides an 
ethnographic exploration of  Hariri’s use of  philanthropy to create a leadership position. 
Through describing the transition from what fans popularly called the ‘Ghandour Era’ to 
the ‘Hariri Era’ within Nejmeh Sport Club, I analyse the ascent of  Rafic Hariri into 
leadership in Lebanon and the new model of  socio-political zaʿim he presented. I do this 
by examining how the discourse and images of  Hariri as a person, and ‘Harirism’ more 
broadly, were presented and consumed by Nejmeh members and fans. I trace the ways in 
which the ‘Hariri approach’ coincided with and built on existing understandings of  
leadership and social capital, while at the same time highlighting what is distinctive about 
the approach. 
In his philanthropy, as in politics, Hariri was distinguished by his wealth. His charitable 
endeavours resembled global trends of  mega-philanthropy, a phenomenon which has 
shown marked growth with the significant increase in the income of  the richest 1% and the 
emergence of philanthrocapitalism understood as ‘the application of  business techniques to 
philanthropy by a new generation of  self-made, hands-on donors—and strategic 
grantmaking’ (Jenkins 2011:3). Philanthropy has long been discussed as a tool of  hegemony 
of  the capitalist class (Gramsci 1971), or at least as a gift which entails reciprocity (Mauss 
1967) [1923] and contributes to accumulation of  symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1986). Recent 
research which has examined the contributions of  philanthrocapitalists within specific 
sectors has made clear the ways in which their financial contributions allow them to 
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promote the political agenda they support (Morvaridi 2012a). Research into the individual 
trajectories of  philanthrocapitalists such as Carnegie provides a more nuanced 
understanding of  the ‘symbiotic relationship between entrepreneurship and philanthropy’ 
and ways in which philanthropy ‘serves as a mechanism both for capital conversion and 
capital accumulation’ (Harvey et al 2011: 445). Seen in these terms, economic capital is used 
to generate social and cultural capital, thereby increasing a philanthropist’s field of  power 
and enabling them to contribute to decision-making on a grand scale. In turn, their 
involvement in such decision-making serves to bolster their entrepreneurial and economic 
endeavours. 
The chapter consists of  two sections: the first explores how Hariri’s philanthropy was 
presented and consumed and ways in which it contributed to his accumulation of  political 
capital. Like the project mentioned in the vignette, Hariri’s endeavours were typically 
performative, characterised by exceptional scale, and the ostentatious expenditure of  huge 
amounts of  money. They were also porous, giving way for some ‘favours’ and ‘losses’, or in 
other words, were permissive of  a certain degree of  corruption which at times was 
instrumentally used to serve Hariri’s political agenda. In addition to the instrumental 
political value of  Hariri’s philanthropy - and beyond the simplified understanding of  
philanthropy as a way of  securing political support in a dyadic patron-client relationship - I 
explore the symbolic and idealistic underpinnings of  Hariri’s philanthropy. I also examine 
the impact of  Hariri’s philanthropy not only on what would become Hariri’s constituencies, 
but also its effects on his relationship with other members of  the elite.  
In the second section, I focus on the experience of  Nejmeh Sport Club, especially the 
conditions that led its management to approach Hariri as a patron and the process by 
which they handed the club over to him. The club had always enjoyed political patronage, 
predominantly from Beirut’s traditional leader Saeb Salam, yet that patronage often only 
provided political cover and support when administrative and political problems were 
pressing. The patronage of  Hariri that began in 2003 was of  a significantly different nature, 
in that full responsibility for the club was entrusted to the new patron whose remit 
included ensuring both proper management and sustainable funding. The second section 
also presents the contrast that existed between the desired financial stability and 
sustainability from Hariri’s patronage, and the fickle precarious situation of  the club while 
this research was being implemented. Most of  the time-period that this chapter is 
concerned with is the phase preceding the transition of  the club into the hands of  the 
Hariri establishment. The chapter scrutinizes the ‘Hariri approach’ and illuminates the 
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underlying logic of  the way the club later came to be managed – an issue I pursue further 
in later chapters. 
Point of  Departure: The Characteristics of  the Hariri 
Style 
Philanthropy, as described by Cammett and Issar (2010) and Baumann (2012a), was Hariri’s 
starting point for building a constituency, particularly among the Sunni communities of  
Beirut. Hariri’s charitable initiatives, like the cleaning–up of  Beirut in 1982, were either 
implemented by his contracting company, OGER Liban, or more often by the ‘Hariri 
Foundation’ which was established in 1979. The Foundation’s programmes included 
delivery of large scale educational grants in the 1980s and 1990s, and the establishment of  
educational and health centres that continue to be active71. Several other charitable 
donations were made under different institutional and personal capacities72, not least in the 
field of  sports.  
Building on Johnson’s (1986) earlier work on the leadership of  the Salam family, which 
presented philanthropy as part of  the clientelist exchange of  services of  a leader for 
political support, political scientist Baumann argues that philanthropy is more than 
‘material exchange’ and includes a ‘set of  practices whereby a community is being 
“imagined”’73 (2012c: 83) and out of  which a leader gains symbolic power. Sectarianism, ‘a 
nationalist creation that dates back no further than the beginnings of  the modern era when 
European powers and local elites forged a politics of  religion amid the emerging nation-
state system’ (Makdisi 1996) was a readily available ‘cultural artefact’ (Anderson 2006: 48) 
around which symbolic communal imagination could be mobilised. In these mobilization 
efforts Baumann argues that ‘Hariri deployed political and financial “capital” derived from 
the fields of  international relations and the economy in the field of  political culture’ 
particularly through his philanthropy (2012a: 83), or in other words in the generation of  
                                                 
71  After the assassination of  Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in 2005, two organizations have evolved from the 
Hariri Foundation, the ‘Hariri Foundation for Sustainable Development’ http://www.hariri-
foundation.org which is presided over by Hariri’s sister Bahia and the ‘Rafic Hariri Foundation’, which 
has the late Hariri’s wife, Nazek, as president http://www.rhf.org.lb - both websites accessed 
28/12/2014. 
72  One example is the ‘Beirut Association for Social Development’, which according to its website ‘was 
founded in Lebanon upon a decision taken by the Martyr Prime Minister Rafic Hariri’ though without 
reference to how its management and funding today relates to Hariri’s other charitable endeavours 
http://beirutassociation.org/about-us.html - Accessed 28/12/2014. 
73   As per Anderson's understanding of  the 'imagined community' (2006) 
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symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1986). In that sense Hariri chose to ‘confirm rather than 
transform’ the Lebanese socio-political order and the culture of  sectarianism in Lebanon, 
by using the same techniques as previous Lebanese political leaders and positing himself  as 
a Sunni leader or zaʿim (Baumann 2012a: 84). 
With regard to Hariri’s supporters and his clients within this philanthropic exchange, I 
agree with Baumann’s ideas on the centrality of  philanthropy in Hariri’s path to leadership, 
as well as the importance of  looking at both the material and symbolic aspects of  that 
exchange (Auyero 2007). At the same time, following Shore (2002), and examining Hariri’s 
ascendance to power beyond the sectarian perspective which dominates the analysis of  
Lebanese politics, Hariri’s power and status as an emerging member of  the elite needs to be 
understood as part of  a set of  dynamic processes ‘rather than static or bounded entities’ 
embedded in broader sets of  economic and social changes (Shore 2002:13). In fact Hariri, 
as a member of  the ‘transnational capitalist class’ (Baumann 2012b: 129), resembles as 
much the model of  the Lebanese pre-war philanthropist zaʿim as he does that of  the 
neoliberal ‘philanthrocapitalist’74. Through consideration of Hariri’s political and 
philanthropic trajectory, particularly his patronage of  Nejmeh, I examine ways in which the 
above two models converge and diverge, particularly looking at (1) the scale of  
philanthropic contributions (2) sources of  funding and (3) the ideals of  philanthropic 
endeavours. 
                                                 
74  The Hariri family is one of  the few Middle Eastern capitalist philanthropists to have signed, according 
to Morvaridi (2012b: 254), the ‘Giving Pledge’, which the initiative’s website describes as ‘a commitment 
by the world's wealthiest individuals and families to dedicate the majority of  their wealth to 
philanthropy’. Interestingly, going to the website of  the Giving Pledge in 2014, the name of  the Hariri 
family no longer features as one of  the current pledgers – see http://givingpledge.org/ - Accessed 
20/12/2014. 
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Figure 17: The tomb of  late Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in down town Beirut. Picture in the left corner is of  the 
Prime Minister kissing the hand of  his father as a sign of  respect. 
 
Figure 18: Wreaths next to Hariri's tomb, each given in the name of  one family member, including his sons, 
daughters, their spouses and his grandchildren. 
 
123 
 
Figure 19: The tomb of  Yahya Mustafa al-Arab, head of  Rafic Hariri’s private security. Al-Arab, who was a 
board member of  Al-Ansar, was killed with Hariri on the same day and buried next to him. 
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Mega-Philanthropy: Scale and Performance 
Let me start with a description given by Mahmoud, a Nejmeh club fan75 who outlines the 
particulars of Hariri’s use of  philanthropy in his public and political career. 
‘Some people criticise Hariri, they say he robbed the country, but I don’t think 
he did. It does not require much thinking. Let me put myself, or any ordinary 
person, in his shoes. I find a country completely destroyed, I buy it all, 
reconstruct it, I borrow money from here and there to make it a beautiful 
place. I would have benefited people through that; employed people in 
reconstruction, started a restaurant here and employed people, established 
institutions to employ youths who are on the streets. As long as those young 
people are on the streets, they will be looking to carry arms. No, some people 
want to educate their kids... Their kids were sent abroad for an education. This 
I know really well, I have personally experienced it. Hariri came to a destroyed 
country. There was no zaʿim and he established himself  as one. He 
reconstructed the country […]. Look at the Hariri institutions, how many 
families do they employ? I have been to Hariri’s house, to his palace; He 
probably has 200-300 employees there. That is 300 families… imagine he 
leaves the country, imagine he gets upset and quits politics, those three hundred 
will go home, have no income, and will become either thieves or smugglers or 
.. or.. let alone those employed in the institutions, the banks, and the 
companies. Should I not see the benefit of  all of  that?’ 
What is distinctive about Hariri in Mahmoud’s description is that he ‘bought’ the country to 
be able to ‘fix it’, just like he ‘bought the club’, according to popular discourse, as described 
in the introduction to this chapter. Hariri, with his extensive wealth and his image as a 
successful businessman, was capable not only of  ruling or governing the country on its 
path to recovery, but of  buying it. According to Baumann, one of  the ways in which 
Hariri’s charitable endeavours differ from those of  the pre-war elite is in scale: he 
succeeded in building ‘a truly national presence by spending amounts that were beyond the 
financial capability of  the zuaʿma’ (2012b: 134). Evidence of this approach showed in the 
                                                 
75  Interview with Nejmeh club fan Mahmoud on 6/6/09. The interview was one of  several recorded with 
Mahmoud and took place when I had already known him for a year. It was part of  a wider discussion of  
Nejmeh club, its history, and Lebanese politics. The interview was conducted in Arabic and the 
translation is mine. 
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way he entered the public domain in 1982 and in his takeover of  the club, as described in 
the vignette. It also showed again repeatedly throughout his career as I will detail in 
following sections. Large scale expenditure, or mega-philanthropy, was not only a 
characteristic of  Hariri’s giving, but also a trend present in philanthropic expenditure more 
generally over the past two decades, and it parallels the rise in wealth creation of  the past 
twenty-five years (McGoey 2012)76. 
One of  the ways that mega-philanthropy achieves presence and utility in the public sphere 
is via its performative aspect; expenditure needs not only be made on a large scale, but also 
– like the orange electricity poles - it needs to be flagrantly visible in its largesse. To achieve 
these ends Hariri built a media empire, which, using sophisticated advertising strategies, 
succeeded in creating the popular image and myth of  Hariri as both self-made man and the 
country’s saviour in the post war period (Zaraket 2009). Zaraket argues that the backbone 
of  Hariri’s media image was that of  ‘making dreams a reality’, an image that, as she argues, 
captured the imagination of  the Lebanese in the post-war period. Of  particular interest is 
Hariri’s choice of  the magical word ‘Future’ which he used as the name of  the television 
station, newspaper, and political movement he established. Zaraket states that Hariri 
rejected claims that he had secured his popularity through the use of  wealth, and that 
according to him, his following was based on his ability to ‘implant hope in people’ 
(Zaraket 2009). This ability to ‘make dreams a reality’ is rooted in the presentation of  
Hariri’s own trajectory, as a poor farmer’s son who acquired his fortune through his own 
personal efforts. This story of  the successful entrepreneur who comes from a humble 
background accords with what Godelier describes as one of  the most common ‘cultural 
mythologies’ which are used to ‘legitimize the status and power’ of  the globalized 
entrepreneurial elite (2010: 76). The utility of  Hariri’s wealth at the popular level is thus tied 
to the performative aspect of  it, not only in the scale of  expenditure and the ability of  that 
expenditure to make dreams a reality, but also in his presentation as coming from a humble 
origin77. 
                                                 
76  The year 2006 for example, has been described as a ‘blockbuster year for American philanthropy’ where 
only 21 wealthy Americans donated over $100 million to charity 
http://philanthropynewsdigest.org/news/mega-philanthropy-hits-new-highs-in-2006 - Accessed 
22/12/2014. 
77  See for example Rafic Hariri’s biography on his website: ‘Mr. Hariri is a philanthropist, a self-made man 
who built his businesses single-handedly on the basis of  his reputation as an honest, credible and 
trustworthy partner in all his endeavours.' http://www.rhariri.com/general.aspx?pagecontent=biography 
- Accessed 22/12/2014 
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The implications of  the performative and large-scale philanthropy I describe went well 
beyond securing the political loyalty and votes of  recipients of  Hariri’s aid, and dwarfed 
any competition   he might have faced.  The scale of  his expenditure actually raised the 
standard of  what was expected and accepted and it filtered out any other actors who could 
not match it thus establishing him as a ‘super-zaiʿm’ (Bauman 2012b: 134). In his 
relationship with other members of  the elite, Hariri’s scale of  expenditure posited him as 
belonging to a higher rank. From this position of  authority he used his wealth tactically and 
instrumentally, making payments either directly or indirectly to other elite members, and to 
allies and competitors alike (Baumann 2012c; El-Husseini 2012). 
Sources of  Funding 
Another characteristic which distinguished Hariri’s approach from the pre-war clientelistic 
relations in Beirut concerned the sources of  funding. According to Johnson (1986) the 
zuʿama of  Beirut traditionally relied on donations by Beirut’s bourgeoisie and middle class 
families, primarily through the institutional setup of  the Makassed Philanthropic Islamic 
Association of  Beirut (hereafter Makassed). Originally Makassed was a Muslim charity 
established in 1878 which, over time, transformed into a bureaucratic institution with a 
corporate structure which relied as much on religious endowments as on the commercial 
endeavours led by its members who were drawn from amongst Beirut’s business 
communities and notables (Johnson 1986: 110-114). In the post-war period of  independent 
Lebanon, Makassed’s resources were increasingly an ‘important source of  patronage for 
Sunni politicians’ (Johnson 1986: 111) not only through charitable distribution, but also 
through employment provision and in providing structure for the recruitment of  emerging 
leaders’ and their incorporation into the political machines of  existing zuʿama. 
By contrast, Hariri relied - like other philanthrocapitalists - in his philanthropy on the 
combination of his own wealth and support from Saudi Arabia (Shalaq and Farshakh 2006; 
Baumann 2012c). This, as I discuss in Chapter Five, allowed Hariri to maintain greater 
independence and power in his relations with other elite members and with Beirut’s 
bourgeoisie. Important to note though is that the decline in the power of  Makassed in 
particular is largely due to the role played by Hariri during his political career: he diverted 
Saudi Arabia’s funding away from Makassed, re-channelling it either towards his own 
charitable efforts or towards property acquisition and Solidere’s reconstruction projects in 
downtown Beirut (Baumann 2012b). 
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The Ideals: the Capitalist, Professional, and Moderate Muslim   
In Mahmoud’s quotation above, Hariri ‘benefits’ the people and the country not only 
through charity, but also through his economic enterprises; he is doing the country and its 
people a service by borrowing money and starting new businesses that provide 
employment opportunities. In Mahmoud’s description, Hariri’s charitable efforts are mixed 
with his role as Prime Minister and his private business endeavours; the mix includes the 
education grants he provided, the public reconstruction efforts that are largely paid for by 
the Lebanese government, or Hariri’s privately owned businesses, including banks, 
companies and even his own house which Mahmoud describes as the ‘palace’. The 
intermixing of  these various interests resembles the tactics of  other philanthrocapitalists 
who justify such an approach by emphasising that the pursuit of  a capitalist’s own self  
interest is in itself  a contribution to collective social interests or, as McGoey summarizes it, 
the notion that ‘the more financially profitable and market-savvy an organization is, the 
more social good it will inevitably create’ (McGoey 2012:193). 
Hariri’s approach brought significant changes to the practice and ideals of  philanthropy, 
not least in scale, the sources of  funding, and the performative aspects of  it, but it also 
built on many ideals widely held by the constituency he aimed to represent. The above 
mentioned belief  that economic enterprise in itself  produces social good, and the 
acceptance of  the conflation of  public and private interest is central to the ideals which 
underpinned Hariri’s charitable endeavours and  ‘resonates with long-held economic 
assumptions of  the moral advantages of  capitalism’ (McGoey 2012:186). Confirming 
McGoey’s argument that ‘Philanthrocapitalism is both less novel than proponents claim, 
and more novel in ways that proponents have either failed to envision or are reluctant to 
articulate’ (2012:186), is the third characteristic of  Hariri’s philanthropy, namely that these 
ideals seem also to have been widely held by many of  Beirut’s entrepreneurs and 
bourgeoisies, even before Hariri’s ascent to power. As early as 1948 for example, Makassed, 
which was established as a Muslim Sunni charity relying on religious endowments – waqf - 
and presided over by the Mufti, went through a process of  secularization and moved into 
management by salaried professional staff  and a board of  directors. Beside waqf, it also 
made use of  the ‘commercial talents of  its members and leaders, and entered the world of  
high finance and property speculation’ and generated income from the rental of  office 
space in Beirut’s down town area (Johnson 1986: 111). Members of  Nejmeh, who served 
on the board before the club moved into Hariri’s patronage, echo the same sentiment; their 
skills as businessmen testified to their ability to manage the sports club. Baroudi, a board 
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member in the early 1990s, who joined the club’s board upon the invitation of  a friend to 
take on the responsibility of  leading and funding it, echoes such logic: ‘we all had managed 
our own businesses and institutions successfully, how difficult can managing a football club 
be? Hariri was by far richer and more successful, so sure to be able to take on that role.’ 
This parallels the reform efforts of  modern philanthropy, including the use of  ‘scientific 
methods to the promotion of  human welfare, explicitly distinguishing their practices from 
acts of  alms-giving prevalent within religious orders which viewed charity as valuable in 
itself  regardless of  observable benefits’ which McGoey summarises (2012: 189). 
The business ethos described above comes replete with a discourse of  institutional 
development, professional and efficient operation, as well as computerisation and use of  
the latest technology in day-to-day operations. This trend is evinced in the way in which 
Shalaq (Shalaq and Farshakh 2006) boasts of  Oger Liban’s efficient implementation of  the 
cleaning operation and all later projects and even his work with CDR in the 1990s, as well 
as in the public image of  the Hariri Foundation and institutional set-up of  his charitable 
organizations. 
That said, a religious image and discourse remains central in the self-presentation of  most 
of  Beirut’s elite, not least Hariri himself. Indeed, the image that Hariri constructed for 
himself  as a ‘moderate Muslim’; the ‘son who kisses his father’s hand and takes his children 
to Hajj’ who also ‘takes part in international business conferences and meets with world 
leaders’ (Zaraket 2009) does not differ from the way that many of  the older members of  
Nejmeh from Beirut’s entrepreneurial elite – and possibly Arab urban elite more broadly - 
also presented themselves. It could even be argued that all such players, old and new, from 
among Beirut’s entrepreneurial elite belonged to what Arab intellectual Al-Azam calls 
‘good-for-business-Islam’; ‘Arab middle-class commercial Islam as represented by the 
bourgeoisies of  various key Arab countries and led by an assortment of  agencies such as 
the chambers of  commerce, industry and agriculture, multiple forms of  Arab Islamic 
banking, investment houses, venture capital and so on’ (2014: 283). 
The extent to which the discourse and image of  the ‘moderate Muslim’ mirrors personal 
beliefs, cultural norms or constructed instrumental presentations for different members of  
Beirut’s elite is impossible to gauge. The discussion in the next chapter, on the self-
described motivation of  different board members to engage with Nejmeh, further 
illuminates this issue as well as ways in which the characteristics of  Hariri’s philanthropy, 
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namely scale, sources of  funding, and ideals impacted on governance of  the club and on 
the practice of  politics more broadly. 
The Corrupt and Porous 
Alongside representations of  grand, professional and idealistic performative aspects of  
Hariri and his philanthropy, the name of  Hariri has been also closely associated with wide-
spread corruption in Lebanon. Leenders (2014) shows how political corruption was 
endemic in post-war Lebanon: his account details Hariri’s strategies and his involvement in 
the politics of  reconstruction which included the establishment of  Solidere and the 
implementation of  the downtown reconstruction project. The corruption in Hariri’s 
philanthropic and political endeavours was in fact a strategic choice rather than the result 
of  oversight. Most his projects were permissive of  a certain degree of  corruption, and thus 
described as porous in that they allowed individuals involved in them a certain degree of  
unaccounted for profit. At the same time, corruption within the broader Lebanese political 
system allowed Hariri to instrumentally use his wealth to push forward his political agenda. 
Indeed Hariri is presented by some sources as a model of  ‘effective corrupt leadership’ 
(Neal and Tansey 2010). As early as 1982, Hariri’s expenditure in the public sphere, as 
described by his close aid at the time, Shalaq (Shalaq and Farshakh 2006), appears to have 
been porous, incapable and unwilling to thwart the abuse of  the resources allocated for the 
clean-up by members of  the militias and allowing for unplanned ‘services’ to be 
implemented for other politicians. Allowing such favours to fellow members of  the elite 
and the ‘leakage’ of  funds appears to have worked more as an instrumental tool of  
governance and management rather than as an unintended consequence. Even before 
arriving in office, Hariri was known for employing ‘cheque book diplomacy’ (Baumann 
2012b: 130) not least in supporting the materialisation of  the Ta’if  agreement that ended 
the Lebanese civil war.  
Tolerance of  a significant level of  corruption was evident at the popular level. In 
Mahmoud’s description of  Hariri’s aid-giving, he gave me many examples of  the 
distribution of  aid he had personally facilitated. He told me how, for example, a guy could 
come to him wanting help in paying for hospitalisation costs for one of  his kids, and 
Mahmoud would send the applicant to acquaintances in the appropriate Hariri office who 
would see that around 50% of  the medical expenses were covered once the person in need 
indicated that he had come on Mahmoud’s recommendation. This is not necessarily an 
indication of  any great authority that Mahmoud held at the Hariri establishment, but 
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possibly reflects the existence of Mahmoud’s good network of  relationships which enabled 
him to play that sort of  brokerage role. He was relied on to facilitate the process of  
distribution of  food aid in the month of  Ramadan when this research was being 
implemented. Mahmoud recounted to me how he surveyed needy families on behalf  of  
what he called the ‘Hariri Aid Bureau’78 and later gave each family a voucher entitling them 
to receive a box containing food aid worth around fifty US dollars. He admitted that 
around half of  those who received such aid were not really in need, and according to him 
they would often sell the food they had received to a local shop for around two thirds of  its 
value. ‘It would not matter to them that they are selling it for cheaper’ he explained, ‘they 
have paid nothing for it to start with’. In other instances, instead of  giving vouchers to 
needy families, the aid office would deliver an aid box direct to people’s houses. When this 
happened, Mahmoud described how, often, one of  the recipients would bribe the 
distributor to bring more boxes which had originally been allocated to other families. 
Mahmoud did not condemn this small-scale business transaction disguised as charity; it is 
what was expected or at best a side effect of  Hariri’s generosity. ‘Games always take place’, 
he said, ‘but if  a person plans to give charitable aid, he continues to help people as much as 
he can regardless.’ 
The Transition of  Nejmeh Club into Hariri’s Patronage 
Starving the Club and the Increasing Costs of  Football 
‘There were people who robbed us of  [Nejmeh], they starved it so they can take it away 
from us. They starved it and controlled the club through money’. These were the words of  
long-time club fan Sami on the transition of  the club into Hariri patronage. Along with the 
accusation that Sami’s words imply, this section explores the changes in the post-war period 
within the club and within Beirut’s sports, political and economic scene – all of  which 
necessitated a change in the club’s patronage, or the process of  ‘starvation’ as Sami 
described it. 
Contrary to popular rumours Hariri did not seek to acquire the club, but rather attended to 
it upon the board’s request. One of  the main reasons was the inability of  board members 
                                                 
78  The 'Hariri Aid & Relief  Bureau', is part of  the Hariri Foundation and is the branch of  the Foundation 
that appears to provide ‘on-demand’ humanitarian – and at times political - assistance. After the 
assassination of  Rafic Hariri in 2005 it was renamed: 'Martyr Rafic Hariri Assistance Office'. For details 
see http://www.rhf.org.lb/content/office-hariri-relief-services-0#overlay-context=content/office-hariri-
relief-services-0  - Accessed 2/1/2015. 
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to adequately fund the club as they had done for the past decades. In a 2009 interview I 
conducted with former club President Omar Ghandour, six years after he left the club, he 
explained the economic difficulty faced by club board members which motivated the 
decision to appeal to Hariri for help: 
‘As board members, those of  us who used to be able to pay a pound now could 
only pay a penny. Donors who used to pay a thousand now only paid a 
hundred or could not pay at all. So we only had one of  two choices, we either 
hold on to the club although this could be its end since we no longer could 
cover its financial needs, or we find somebody capable of  supporting it 
financially. This is why we went to Sheikh Rafic Hariri, God bless his soul, and 
told him that we wanted his son to take charge of  the club and become the 
club’s president. Even then, Bahaa [Hariri’s son] did not come as club 
president, but as a benefactor’.  
The change in Ghandour’s and other board members’ economic status was not 
coincidental, but indicative of  the broader economic changes in the post-war period. Club 
donors and board members mostly belonged to the upper and upper-middle classes of  
Beirut society, many of  them were industrialists. For most of  its modern history, Lebanon’s 
economy has generally been dominated by its service sector - the country’s largest 
employer. The 1940s and 1950s had witnessed growth in the urban industries (Gaspard 
2004), which Ghandour and his family had considerable position in (Johnson 1986: 35-36). 
The industry’s work force, mostly new immigrants to Beirut residing in its suburbs, 
quadrupled between 1953 and 1975, comprised around 20% of  the country’s total 
population (Fawaz and Peillen 2003). The Israeli invasion of  1982, and the ensuing 
departure of  a defeated PLO from Lebanon, was followed by an escalation of  the civil war 
and deterioration in financial and economic conditions in the country (Makdisi 2004). Yet 
the economic deterioration in this period did not affect all sectors in the same way. The 
negative impact of  the war on the service and trade sectors precipitated a rise in the 
manufacturing and construction sectors’ share of  the Lebanese economy (Makdisi 2004: 
47). Despite overall hardship during the civil war from 1975 till 1990, those in 
manufacturing, like Ghandour and other board members, were relatively less badly affected 
than elite members who conducted business in other sectors. 
The post-war period had produced weak financial performance and limited growth. 
According to renowned Lebanese economist Gaspard, this contraction was largely due to 
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the laissez fair policy championed by Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, and to systematic 
government failure ‘on all the major fronts of  fiscal, monetary and structural reform 
policies’ (Gaspard 2004: 215).  In particular, the Lebanese economic policy repeatedly failed 
to make use of  ‘uniquely favourable circumstances’ for the growth of  the industrial sector 
as early as the 1950s, where the laissez-faire regime ‘effectively became the alternative to, if  
not the opposite of, a potentially successful industrialisation strategy’ (Gaspard 2004: 140). 
The economic circumstances I describe had seriously weakened the ability of  board 
members to continue contributing to the club financially since many of  them were 
involved in the ailing manufacturing industries. Their much reduced financial capacity was 
compounded, as board members active at the time indicated, by the burden of  paying 
repeated financial penalties which were imposed on Nejmeh by the LFA - as explained in 
Chapter Three. Nejmeh and its board members were not only penalised, but were also 
often deprived of  the significant revenue from ticket sales to the club’s wide fan base that 
they usually depended on. 
Increased financial pressure came at a time when the costs of  the club were also being 
driven up by the global trend towards professionalisation of  organised sports. Against this 
background Nejmeh continued as one of  the few clubs in the premier league not to have 
stable politico-sectarian patronage. According to Ghandour - and other board members 
active in the same period - the responsibility of  the club had become too heavy for them to 
bear: 
‘The last three to five years I was in the club I was financially exhausted. The 
club’s yearly budget had reached 800,000 – 900,000 USD. Its income, including 
advertisements was around 500,000 USD. We had to find a way to get 400-500 
thousand every year, either out of  our own pockets or by some sort of  
begging. We became professional beggars. This is why I could not continue 
with the club.’ 
The situation Ghandour describes coincided with the appearance in Beirut of the new and 
very well funded Olympic Club which was funded by Taha Koleilat, a Beiruti businessman 
who acquired his wealth through a much discussed, and notorious bank embezzlement 
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case79. Koleilat had strong ties with Syrian military and intelligence officers, who at the time 
enjoyed significant authority in the Lebanese political scene. Some news reports rumoured 
that Koleilat was being supported by the Syrians as an alternative to Rafic Hariri for the 
leadership of  the Sunni communities. The way in which Koleilat went about raising the 
profile of  his newly acquired club is worth a closer look, despite the difficulty of  validating 
the truth of  either news reports or rumours in circulation at the time. According to 
accounts by football media personnel, Koleilat acquired the licence of  an existing non-
functioning club and by making substantial financial investment managed to take it up to 
the Lebanese football club’s premier league in only one year. With Kolielat’s continued 
support the club won Lebanon’s championship a year later in 2003. The budget of  
Olympic Beirut was significantly higher than that of other clubs, and Koleilat used his 
financial resources to attract both players and fans, especially from Tariq Al-Jadidah, the 
neighbourhood he came from. As members of  both Nejmeh and Ansar clubs told me, 
Koleilat attracted fans to his club by the many giveaways he offered them when they 
attended games, an indication of  the capricious nature of  football fandom in Lebanon. 
Olympic Beirut raised the bar for other clubs with salaries that at least doubled the highest 
payments offered elsewhere in Lebanon. Nejmeh board members, who did not anticipate 
that the phenomenon of  Olympic Beirut would be so short lived, felt intensified pressure 
to secure their club financially so that it could compete with its rivals. Koleilat, whether 
inspired by Hariri or determined to compete with him, actually used Hariri’s own tactics. 
However, Koleilat fell into oblivion when he lost his political standing after facing  
numerous charges of  embezzlement and drug taking, and his demise actually strengthened 
Hariri’s position.   
Options for Nejmeh’s Funding and Sustainability: Who but Hariri? 
In the face of  financial crisis and the amount of  capital being attracted by the Olympic 
club, Nejmeh board members were under pressure to not only find alternative funding 
sources, but also ensure long term secure funding for the club. The Arabic word which 
Ghandour and other board members repeatedly used to describe the responsibility that 
board members felt towards the club was ʾamana (trust), which in Arabic comes from the 
                                                 
79  The account of  Koleilat’s and Olympic Beirut’s rise is based on information shared by research 
participants, and not necessarily based on verifiable information. These accounts do however present 
how the club and its patron were perceived at the popular level. Many media reports support the 
accounts above, although information in these reports is also difficult to verify – see for example Asharq 
Al-Awsat (2003), Sabra (2005), and Khbeiz (2006). 
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root verb meaning ‘to secure’80. The club was entrusted to them, and as board members 
they were duty-bound to safeguard it. If  unable, they needed to find an appropriate 
guardian who would be able to fulfil this obligation. For them, Nejmeh’s history and loyal 
fan base were far too precious to be left in an insecure financial and managerial situation.  
In the discussion about which guardian would be the most appropriate, several options 
were suggested as I explain below, but Hariri was eventually the one chosen since he was 
perceived as the most capable of  handling the club’s financial needs, and would offer the 
most secure prospect in the long term if  he were to also commit his son to the club’s 
presidency.  
The first option suggested for club funding was to supplement the existing funds of  the 
club with support from its large fan base. This would mean continuing to run the club as it 
had been run for the duration of  Ghandour’s presidency; that is with two to three major 
donors, and a few smaller donors who were mostly board members. The work of  these 
donors would be paralleled with mobilising club fans and General Assembly members to 
contribute to the club financially. This scenario was developed by one of  the board’s 
members at the time, Zuheir Baroudi, who researched different models followed by 
European and Egyptian clubs. According to him, clubs in Egypt followed an organisational 
model similar to the one used in Lebanon, but their General Assembly membership was 
hundreds of  thousands strong, and this membership covered a substantial proportion of  
their club’s expenses despite the lower economic capacity of  Egyptian fans. Yet according 
to both Ghandour and Baroudi, responses to calls from the board to the fans and General 
Assembly members for contributions were not encouraging. In parallel, it appears that the 
board at the time were reluctant to extend the membership of the General Assembly. An 
influx of  additional members would have meant that control over the General Assembly 
and the results of  board elections could no longer be guaranteed and nor could the ability 
to ‘safeguard’ the club. 
                                                 
80  Most probably in Ghandour’s usage of  the word he is making reference to the obligation on him as a 
Muslim in respect to what is entrusted to him as stipulated in the Quran; 'Indeed, Allah commands you 
to render trusts to whom they are due and when you judge between people to judge with justice. 
Excellent is that which Allah instructs you. Indeed, Allah is ever Hearing and Seeing.'  Sahih 
International 4:58 - http://quran.com/4 and in another verse in describing the believers: 'And they who 
are to their trusts and their promises attentive'. Sahih International 23:8 http://quran.com/23 - 
Accessed 6/3/2015. 
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The second option was to take money from larger donors like Hariri, but without 
completely handing over the leadership of  the club. Other donors suggested were Koleilat 
himself, before he took over the Olympic Club, and Walid bin Talal, a Saudi billionaire 
businessman whose grandfather on his mother’s side was Lebanon’s first Prime Minister. 
Both these prospective donors were in political competition for the leadership of  the Sunni 
communities in Lebanon. Bin Talal’s cousin was a Nejmeh board member and is claimed to 
have promised a donation to the club. While I heard many stories of  why a suggested 
donation by him was not accepted, a more probable scenario, relayed by a board member 
serving at the time, was that the promised donation was never actually made. Proceeding 
with such a scenario would have required the continued diplomacy of  the board with 
multiple donors, but such negotiations would not have provided any guarantees of  
continuity of  funding. While money could have been secured for one year, there was no 
way to make sure there would be enough funding for the coming years. 
A similar option was to take Hariri’s funding while retaining the club’s management. As one 
board member described it, ‘we could have taken the money, and sent him and other 
donors a thank you letter’. This was even suggested by Hariri himself  according to board 
members involved in the first phases of  the negotiation, who were urged to continue 
running the club. The main reason behind refusing such a scenario was once again a 
concern over the sustainability of  funding. Some of  the older members who had served on 
the board for a long time wanted to retire and they wished to hand over the club to an 
administration that would be morally responsible for it, again as an ‘ʾamana’. For this 
reason Ghandour specifically asked for Hariri’s older son to become President as he saw 
this arrangement as a way to further strengthen the moral responsibility of  the new patron 
towards the club.  
The search then was for a patron who could ensure adequate and sustainable funding for 
Nejmeh, by being both wealthy enough to cater for it financially and being responsible for 
it as an ‘ʾamana’. Hariri, with the characteristics of  his philanthropy discussed earlier in this 
chapter, was thus the obvious and only choice. As Ghandour explained, no other patron 
could have provided the level of  funding that the club needed but Hariri. No other patron 
was capable of  ensuring half  a million dollars in payment yearly. True, Hariri from as early 
as the mid 1980s had provided occasional or on-request funding to the club, as one 
administrator who had been with the club for three decades attested: 
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‘The first cheque of  5000 USD donated by Hariri was given to me personally 
in the club’s stadium, through Oger Liban he planted the stadium’s turf  in the 
eighties, and for the Pan Arab games of  1997, he paid 150,000 USD. He made 
sure all the ministries contributed to its success and Bahia Hariri [Hariri’s sister] 
provided full support’.  
The giving of  such donations was confirmed by contemporaneous news reports about 
Hariri’s financial contribution to Nejmeh and other sports institutions as well as by almost 
everyone I spoke with in the club, including those who opposed the current management. 
The figures I was told of were, however, quite varied. One member who was on the club’s 
board before the transition told me the club received a regular monthly 5,000-dollar 
payment. Other board members, including Omar Ghandour, told me that Hariri had made 
a payment before the transition of  management of  200,000 USD which had cleared a 
substantial amount of  the club’s debt.  
Despite his regular financial contributions, Hariri was never the largest donor to the club, 
and the faith that he would be able to guarantee such funding indefinitely was deeply 
rooted in the image of  him as a mega-philanthropist and in the performative expenditure 
of  his wealth as discussed earlier in this chapter. As Baroudi, the Secretary General in 
office at the time, put it: 
‘If  we really wanted the club to move forward, we had to admit that this was 
the limit of  our financial capacity, and we should find somebody better than us 
who had capacity at the Arab regional level... who has the generosity to spend 
and the capacity to do so …somebody who if  they were to put their hand in 
their pocket to pay, there would be money there… we are talking about 
millions of  dollars here. Who can do that [in the same way that Olympic Beirut 
did]? To be honest, there was nobody in that period but Rafic Hariri’. 
Another factor to be taken into consideration, as described by a board member serving at 
the time, was the presence of  many of  Hariri’s business partners on the board of  Nejmeh. 
To describe them as partners perhaps misrepresents the relationship as one in which the 
power was more evenly balanced than was actually the case, despite the exact word 
‘partner’ being the one used by my research participants. ‘Partnering’ with Hariri meant 
working on projects that he led or owned in addition to access to government contracts 
through governmental agencies which were under his control. Throughout the post-war 
reconstruction period, consociational power sharing between members of  the Lebanese 
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political elite extended into the business sector and influenced the allocation of  
government contracts according to sect and area between those in power. For example, if  a 
highway leading from Beirut to the south of  Lebanon was to be laid, the contract could 
only be given to a contractor who Nabih Berri, leader of  the Shiite political group ‘Amal 
Movement’, approved of. Or, if  a project was to take place in Mount Lebanon, it had to be 
approved by the Druze leader, Jumblatt. Each region had its sect, leader, and custodian, 
who either got a share of  the contracts in his area or used his power to grant certain 
contracts with the implicit aim of  strengthening his own clientalist base. The same system 
governed almost all such major projects, and to guarantee that, the different ministries and 
governmental posts were distributed among the Lebanese leaders – albeit often after much 
‘political debate’. Hariri was guaranteed that certain posts would be taken on by staff  
members who were part of  his team, not least the Council of  Development and 
Reconstruction (CDR). The CDR, unlike other governmental entities ‘was an autonomous 
institution endowed with extended jurisdiction and is directly accountable to the Council 
of  Ministers through the Prime Minister, thus evading the administrative routine matters 
which had ceased to be followed in order to accelerate the reconstruction process and to 
allow adequate time for the reconstruction and building of  public institutions’81. The CDR 
was entrusted with many major reconstruction projects, and the contracts it awarded often 
involved substantial budgets. Retaining such a ‘partnership’ with Hariri ensured continued 
access to further contracts. To return to the topic of the club, one informant told me that 
some board members preferred handing the club to Hariri as opposed to other prospective 
patrons precisely because of  the existence such relationships. 
Under Hariri’s Patronage: Grand but Precarious 
The earliest projects and interventions undertaken by the club’s new patronage clearly 
illustrate Hariri’s large-scale performative approach. The first projects included restoration 
work, most significantly the renovation of  the stadium and laying of new turf  on the pitch, 
which together cost around 350,000 USD. This expensive first step was paralleled with 
what Muheib Itani, the Hariri establishment’s ‘client representative’ in its relationship with 
Nejmeh, calls a revamping of  the club, in particular on the financial and technical levels. In 
my interview with Itani on his role in the club, ensuring ‘professional management’ of  
Nejmeh Club was repeatedly voiced as one of  his duties in the post transition period. 
                                                 
81  http://www.cdr.gov.lb/eng/profile.asp  - Accessed 4/12/2010. 
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Organisationally, Itani was responsible for the liaison between Hariri and the club’s board, a 
role he had taken on at the inception of  transition negotiations and had continued in until 
2006. He made arrangements for the club’s financial payments and was instrumental in 
making strategic decisions, including the appointment of board members. Apart from 
securing agreements to ensure steady and long-term income for the club, the revamping 
process also involved securing more lucrative advertising contracts often from Hariri-
affiliated businesses, notably BankMed. This strategy provided a useful way of channelling 
more money into the club.  
In organisational terms the overhaul included entrusting the newly recruited, and now 
salaried, Secretary General of  the club with computerising the day-to-day operations, the 
only evidence of  which that I saw was the purchase of  new desktop computers. Another 
change involved intervention at the level of  the General Assembly. During the early stages, 
the Hariri establishment did not ‘buy’ the General Assembly; it first raised its price. In 
practice this meant that the membership fees were raised from 100 USD per year to 1000, 
to make sure that any existing members who had not been chosen by the Hariri 
establishment were effectively priced out. Itani argued that this tactic was meant to ensure 
financial stability for the club by having more of  the club’s costs covered by the General 
Assembly membership; this was despite the fact that in practice the Hariri establishment 
were paying their membership fees on their behalf82. 
Despite the changes and promises described above, when I observed the club during my 
fieldwork in 2008, the effects of  the institutional restructuring outlined by Itani were not 
particularly evident: the club remained as lacking in sustainability as Hariri’s funding had 
proved to. Internally, the club appeared to run in just the same way that it always had, and 
despite the presence of  a computer in the office, staff  had no idea how to send a simple 
email with an attachment. In addition, soon after the Hariri establishment guaranteed 
control over the General Assembly and opposing members were indirectly forced to resign, 
the need to pay large sums of  money to ensure control was no longer necessary. Most of  
the 400 new members who had joined the General Assembly as part of  the organisational 
revamping described by Itani left a year or two year later. 
                                                 
82  The intervention at the level of  the General Assembly is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Six, in 
which I show how legal bureaucratic and institutional discourse was used within the Hariri 
establishment’s operation. 
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Figure 20: Bahaa Rafic Hariri in a visit to Nejmeh stadium in 2003. During the visit which came only days after 
the acquisition of  the club by the Hariri Establishment and Bahaa’s appointment as Honorary President, 
instructions to renew the grass of  the stadium were given83. 
Ironically, and despite the choice of  Hariri as patron being motivated by the desire to 
secure the club financially, the funding situation of  the club while I was doing research in 
2008-2009 was far from secure. After the assassination of  Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in 
2005, his son Saad Hariri was the chosen political heir84 and not his older brother Bahaa. 
Ghandour’s request back in 2003 for Bahaa Hariri to preside over the club, even if  only as 
honorary president, in hope that this would create moral ties and responsibility towards the 
club appeared inconsequential; Nejmeh, along with other institutions that Bahaa presided 
over, like Almustaqbal newspaper, was handed over to Saad Hariri as part of  Rafic Hariri’s 
political inheritance. In fact, if  I were to highlight only a handful of  observations about the 
club at the time of  my field work, a sense of  precariousness and a perpetual quest for 
money by staff  and players would definitely head the list.  
                                                 
83  Copyright is for Almustaqbal newspaper. Obtained from the electronic version of  issue dated 
22/3/2003. 
84  Publicly it was announced that the Hariri family chose Saad as the political heir, and Itani explained to 
me in a September 2010 interview that Bahaa had no desire to play a political role. Yet El-Husseini 
claims that the decision for Saad to take the political lead was ‘heavily influenced by the Saudi Royalty’ 
who ‘already knew Saad from his work in Riyadh and preferred his deferential style over Bahaa's 
unpredictable temper’ (2012: 179). 
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On my last day of  fieldwork, late on a Saturday morning, I visited the club’s offices to say 
good-bye. There was a game that afternoon, and Mahmoud, Nejmeh’s PR officer needed 
to leave to attend to the logistics, but he stayed. He and other staff  members were waiting 
for their salaries which had been delayed for months. Everyone had been told that they 
would be paid that day. ‘I am not moving out of  here before I get my salary’ one employee 
told me. The office assistant arrived an hour or so later with money to pay the staff  
salaries, and an urgent request to send one of  BankMed’s staff  an email detailing the 
amount due for each staff  members’ salary. Although the money that the assistant was 
handling came from the bank, it was not being drawn from the club’s bank account or a 
cashed cheque. It was a payment that the club received through the bank itself which 
appeared to be acting as the patron’s cashier. The amount of  money received appeared to 
be a random figure that the patron could afford to pay at the time. There was no fixed or 
regularly paid monthly amount, and this particular payment was handed over to the office 
assistant before the club administrators had a chance to see the details of  what expenses 
the payment was intended to cover. Waiting for salaries and wondering when they would be 
paid formed one of  the most recurrent topics in discussions I had with most of  the staff. 
For many of  them the worst part of  the waiting was a deep uncertainty about whether any 
money would ever actually arrive.  
The daily expenses of  the club were yet another cause for complaint. Staff  in 
administrative positions needed cash to perform their work, be it taking a taxi to pick up a 
player from the airport, paying for another player’s medical expenses, or buying water and 
refreshments in the stadium. The staff  who were going through the difficulty of  not being 
paid their salaries were naturally reluctant to make these payments out of  their own pockets 
knowing very well that it could be months before they were reimbursed. The anger caused 
by the scarcity of  resources was often directed towards the management rather than the 
patron. Some board members were often criticised for their unwillingness to ‘put their 
hand in their pocket’, an expression used to describe a person who was generous and ready 
to pay.  
The desire of  Ghandour and his fellow board members to ensure financial security and 
sustainability for the club by handing over its patronage to the Hariri Establishment 
appeared unfulfilled. For many reasons that I will further elaborate on in the following 
chapters, the club actually had a flimsy structure and stood on administrative and financial 
grounds that were more precarious than ever after the interventions of  the Hariri 
establishment. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter I have introduced Hariri’s approach to philanthropy and to building a local 
constituency as one that combines large scale expenditure and the instrumental use of  
wealth with symbolic and spectacular elements which together posit him as a sectarian 
leader and as a self-made, professional and successful entrepreneur. I have described how 
his philanthropic trajectory and public image influenced the club’s decision to ask him to 
take over Nejmeh’s patronage. I have also shown the fragile and capricious nature of  his 
public engagement, and the porousness of  his expenditure - aspects which have 
contributed to corruption’s wider acceptance and reproduction (Haller and Shore 2005).  
Nejmeh club’s transition into the patronage of  Hariri signalled several significant changes 
in the club. The Hariri patronage started with large-scale expenditure and a discourse of  
improved management and sustainable financial structures. In practice though, the 
promises embedded in this discourse never truly materialised, funding was not sustained, 
and the structures of  power and governance within the club were significantly changed as 
Hariri, in entrepreneurial rather than beneficiary guise, suppressed any opposition within 
the club. These changes signalled a significant alteration in what being a zaʿim in Lebanon 
means – especially in the ways in which he relates to other members of  the elite. In the 
next chapter I explore this change further by examining Hariri’s relationship, as a club 
patron, with members of  Beirut’s urban elites or bourgeoisies. I examine the impact and 
effects of both his newly redefined role and his economic policy on governance within the 
club itself and, more widely, on the roles played by other urban elite members. 
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Figure 21: Statue of  late Prime Minister Hariri in front of  the council of  ministers. The logo of  Solidere – which 
simply reads ‘Beirut’ - is engraved on the cement block shown at the bottom of  the picture.85  
                                                 
85  Photo taken by Heba Hage and is used with permission. 
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5 
Beirut’s Bourgeoisie and Club 
Patronage: 
Changing the Players or the Game? 
 
 ‘Celui qui donne, ordonne’ (He who gives, governs) 
 French proverb86 
 
The Portraits of  Smiling Club Presidents 
Sunday, 3rd May 2009. Nejmeh stadium is in a festive mood. The team has won the club’s seventh 
Lebanese Football Association championship and the club has opened its doors this Sunday afternoon so 
that supporters can celebrate its achievement. 
A huge photograph of  the team hangs at the far end of  the stadium’s hall which serves on non-match days 
as a cafe for the club’s fans. Today large trays of  sweets and chocolate are laid out on side tables ready for 
the guests. Club President, Daouk, is seated in front of  an enormous wall-sized recent photograph of  the 
members of  his winning team. Along with other board members and the club’s staff  he stands and greets 
every new guest. The ambience is domestic and home-like. The sweets, the seating, the hospitality with which 
every guest is received all create the same kind of  atmosphere that you would experience at the welcome of  a 
returning traveller, or in the homecoming congratulations laid on for a newly married couple.  
True, this was perhaps more of  a social event than a sport-related one. The hugely enlarged photograph of  
the players formed the backdrop for all the other images taken on the day, but the players themselves were 
                                                 
86  The proverb was repeated to me in French by Lebanese research participants. On inquiring about it 
from French friends and researchers, I was told that the proverb is rarely used by French people and that 
it is usually only heard outside of  France. 
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not in attendance. Although many of  the guests were presidents and directors of  other teams, most of  the 
other visitors were social and political figures from Beirut. It was not the Minister of  Sports that came for 
example, but Tamam Salam, Beirut parliamentarian and Minister of  Culture and son of  one the club’s 
previous patrons, Sunni zaʿim, Saeb Salam. The guests also included Houri, a member of  the parliament 
representing Beirut, along with a member of  Beirut’s municipal board, the head of  the sport section at the 
Future Movement, and a number of  elected mayors from different districts of  Beirut.  
The next day the main picture of  the event published in Lebanese papers showed three of  the club 
Presidents who had been in attendance. In the picture Daouk, the current President, sits between two of  his 
predecessors, Omar Ghandour and Mohammad Fanj. Between them, these men have led the club through 
the past four decades. All three are smiling and the positive vibe between them seems palpable. The three 
share many similarities; all are successful Muslim Sunni businessmen of  good social standing. Both 
Ghandour and Daouk are from notable Beirut families, and are related through marriage and business 
relationships. They both have a long history of  contribution to and leadership of  Islamic charitable 
organisations. As leaders of  the club, they clearly resemble in background and class terms the politicians 
and officials who came to congratulate the club far more than they resemble members of  the club’s wide and 
varied fan base. 
Yet the amiability that seems to pervade their relationship does not coincide with the views of  club fans who 
spoke of  important differences between Ghandour, who left the club in 2003, and Daouk, the current 
President. According to club members the three Presidents symbolise between them two distinctly different 
eras; the Ghandour era, between 1969 and 2003, and the Hariri era which began in 2003 and during 
which both Fanj and Daouk served as Presidents. Hariri’s patronage initiated significantly different 
dynamics both within the club’s leadership, and in the management’s relationships with the club’s patron, its 
membership and its fan base. Seen from the fans’ perspective, the club was at one time pronounced ‘dead’ 
and a picture of  its logo with a black mourning strip photo-shopped onto it was used in one of  the club’s 
Facebook groups to convey this message. Despite the many similarities, between Daouk - an entrepreneur 
and international business lawyer - and Ghandour – a leader in paper manufacturing and other industries 
- there was more than a decade of  age difference between them. Beyond age, they had varied outlooks 
towards their role as presidents of  the club and the way they positioned themselves in relation to the club 
patron and the fans; a variation which reflected the broader changes taking place in Lebanon’s economic and 
political context in the post-war period.  
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Figure 22: Nejmeh Presidents from 1969 – 2011. Nejmeh club's stadium in celebration of  the club's 7th Lebanese 
Football Associations' championship, 2009. From left to right: Mohammad Fanj (2003-2005), Mohammad Amin 
Daouk (2005 – present), Omar Ghandour (1969 – 2003).87 
Introduction 
In my analysis of  changing roles and power relations within Nejmeh, and in following the 
discourse of  club members and fans who spoke about a ‘Ghandour era’ and a ‘Hariri era’, I 
fell into the trap of  making direct comparisons between the Ghandour’s leadership of  the 
club and that of  Hariri. However, Ghandour and Hariri occupied distinct positions and 
undertook very different roles within the club itself  and in the broader social and political 
scene. Rafic Hariri, and later Saad his son, both served as Prime Minister and as leaders of  
the Sunni communities. Hariri senior’s position within the hierarchy of  club leadership was 
similar to that of  Saeb Salam in the late 1960s – the time when Ghandour joined the club; 
Hariri, like Salam, was the club’s raʿi, the Arabic word for patron. Ghandour’s position 
should have been comparable to that of  Daouk, Nejmeh’s President at the time of  my 
research. However, the fans’ labelling of  the two phases was justified by the relative equity 
in the power that Ghandour and Hariri had or still have in the club. It possibly summarised 
a key change that took place within the club, and within the Sunni communities of  Beirut 
in the post-war period more broadely, namely the shift from a locus of  power shared 
amongst Beirut’s bourgeoisie towards one held by a single leader from the entrepreneurial 
elite. 
                                                 
87  Copyright is for Almustaqbal newspaper. Obtained from the electronic version of  issue dated 4/5/2009 
– page 22  http://www.almustaqbal.com/v4/Article.aspx?Type=np&Articleid=345439 accessed 
19/9/2015. 
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In the previous chapter I described the new model of  political elite that Hariri personified; 
that is, the emerging entrepreneurial elite who, in their political and public careers, 
instrumentally and performatively used wealth on an exceptional scale. The predominant 
role of  this entrepreneurial elite, which paralleled the shifts in the elite’s formation across 
the region (Leenders 2004, Husseini 2004), is closely tied to global and local economic and 
political transformations, not least of  which is the growth of  neoliberalism. The subject of  
this chapter is the ways in which the change in the elite at the upper tier of  the Lebanese 
political hierarchy correlates with changes within Beirut’s bourgeoisie. According to 
Roniger and Güneş-Ayata (1994: 14-15), patronage is strengthened by neoliberal policies as 
‘promotion of  liberalisation, reduction of  state intervention in favour of  market 
mechanisms, privatisation of  state-owned and state-supported services, and curtailment of  
union power, among other processes, further fragment society and heighten the need for 
support networks’. Nejmeh club provides a particular example of  how interactions were 
effected between neoliberal economic policy, the newly re-modelled elite (as epitomised by 
Hariri), and Beirut’s bourgeoisie. Drawing on developments in Nejmeh Sport Club I show 
how the relationship between the political elite and the bourgeoisie changed in the post-war 
period.  
As described in the previous chapter, the industrial sector had undergone brief  periods of  
growth in the pre-war period. Ghandour’s family belonged to - if  not constituted the 
majority of  – the industrial bourgeoisie which comprised less than 1% of  the Lebanese 
population of  Beirut and its suburbs in 1970, compared to the 4% who belonged to the 
commercial and financial bourgeoisie (Johnson 1986: 34). According to Johnson (1986), the 
industrialist bourgeoisie were, to a great extent, dependent on foreign and local financial 
capital and thus had a weaker position within the clientelist set of  relationships. The 
relationship between industrialists and the traditional zaʿim, (namely Saeb Salam in the 
1970s) thus implied a subordinate political position. However, the relationship between 
industrialists and Salam was ‘marked by friendship and more equal exchanges between 
patron and client than those which existed, for example between a zaʿim and a member of  
the sub-proletariat’ (Johnson 1986: 36). Those relatively ‘more equal’ relationships in the 
1970s, I believe, allowed Nejmeh under Ghandour a certain measure of  independence 
from the zaʿim’s authority.  
The economic policy of  the post-war period was less favourable to the industrial sector, 
serving to marginalise the position of  its bourgeoisie members and to force their retreat 
from Nejmeh’s leadership - as described in the previous chapter. The ‘Hariri Era’ within 
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Nejmeh was characterised by a greater role for the commercial and financial bourgeoisie as 
compared to those in the industrial sector. The former though, seem to have had a more 
subordinate relationship to the zaʿim in the post-war period than their industrial 
counterparts had to Salam in the 1970s, a factor which contributed to the shift in power 
within the club into the hands of  Hariri, the highest entrepreneurial and political authority 
in the Sunni community of  Beirut.  
In the following sections I offer ethnographic data to elaborate on the above-mentioned 
changes within Nejmeh. I begin by arguing that the rhetoric of  patronage was used to 
describe and possibly strengthen the pre-existing power relationship within the club. I 
propose that this power balance was predetermined by economic relationships rather than 
by the patron-client hierarchy. Political and economic changes, and the capture of  state 
resources by political leaders, underpinned the transformations I observed in patron – 
client relations. One of  the major effects of  such changes was the marginalisation not only 
of  clients within the club’s sub-system, but also of  those who chose not to engage with the 
patronage system and retained their non-client status. I single out Beirut’s urban elite as 
clients or brokers, and show their role in furthering the power of  the political leadership. 
My focus on these issues provides evidence of  the form that political relationships have 
taken but I also take into account the idea that they are not the direct cause of  these 
relationships’ formation (Gilsenan 1977).  
In the second section I sketch the profiles of  two club presidents; Omar Ghandour, 
President from 1969-2003, and Mohammad Amin Daouk, President from 2005 and 
currently. I explore their motivations for joining the club and their positioning within it in 
relation to the club’s patron, their fellow members, and the fans. I examine both 
continuities and changes in the roles and discourses of  the two men in an attempt to 
understand how the urban elite of  Beirut position themselves. The section also explores 
how the urban elite engaged with changes in the leadership of  the Sunni communities and 
with more far reaching political and economic changes in Lebanon. I show how shifts in 
the broader context are manifested and recreated in the club, signalling a change in the 
ethos selected to represent the elite’s motivation to engage in club affairs - the focus having 
changed from a charitable approach to a professional and institutional one. 
The third section elaborates on the above-mentioned developments and the ways in which 
these exemplify changes not only in the roles and ethos of  the club President but also in 
those of  other members of  the board and amongst the bourgeoisie more generally. In 
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addition to presenting what appears to be a dichotomy of  old and new leaderships, I 
highlight the continuities which exist between different board members who, despite being 
affiliated to various political camps today, nevertheless belong to the same social class and 
maintain business, social and personal relationships which are not shared with lower class 
fans and members. Alongside the preservation of  existing class structures, Nejmeh’s board 
has also witnessed a diminution of  the charitable motivation of  its members as well as a 
de-prioritisation of  the fostering of  horizontal relationships between members of  the elite. 
Nejmeh’s board has moved away from being a relatively independent group of  
entrepreneurs and industrialists governed by a charitable ethos to become a board 
exclusively made up of  entrepreneurs. Board members today subscribe to an ethos of  
entrepreneurship and a unanimous desire to implement the patron’s agenda. Evidence of  a 
repositioning of  the club’s centre of  power shows in changes to the board and president’s 
instalment processes, exclusivity of  the patron’s funding, and above all in the public vocal 
allegiance of  loyalty to the patron’s politics by board members and fans. I argue that these 
developments were only made possible because of  the complicity of  some of  Beirut’s 
urban elite, and not despite their interventions. 
Outside the Pitch: Exclusion from Clientelistic 
Networks 
Clientelism and the sectarian-based patronage system have been repeatedly cited as 
dominant features of  Lebanese communitarian politics (Khalaf  1977, Gellner 1977, 
Johnson 1986, Hamzeh 2001). Hamzeh, a Lebanese political scientist, claims that in the 
post-war period clientelism in Lebanon reinvented itself  and proved its tenacity or in other 
words took ‘one more turn along an evolutionary track’ (2001: 17). Clientelism’s persistence 
in Lebanon provides yet another example of  a now commonly held understanding of  
clientelism’s ubiquity and resilience. Roniger provides an appropriate description of  
clientelism in post-war Lebanon, as ‘an enduring feature of  politics [...] that the rising tide 
of  neoliberalism has only increased its presence in many contemporary societies’ (2004: 6). 
Acknowledging the limitations of  the literature on, and the language of  clientelism as an 
analytical entry point, it is useful to briefly discuss what Lebanon’s changing political scene 
can offer to understandings of  the evolution of  patron-client relations. I examine this topic 
against the backdrop of  a change of  style of  political leadership in Lebanon which reflects 
neoliberalism’s global growth. 
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The post-war period saw a transfer of  political leadership from the traditional zaʿim to 
warlords and entrepreneurs. Hariri was a prime example of  the latter (Leenders 2004, 
Husseini 2004), and his monopolisation of  representation of  the Sunni sect in a process of  
‘sectarian crystallization’ (Beydoun 2012) forces a closer analysis of  the processes of  
inclusion and exclusion within the sectarian based clientelistic networks that characterise 
Lebanese politics.  
The ‘sectarian crystallization’ within the Sunni sect, described by Beydoun (2012) was 
primarily due to Hariri’s style of  large-scale expenditure combined with his symbolic and 
performative self-presentation as a sectarian leader. As described in the previous chapter, 
Hariri’s style brought him exclusive leadership of  the Sunni sect and marginalised all other 
potential leaders; both ends were achieved through either the buy out of  competition or 
the monopolisation of  Saudi financial support. What I present in this chapter, and the 
following two chapters, is the process by which members of  the Sunni sect were either 
compelled to show loyalty to Hariri or were de facto outside of  the clientelism and 
patronage networks which characterise public and political life in Lebanon. 
The classical understanding of  patron-client relations is well summarised by Gilsenan as 
‘relations between two persons or groups one of  whom is in some way in a superior or 
more favourable position than the other. From the first flow favours, rewards and 
protection; from the latter perhaps specific goods and services but also more diffuse 
returns of  loyalty, support, or allegiance’ (1977: 167). Gilsenan though, is one of  a number 
of  critics who see clientelism as a relation of  exploitation and dominance (Li Causi 1975, 
Littlewood 1981). He has argued that patron-client terminology ‘is part of  a functionalist-
consensus view of  society that obstructs a deeper analysis of  social structures in quite 
fundamental ways’(1977: 168). The obstructed analysis Gilsenan mentions could usefully be 
brought to bear on class-related structural relations.  
I suggest that evidence from Nejmeh club’s leadership supports Gilsenan’s assertion that 
‘patron client-relations are symptoms of  power relations not a cause’ (1977: 180). To 
illustrate the above I first examine the transactional basis of  patron-client relationships. In 
order to create a demand for patronal favours, rewards, and protection, a prospective 
patron would need not only to institute his control over available resources in order to 
provide such favours, but also to ensure that potential clients had no access to such 
resources through any channels other than his. Control of  this kind is unlikely to be 
acquired with the unanimous consent of  members of  the larger community, although any 
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patron or political leader would have a number of  followers and supporters. Hariri’s 
control of  Nejmeh was not achieved at the moment when he became its patron, but, as 
mentioned in the previous chapter, it depended on a far longer prior process involving the 
political and economic marginalisation of  other potential leaders and a deliberate 
narrowing of  options to secure club funding - both strategies which ensured that Hariri’s 
patronage would seem like the only option capable of  ensuring the club’s continuity. At the 
time, drawing Hariri in as a patron provided a rationale for his control and a way of  
ensuring his commitment to the club, much as Silverman discusses the use of  a rhetoric 
and ideology of  patronage as ‘a means of  drawing high status outsiders into local 
commitments’ (1977: 17). Seen in these terms, clientelistic relations, rather than being 
understood as stemming from a client’s need for protection, are instead an adaptation 
strategy deployed by some members of  society to ensure receipt of  the largest share of  
resources possible through alignment with the zaʿim.  
Similarly, a broad perspective needs to be taken in defining the community within which 
clientelistic relations exist. While the relationships between Hariri, acting board members, 
and his supporters among the fans could be described as clientelistic, at least in form, 
expanding the analysis to include club members who were not among Hariri’s followers 
highlights the marginalisation experienced by those who resisted the role ascribed to them 
within the patronage hierarchy. Individuals like Ghandour and Baroudi, who were board 
members before Hariri took over the Club’s patronage, and also members of  Beirut’s Sunni 
communities over which Hariri was zaʿim can definitely not be regarded as his clients. 
Within every community where certain patrons dominate, many individuals choose not to 
engage in the transaction patterns of  loyalty and protection and therefore become marginal 
in that community. While consent might be one feature of  the relationship between the 
patron and his clients, the trait of  domination best describes a patron’s relationship with his 
‘non-clients’. The structures of  exploitation and domination that Li Causi (1975) discusses 
need to be seen not merely as the exploitation of  lower class clients, but rather as the 
exclusion of  those who refuse to become clients or those whose loyalty is not seen as 
profitable or of  any value to the patrons. 
As this and later chapters demonstrate, members of  the Sunni sect – as well as some 
members of  other sects - continued to be members of  the web of  clientelistic relationships 
surrounding Hariri on condition firstly that they consented to the leadership of  Hariri and, 
secondly, that they were of  instrumental value to him in electoral competition and non-
electoral popular mobilisation (Cammett and Issar 2010). While some of  those excluded 
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from Hariri’s network found alternative clientelistic networks to attach themselves to – for 
example some Shiite fans whose votes and loyalty were of  no instrumental value to Hariri 
but nevertheless useful to other political groups - many of  those in the club who refused to 
be Hariri’s clients found themselves outside of  the ‘game’. This group included the Sunni 
industrialists of  Beirut’s bourgeoisie, Sunni members of  Arab Nationalist groups who did 
not support Hariri politically, and a large proportion of  the 50% of  the Lebanese electorate 
who did not vote in the most recent parliamentary elections. 
Nejmeh was an exceptional club which for years managed to stay outside the clientelistic 
networks of  the sectarian zuʿama of  Lebanon to such an extent that at one point the club 
was labelled the ‘19th sect’, an ironical appellation signifying its specifically non-sectarian 
character. However, the club could survive neither the post-war economic policy of  Hariri, 
nor the ‘sectarian crystallization’ of  the Sunnis among other sects. 
Snapshot of  Two Presidents and Two Eras 
In this section I present a summary of  the career trajectories of  two of  Nejmeh’s 
Presidents. I use their profiles as examples to illustrate the roles which they, and members 
of  their boards, played vis-a-vis the club, its fans, and the club’s patron. Between the 
presidencies of  Ghandour and Daouk, I observe differences in the profiles of  board 
members, as well as in the styles of  their instalment and their sources of  legitimacy. I also 
compare various board members’ motivations for engagement with sport and their 
perceptions of  it. Table 8 below summarises key differences between Ghandour’s and 
Daouk’s presidencies on which I expand further in following sections describing each 
presidents’ separate trajectory.  
In brief, the difference in the two men’s roles and trajectories is indicative of  a shift in the 
locus of  power in the management of  Nejmeh upwards. I show how power has gravitated 
away from what can be seen as a second tier of  the socio-economic elite, namely Beirut’s 
bourgeoisie, from which both club Presidents, Daouk and Ghandour, originated. The 
hierarchical structure of  the club’s leadership has not changed significantly, with the Sunni 
zaʿim and club patron occupying the top of  the pyramid and the club’s management being 
mostly being in the hands of  a group of  members of  the Beiruti urban elite. Yet the roles 
each president played underwent change: when responsibility for club funding fell entirely 
on the club’s patron in the Hariri era, the patron acquired full entitlement to choose the 
club’s board, relegating the role of  the club President to one of  management on the 
patron’s behalf. 
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Table 8 - Comparison of  the profile and role of  club presidents Ghandour and Daouk 
 
Ghandour as President88 
(1969 - 2003) 
Daouk as president 
(2005 - present) 89 
President’s Profile The charitable industrialist. The professional entrepreneur. 
Profile of Board 
members 
Industrialists, engineers, members of 
Islamic charity associations, from 
prominent Beiruti families. 
Lawyers, contractors, members 
of Islamic charity associations, 
from prominent Beiruti families. 
Styles of instalment 
of President and 
board members 
Horizontal: board members are recruited 
through networks of kinship and 
friendship as well as from upper class 
fans (using ‘mawna’ and through 
assessment of ‘social capital’) – 
Presidency as social duty. 
Vertical: appointed by club 
patron or his client 
representative for professional 
qualifications or for patron’s 
political considerations. -
Presidency as political reward. 
President’s source of 
legitimacy 
- Securing needed funds. 
- Sporting achievement of the club. 
- Representing the club’s patron. 
- Sporting achievement of the 
club. 
Self described 
motivation for 
joining the board of 
the club 
- ‘charitable contribution’. 
- ‘leaving a positive print’. 
- ‘protect youth from vice through 
attracting them to sports’ 
- ‘It would be difficult to deny 
[Rafic Hariri] a request’. 
- ‘I came to provide managerial 
and institutional support’. 
Source of funding 
Various patrons and contributions of 
board members: 
‘For 35 years, I was not counted as 
anybody’s follower, I used to get money 
from everybody and pay on top of that 
from my own pocket, me and the 
members of the board - and we 
remained on good terms with 
everybody.’ 
One single patron:  
‘We were entrusted to manage 
the club, not to fund it’. 
Perception of sports 
A community affair, part of the 
‘communitarian society’. It’s role, just 
like Islamic charities and the Islamic 
waqf is a social charitable one. 
‘Nejmeh was full of history, and 
representative of the nobility and 
rootage (ʿaraqah) of Lebanon 
and Beirut in particular’. 
Expectation from 
client 
Get ‘reformed’ & avoid ‘immorality’. 
Respect (if not show loyalty) to 
the club’s patron – ‘You can’t be 
in a club and badmouth he who 
is funding it’. 
                                                 
88  Quotations in this column are by Nejmeh President Ghandour, and board members Zuheir Baroudi and 
Saadeddine Itani who served on the board in the nineties. Ghandour and Baroudi both left once the 
club moved into the patronage of  Hariri. Later sections include all the above quotations including the 
name of  the person who said them and the context. 
89  All quotations in this column are by Nejmeh President Daouk, who served in this role since 2005 and 
while the club was under Hariri patronage.  
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Ghandour as President88 
(1969 - 2003) 
Daouk as president 
(2005 - present) 89 
Role of club’s Patron 
(ra’i) 
Play an honorary role that gives the club 
status and facilitates fundraising by its 
board members. 
Support the club in times of trouble 
through connections and access to the 
state, particularly governmental and legal 
issues. 
Provide the club’s financial 
needs. 
Appoint board members and 
other needed personnel for 
smooth running of the club. 
The Charitable Industrialist: The Ghandour Era90 
‘I still remember it really well, and no matter how much I have paid into the 
club, I knew it was worth it when this woman came to visit me in my office. 
The secretary knocked on my door and told me there was a lady who wanted 
to see me. I welcomed her in, and from the doorway - she did not even go in, 
she said “Mr. Omar, I am here to thank you because my husband no longer 
gambles in horse racing”. This statement alone was worth all my efforts and 
the money I have paid’. 
This is how Omar Ghandour, President from 1969 – 2003, described what he regarded as 
Nejmeh’s most important achievement. The quote also reveals his motivation for investing 
time, effort and money in the club. His comments were made in an interview I conducted 
with him in 2009, six years after he had left the club. In the reception area of  a large 
warehouse space that housed both offices and storage space for products manufactured by 
Ghandour’s companies, I saw an array of  Nejmeh memorabilia and photographs showing 
Ghandour either standing amongst the Nejmeh members and players or held aloft on fans’ 
shoulders. The club, and his role in it, was still a crucial part of  Ghandour’s self-
presentation despite the long time that had passed since he left and the many changes that 
had taken place. 
The setting for the interview was Ghandour’s office which was a huge, luxurious space, 
despite it being in an industrial underground depot. Ghandour sat behind his desk at the 
far end of  the imposing, almost ten-meter long room in which several well-upholstered, 
capacious sofas did not detract from the impression of  spaciousness. At the far end was 
the door by which the lady referred to in the interview had stood many years ago. When 
                                                 
90  This introduction to Ghandour is based on an interview I conducted with him on 25/9/2009 in his 
office in Beirut. Additional material derives from a leaflet distributed in support of  his electoral 
campaign for a parliamentary seat in 2009. (See figure 26) 
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she deferentially asked the secretary for what Ghandour recalls as ‘just a word at the door 
with Mr. Ghandour’, she was obviously acknowledging that she would not be able to ask 
more of  the wealthy and influential businessman. Ghandour pointed out to me that she 
had called him ‘Mr. Omar’, noting that at the time he was not yet a ‘Hajj’, a title only 
bestowed on a person who had performed the religious pilgrimage to Mecca.  
Hajj Omar Abdul Kader Ghandour was born in 1930, to a well-known Beiurt family of  
industrialists who had established some of  Lebanon’s earliest factories and who, in the pre-
civil war period, were ‘perhaps the most influential industrial group in Beirut’ (Johnson 
1986: 35). Ghandour studied at the Islamic Makassed, an Islamic Lebanese school, and the 
Jesuits Freres a missionary school, and completed university studies at the American 
University of  Beirut. As noted in earlier chapters, all three institutions were instrumental in 
advancing organised sports in Lebanon and were private institutions where members of  
Beirut’s middle and upper class not only received their education, but also socialised and 
built networks of  friends and acquaintances. Upon his graduation from university, 
Ghandour took over the management of  his father’s factory, later establishing a factory for 
paper products in Lebanon, an industry that he expanded to the Senegal in 1971.  
He also followed his father’s example in participating in charitable works. His father was on 
the managing council of  the Islamic Endowment, and active in social care organisations 
and the establishment of  mosques. Ghandour himself  was Secretary General for the same 
mosque establishment committee, and served on the boards of  at least five different 
Islamic charities.  
In sports, he began in horseback riding and was later elected President of  a Lebanese 
equestrian club, an office he held until 1975. In that same year, he was elected head of  the 
Lebanese Gymnastic Association which he continued to lead until 2003. He had other 
leadership roles in a number of  sports institutions, including football, golf, and the 
National Olympic Committee, but his greatest engagement with sport was reserved for 
Nejmeh Sport Club.  
Hajj Omar joined Nejmeh in 1968, at the request of  his paternal cousin Samir Ghandour491. 
Samir had been asked to lead Nejmeh club by the patron presiding at the time, Mr. Saeb 
Salam, who was a Sunni zaʿim and ex-Prime Minister: 
                                                 
91  Samir was Omar Ghandour's son of  his father’s brother. 
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‘[Samir Ghandour] called me one day and told me about Nejmeh, that it was a 
significant Lebanese club ... and said that Saeb Salam had asked him to become 
its president and it was important for him that I join. I said I couldn’t, that I 
didn’t have the time and did not know much about football; true I played 
football in school but I didn’t know how to run a football club. He insisted, 
saying that I had experience in sports and associations, that it was important 
for him that I support him, that I would come as Vice President and help him 
out and that the whole thing would not take much time, only a meeting once 
per month. Of  course, out of  my regard and brotherliness to my cousin I 
accepted.’ 
While his cousin might have been motivated to join the club because of  his political 
relationship with club patron Salam, Ghandour accepted the invitation to join Nejmeh 
because of  kin obligation. He had been selected over other cousins because of  his interest 
and extensive experience in sports. Only two days after Omar Ghandour accepted the post, 
his cousin picked him up so that they could go together to what was supposed to be the 
election meeting for Nejmeh’s new board which was taking place at the house of  one of  
the club’s founders. As he described it, there were 10-15 members in attendance as well as 
members of  an already agreed on new board. A member who was one of  ‘Saeb Salam’s 
men’ as Ghandour recalls, ‘stood up and introduced the new members of  the board’ who 
received the applause and cheers of  those in attendance. After being congratulated, this 
board went out onto the balcony to allocate the posts of  the new board; this was the 
moment when Ghandour was assigned the position of  a Vice President. 
In recalling the events of  that period, Ghandour said that the whole process ‘did not 
appeal’ to him, meaning that he disapproved of  how elections were run since they were not 
genuine, their outcomes having been prearranged to suit the patron’s desires. When he was 
told that ‘this is how the club is run, Saeb Salam is responsible for it and he appoints its 
board’, Omar Ghandour considered resigning but was assured by his cousin that they had a 
carte blanche from the club’s patron to run the club as they wished. The cousins then 
embarked on a process of  internal organisation of  the club. They started by reorganising 
the General Assembly, which, according to Ghandour should ‘hold the board accountable’. 
They called on its existing members to pay their membership fees, but none did. Many of  
those included on the list of  members were either dead, away, or never paid membership 
fees. The cousins then set about recruiting members for the General Assembly: 
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‘Each one of  us went to his friends and started begging them to join, merely 
because we wanted the funding from membership fees. Of  course, I recruited 
my people, Samir recruited his people, each member recruited those who he 
had mawna [influence or authority] on.’ 
This method of  recruitment – and fund-raising – for the club continued for 35 years until 
Ghandour resigned his post in 2003. He and other board members used their web of  
personal connections, tact, and credibility to fortify the club and to guarantee support for 
it. Through recruiting to the club they both utilised and consolidated their networks of  
social relations and thereby increased their social capital. The concept of  ‘mawna’, which I 
elaborate on in the following section, was crucial to the work of  the Ghandour cousins at 
this time.  
During Omar Ghandour’s first year on the club’s board, the process of  restructuring 
caused internal conflicts between his cousin Samir and Salam’s representative on the board. 
Hajj Omar, though supportive of  his cousin’s vision for the club, tried to play the role of  
the peacemaker. Backed by a group of  members loyal to him, he also managed to subvert 
club bureaucracy and rules to force a new election which resulted in both his promotion to 
the club’s presidency and the silencing of  any opposing voices.  
At the time, Ghandour was not politically affiliated to the camp of  the Sunni leader and 
club patron, Saeb Salam. In fact, in recalling that period, Ghandour recalled how Salam 
assumed that he would move the club away from a ‘political camp that [Salam] has clout 
on’. Clearly though, and as evidence of  the limited power that the patron exercised over the 
club, Salam did not succeed in preventing Ghandour from taking the club over92, and the 
antagonism between them only ended when work progressed and Salam realised that 
Ghandour was trying to distance the club from direct political adherence to a single 
political leader. 
Many fans confirmed that Ghandour’s success in distancing the club from being subject to 
any one politician’s agenda prevented Nejmeh from being swept up in the turbulent politics 
of  the following three decades. His tactics of  distancing the club were especially important 
during the 15-year civil war when the club’s huge fan base could have been fertile ground 
for recruitment of  young men into the warring militias. However, Ghandour’s strategy did 
                                                 
92  In 1969 Ghandour’s presidency of  the club was opposed by other board members with stronger links to 
Salam, but this did not prevent him form winning.  
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not necessarily mean that Nejmeh was completely disengaged from the politics of  the time, 
whether at regional or national level or within the Sunni communities of  Beirut. Neither 
did the strategy mean that Ghandour had no political agenda of  his own. As Chapter 
Three explains, Nejmeh’s growth and popularity were largely due to its positioning as the 
club of  the Muslim communities, who popularly supported Arab Nationalism and the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and stood in opposition to the control of  the 
right wing political powers of  the time. Although Ghandour did not engage in politics 
while he was club President, in 2009 he stood as the lead opposition candidate in Beirut 
against Saad Hariri. In his electoral campaign Ghandour continued to stress these same 
values including ‘unity of  all Muslims’ and ‘Beirut, the capital of  resistance’ - a slogan 
affirming his support of  Hezbollah and of  militant resistance against Israel.93 In practice 
within the club, Ghandour’s efforts engendered an inclusive policy that brought together 
Sunnis and Shiites not only in Beirut, but far beyond the city.  
With no real control from any communitarian or political agencies, Ghandour ran the club 
for three decades relying on three of  his main strengths; his personal wealth, from which 
he contributed to the club’s annual budget, his web of  relations which enabled him to enlist 
financial support and membership for the club, and his interpersonal social skills and 
diplomacy which he used to maintain the satisfaction of  the clubs patrons and its varied 
fans. Of  particular note is Ghandour’s investment in the club’s fan base. In addition to the 
many spectacular events that Nejmeh organised in the 1970s, including inviting Pele to play 
for Nejmeh and playing friendly games against well known international teams, Ghandour 
maintained a personal relationship of  courtesy with fans. As Abu Ahmad94, a Nejmeh fan 
from the Southern Suburbs described him, ‘Hajj Omar was very respectable, very 
courteous, and he had no prejudice; he loved those who loved him and loved the game’. 
Abu Ahmad described how Ghandour regularly visited fans and club’s offices in the 
                                                 
93  Around a quarter of  Ghandour’s electoral leaflet is dedicated to a speech that he gave in 2006 to ‘honor 
martyrs of  Beirut’. In it he celebrates popular actions and demonstrations in support of  Arab 
Nationalist causes, not least the Palestinian cause and resistance against Israel. These included, for 
example, the funeral procession of  Khalil al-Jamal who died fighting Israel in April 1968, which 
exemplified that support with over 150,000 people joining it and the ensuing enlistment of  many 
Lebanese in PLO’s armed ranks (Arfi 2005, El-Khazen 2000). Al-Jamal, who died in Jordan, is claimed 
as the ‘first Lebanese martyr’ in the resistance against Israel, though this of  course is contested, and 
many other groups have claimed ‘first martyrs’. Whether he was the 'first martyr' or not is only 
significant in that it is an attempt to make a claim of  status for him, and to prove the early participation 
of  the Beirutis in the resistance to Israel. 
94  Quotations from Abu Ahmad are from a recorded interview I conducted with him on 10/6/2009 in a 
small park next to his shop in the Southern Suburbs. The interview was in Arabic and the translation is 
mine.  
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Southern Suburbs: ‘if  there was a celebration, the launching of  a [regional] fans’ union, a 
new centre, [Ghandour] would take the initiative and join. If  somebody died, we would call 
the Hajj and let him know and he would come to pay condolences’ 
Despite the amicable relationship Ghandour maintained with the fans and the club being 
an inclusive space for various religions and political affiliations, Nejmeh was never truly 
outside the class and client codes that kept it under the control of  the – albeit charitable 
and reverent – elite. Even without endorsement from a political patron, board members 
were elected uncontested in the vast majority of  elections and the General Assembly 
membership remained selective and was representative of  the different power holders who 
existed on the board. Despite their efforts to establish unions and networks the fans, who 
belonged to lower social classes, remained on the margins of  the club’s decision making 
process and had no legal voice in its management. 
 
Figure 23: Picture of  Ghandour carried on the shoulders of  Nejmeh fans. Picture was hanging on the wall of  
Ghandour’s office when I visited in 2009. 
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Figure 24: Selection of  pictures on show in Omar Ghandour’s office in 2009. All pictures are of  him with Nejmeh 
players and fans. 
 
Figure 25: Awards and certificate on display in Ghandour’s office. All but two are in appreciation of  Nejmeh and 
his role as its President. 
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Figure 26: Omar Ghandour’s electoral flyer for the 2009 parliamentary elections. 
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The Professional Entrepreneur: Daouk as President 
Mohammad Amin Al-Daouk is an attorney and an international arbitrator. He has presided 
over Nejmeh since 2005. When Nejmeh club moved into the patronage of  the Hariri 
establishment in 2003, Daouk became the second person to serve as a president under the 
new patronage having been preceded by Fanj (2003 – 2005). 
My interview with Mr. Daouk was the final one I conducted during fieldwork, and although 
I had his approval to conduct this research and had previously seen him at games and the 
club’s stadium, the interview was my only substantive conversation with him. The interview 
took place in Daouk’s work space, on a Saturday morning, in his spacious office in Beirut’s 
Sanayeh district.  
On taking on the presidency of  the club, Daouk recalls: 
‘I was called one day by Prime Minister Hariri, he wanted to see me. I thought 
maybe it has to do with politics since [parliamentary] elections were coming up 
[…] or maybe business, as I was handling one of  his court cases as a lawyer, 
but I was surprised when he said he wanted me as Nejmeh club’s President. I 
was already a General Assembly member, which goes back to my personal and 
professional friendship with Hajj Omar Ghandour, who had enrolled me in the 
General Assembly without me really having much to do with football. I am just 
like any other citizen in my relationship with football; I like it just as I like 
basketball, which I have played at school, but I have never played football. I 
was a bit surprised by that offer to tell you the truth; I had not taken interest in 
football previously. This is when he told me that this was not a mere football 
club, that Nejmeh was full of  history, and representative of  the nobility, lineage 
and rootedness of  Lebanon and Beirut in particular, and about his desire to 
find a person and a name worthy of  managing it.’95  
After some resistance, Daouk accepted the responsibility Rafic Hariri entrusted him with 
saying ‘It would be difficult to deny him a request’. Daouk justified his decision not only by 
the Prime Minister’s political position, but also by what he describes as their ‘personal 
friendship’. As I was told by an insider to both the club and the Hariri establishment, the 
                                                 
95  Interview took place on 25/9/2009 in the office of  Mr. Daouk. It was recorded and conducted in 
Arabic; translation from Arabic is mine. 
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club’s presidency was given to Daouk ‘as a commitment from Prime Minister Hariri to find 
Daouk an alternative role’ after he had had to side-line him - because of  local and regional 
political considerations - in the upcoming parliamentary elections that were due to take 
place in the summer of  2005.  
By the time Daouk actually assumed his responsibilities as club director, the political 
context in Lebanon had changed significantly. Ex-Prime Minister Rafic Hariri had been 
assassinated a mere weeks after the above conversation with Daouk took place, the Syrian 
army had withdrawn from Lebanon, and the country was going through the most acute 
political crisis since the end of  the civil war in 1990. 
In terms of  personal biography, Daouk is a lawyer with experience in international 
arbitration, especially international commerce cases. Besides being on the board of  
professional organisations like the ‘Arab Association for International Arbitration’ and ‘The 
Lebanese Association for Arbitration’, he has served as legal advisor on the boards of  a 
number of  insurance companies and banks. Although new to the world of  sports, he was 
for 17 years head of  the Beirut based charity the ‘Islamic Centre’ and at the time of  the 
interview was head of  the non-governmental organisation the ‘Beirut Gathering’ - all 
responsibilities that he saw as equipping him with adequate management experience to run 
the club. 
Although involved in charitable work, Daouk did not stress this aspect of  his work with 
Nejmeh in the way that his predecessor, Ghandour, did. What he highlighted, even more 
than the club’s achievement, was the impact of  Hariri’s support, and he evaluated his work 
based on the criteria of  fulfilling the duties he was entrusted with by the club’s patron. 
According to Daouk, and to several other Hariri-affiliated club members, what being part 
of  the Hariri establishment brought to Nejmeh was ‘professionalism’, and ‘managerial 
restructuring’. He confirmed that board members were chosen not only on the basis of  
their interest in football, but also, more importantly, on their professional ‘qualifications’. 
Daouk’s role in the club was limited to managing it on behalf  of  the Hariri establishment 
and he had no responsibility for securing funds. In discussing the financial crisis the club 
was experiencing due to delays in receiving promised payments at the time of  my research, 
he mentioned contributing financially to the club from time to time, but described how his 
main responsibility towards it focused more on management issues: 
‘We contributed what we could as individuals and fulfilled our responsibility, 
each according to his capacity. I wish of  course I had more resources to 
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contribute, but this is a club and we have families, children and their future to 
think about. It is a club, and I was not the one who established it, I was only 
entrusted to manage it, along with my colleagues on the board. We were 
entrusted to manage the club, not to fund it.’ 
Daouk stressed that the board had complete managerial independence and that the Hariri 
Establishment did not interfere in Nejmeh’s day-to-day running. He said ‘there is no 
structured relation, but there is moral supervision, and they know what is happening’.  
Yet, Daouk’s relationships with the club’s patron were significantly different from those 
that Ghandour had with patrons during his presidency. Daouk explained that the Hariri 
establishment’s funding of  the club imposed certain obligations, although these were not 
formally requested by it or outlined in a written contract: ‘we are taking money from them 
and they have the right to ask us what it is we are doing with the money’. These obligations 
went beyond financial management. Just after the 2006 Israeli war on Lebanon ended, two 
Nejmeh Asian Cup games were played in Beirut and during both matches there were 
clashes between opposing groups of  Nejmeh’s fans. The club’s fans had factionalised along 
sectarian and political lines, a development which paralleled the political schism dividing 
the country. In coordination with his board members Daouk published a press release 
clearly positioning the club within the ‘family of  the Future Movement’ (As-Safir 
21/9/2006), an act which automatically distanced many fans who were politically opposed 
to the Future Movement. This press release was often cited by fans as the catalyst for non 
Hariri-affiliated club supporters distancing themselves from the club.96 Commenting on the 
press release and the clashes in the stadium, Daouk, although apologetic and regretful 
about what he called the ‘misunderstanding’ that occurred in reaction to his public 
statement, nevertheless affirmed his right and duty to defend the club’s patron: ‘so what, do 
we deny what he did? He is funding the club, and they [the fans] badmouth him and 
humiliate him, badmouth his sect and humiliate it, and we are not allowed to say a word 
about it?’ 
By highlighting Hariri’s contribution and in issuing the press release, Daouk defined his role 
to as one devoted to ensuring that the control of  the Hariri establishment over Nejmeh 
was maintained. His action showed how he derived his legitimacy from precisely this aspect 
                                                 
96  I discuss the clashes in the stadium and the press release in detail in Chapter Seven. 
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of  his presidential role. Being the representative of  the club’s patron worked to 
simultaneously legitimise and delegitimise Daouk’s role; he possessed a good measure of  
the authority of  the patron yet, paradoxically, he had little power or autonomy of  his own. 
He, and other new board members, were often described as ‘mere employees’, even by fans 
and members who saw themselves as ‘belonging to the family of  the Future Movement’. 
Perceived like this, Daouk and the board appeared powerless unless the work they did was 
obviously authorised by the club’s patron. The designation of  ‘employee’ was intended as 
an overt criticism by some, but seen as an excuse by others for Daouk’s limited 
contribution.  
 
Figure 27: Nejmeh board members and staff  visiting club patron Saad Hariri. Hariri is in the centre with the 
recently won trophy for Nejmeh’s LFA championship, and to his right is the Club president at the time, Mohammad 
Amin Daouk.97 
Which of  Beirut’s Bourgeoisie should Lead the 
‘Ancient Club’? 
In building on my brief  profiles of  the two club Presidents, I expand my ethnographic 
description to explore the roles of  other key decision makers in the club during the two 
presidential eras under discussion. I highlight ways in which the profile, role, and 
                                                 
97  Picture courtesy of  club’s Public relations officer. 
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presentation of  the club’s President and board members have been transformed in the 
post-war period. Focusing on changes in the Lebanese bourgeoisie, I highlight how these 
changes reflect the redefinition of  the highest tier of  the political elite in Lebanon - or as 
Perthes describes them the ‘politically relevant elite’(2004) - and particularly as Hariri 
establishes himself  as a ‘super-zaʿim’ (Baumann 2012a). I also illustrate how such 
transformations are closely linked to local and global economic changes.  
Downgrading of  Charitable Motivations 
In retrospect, Ghandour stressed above all else the charitable aspects of  his involvement in 
the club. As described earlier, the charitable motivation (ʿamal al-khaīr) was what he 
repeatedly mentioned as his main motivation:  
‘Success was never winning a championship or a cup nor managing eleven 
players; this does not require much management or skill. The issue was the 
fans. The amount of  fans you get into the stadium is the same amount you 
deprive militias of, the more people come to the club... the more you protect 
from drug use, from gambling… You protect them. You protect them from all 
vice. This was what I was concerned with in the club, to attract young people 
to the club so we can protect them morally. That is why I do not measure my 
success by the number of  trophies we received, nor championships, nor that 
Pele played with us. These are all tools. These are all excellent, I am not saying 
they are not, but they are just tools to get people to the stadiums.’ 
Unlike Daouk, whose presidency spanned the Hariri era, Ghandour and other board 
members who worked with him stressed their motivation for joining the club and investing 
time and money in it as a charitable one: they hoped their initiatives would protect young 
people from involvement in political violence, drugs, alcohol and gambling. The rationale 
expressed for such charitable endeavour is both religious and social; an ‘emotional 
investment’ in time and money that I argue, like Bourdieu, is ‘not necessarily conceived as a 
calculated pursuit of  gain’ (Bourdieu 1986: unpaginated) 
Baroudi, who was Nejmeh’s Secretary General for nine years, provided an example of  this 
kind of  emotional investment when he explained how his contributions to the club were a 
form of  Zakat, a practice of  mandatory charitable giving, and one of  the five pillars of  
Islam.  
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‘One guy once told me, that we, as Muslims, pay the Zakat. If  a Muslim comes 
to you now and is entitled to receiving the Zakat, and you know he is a drug 
addict and we need to get him rehabilitated, and the contribution we ask of  
you is a thousand US dollars, would you pay a thousand to save his life? Of  
course I would, not only pay a thousand ... but if  you could pay that thousand 
dollars and protect ten people from drugs, you would have done something 
much better.’ 
Baroudi joined the club in the 1990s on his return to Lebanon at the end of  the civil war 
and after graduating with an MBA from the London School of  Economics. My interview 
with him took place in summer 2009, more than six years after his work as Secretary 
General ended. His large office, located in the warehouse of  his sanitary ware 
manufacturing business, was abundantly adorned with Nejmeh memorabilia. In the centre 
of  a whole-wall display there was a huge photo of  the fans filling the stadium. To the sides 
were four smaller framed photos showing players, the club’s captain carrying the 
champion’s cup from many years ago, and others of  Baroudi with fans and board members. 
Next to his desk, alongside pictures of  his children, was another photo showing all the 
members of  the last board in office before the change of  management from Ghandour to 
the Hariri family.  
Despite being over three decades younger than Ghandour, Baroudi also described his 
motivation for joining the club as ‘the public good’. Although he acknowledged the 
personal ‘gains’ he had derived from working for the club he also emphasised how, on 
returning to Lebanon after the war, he had wanted to ‘contribute’, to ‘leave a positive print’ 
on society - and Nejmeh was his outlet for that ambition.  
Another board member, Saadeddine Itani, echoed a similar sentiment:  
‘A lot of  young people used to be attracted to things that would not serve them 
well, drinking or delinquency or anything of  that sort, but we could attract 
them here, not just to football, but to sports more generally, through that we 
could refine and educate them and point them to that which serves society’. 
He described this process and sports more broadly, as part of  the ‘communitarian society’ 
(mujtamʿ ʾahli). Its role, just like Islamic charities and the Islamic waqf, is a social charitable 
one. He affirmed that, unlike other ‘Arab states where governments appoint the boards of  
sports clubs, in Lebanon sports was a community affair’, one that sought to help the 
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community, not only through sporting activities and reaching out to the players themselves, 
but also through ‘the broader sports education work, in schools and college and through 
medical and social support to the players and their families’. 
Itani’s involvement with the club began in the 1980’s when he was still young and unable to 
offer financial contributions. At this stage he was responsible for the youth teams who 
were not otherwise receiving much attention or support. A few years later he was asked to 
join Nejmeh’s board when his uncle left and he became the youngest board member. Like 
Baroudi, he acknowledged the personal gain he derived from his role; ‘It was my only 
breathing space, […] I wanted to contribute, it gave me pleasure, others find pleasure in 
watching a movie, or going to a nightclub, but this was the only hobby I could find at times 
of  war’. For Itani, Nejmeh was not only apolitical, but also a way out of  politics. His 
investment in Nejmeh took place when the country was in the middle of  the civil war. As 
he saw it, engaging in politics at that time almost inevitably meant being involved with one 
of  the warring militias – a position he wanted to avoid.  
However, several people I interviewed explained the motives of  Ghandour and other 
board members in less altruistic terms. Some fans claimed that Ghandour took over the 
club hoping that it would eventually help him, at best, to build a political career or, at least, 
for the sake of  gaining what they called ‘prestige’98. The idea that members were trying to 
acquire ‘prestige’, or what Bourdieu (1986) would term ‘social capital’, is worthy of  further 
exploration. The trajectory of  Ghandour himself  and of  many board members he presided 
over in the pre-Hariri period show that although most of  these people had invested time 
and money which might have assisted in their accumulation of  social capital, ultimately 
they did not achieve political or financial gain. That said, Beirut’s bourgeoisie saw Nejmeh 
club as a space in which the ‘reproduction of  social capital’ (Bourdieu 1986) was facilitated. 
Being on the board of  a sports club allowed individuals to work and connect amicably 
alongside other businessmen of  similar class and standing. It provided them with the 
means to strengthen their network of  relationships in a space that lay between the realms 
of  the professional and the personal. A willingness to devote time, as a busy successful 
businessman, to a social charitable cause was perceived – particularly by other members of  
the bourgeoisie - as a source of  status. The ability to perform such charitable work 
                                                 
98   ‘Prestige’ was the exact word used by fans, most of  whom were using the French word that has the 
same meaning as the English one. 
168 
efficiently and drive the club to success were perceived as further proof  of  capacity and 
managerial ability. 
The above described charitable practices and motives that drove the three men who served 
on Nejmeh’s board in the 1990s, namely Ghandour, Baroudi and Itani, were significantly 
different from those of  board members who joined after the club came under Hariri 
patronage, and the philanthropic endeavours of  Hariri himself. For example, in my 
interview with Daouk no mention was made of  charitable motives. Instead, Daouk 
described his primary motive for taking on the club’s presidency as a favour extended 
towards Rafic Hariri himself. Similarly, Secretary General Farshoukh, (also active during my 
fieldwork period) who acted as a paid staff  member of  the Hariri association, was 
appointed to support the ‘institutionalisation’ of  the club rather than to make charitable 
contributions.99  
Hariri’s philanthropy is also of  a different nature and scale as described in the previous 
chapter, and its instrumental use for direct political gain has been well documented 
(Cammett 2014). 
Amongst the bourgeois members of  the club’s board a downgrading of  the charitable 
motivation for joining was a development closely linked to the economic and political 
changes which occurred during the post-war period as described in the account of  the 
Hariri approach in the previous chapter. Although Sunni zuʿama, for whom the Makassed 
Association was an important stepping-stone, had previously relied to a considerable extent 
on the benevolent contributions of  Beirut’s bourgeoisie to the association, Hariri did not. 
He financed his philanthropic activities by means of  his private wealth augmented by Saudi 
funding, a rich combination of  resources which made the financial charitable role of  the 
bourgeoisie look insignificant in comparison. Hariri’s funding methods were applied 
parallel to, and in contrast with, the sharp decline in wealth amongst politically independent 
groups of  the bourgeoisie whose incomes derived from the manufacturing industries. 
                                                 
99  Overlap did exist between the management styles deployed in the 1990s and the 2000s. Itani for example 
served on the board under Ghandour and continued as Secretary General during part of  my research 
period under the patronage of  Hariri. The change is in the main motivation for the board members in 
key positions and the defining ethos of  Nejmeh membership. 
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Horizontal and Vertical Styles of  Instalment 
Another major difference between the ‘Ghandour era’ and the ‘Hariri era’ – again closely 
tied to the change in the economic and political role of  Hariri as a Sunni zaʿim - was the 
way in which presidents and board members were chosen and admitted to the club. While 
Daouk and other members of  the board were appointed by Hariri and his representatives 
in a top down vertical style of  instalment, Ghandour and fellow board members were 
chosen by other members of  the board who relied on personal relations, in what can be 
described as a horizontal style of  instalment. The latter, which I use the Arabic term 
mawna to describe, merits some further explanation to show how the horizontal networks, 
like charitable motivations, were also downgraded in the new ‘era’ of  Nejmeh’s governance. 
Ghandour was recruited into the club’s management by his cousin who, although slightly 
older, came from a similar socio-economic background. Given that the patron offered no 
serious objection, that background, coupled with multi faceted ties of  kinship, religious 
belonging, and what Wolf  describes as ‘social-credit rating’ was Ghandour’s ticket into the 
club (1966: 8). The source of  Ghandour’s status, which justified his recruitment into the 
club, is best described in the words of  another club member:  
‘He was a young aspiring handsome man, did horseback riding, a true 
gentleman born with a golden spoon in his mouth. His father was Abdul 
Kader Ghandour, known for his charitable work. You would have appreciated 
his support no matter what endeavour you had in mind’.  
Of  course a significant factor that favoured Ghandour’s selection was his ability to 
contribute financially to the club, but this was not the sole reason for his selection. The 
same criteria that governed the choice of  Ghandour had been used to recruit members to 
the board for decades. Baroudi, for example, was recruited in the 1990s by a friend on the 
basis of  his social standing, financial capacity and charitable intentions. Those who were 
chosen were all endowed with wazn - weight in English if  I am to use a strict translation of  
the words used by my club members - or in other words ‘status’. The idea of  ‘weight’ was 
used to describe a specific personal capacity. A person with ‘electoral weight’ for example, 
is one who has influence on a large number of  voters. Someone who ‘has weight in the 
palace’ is one who has the capacity to influence decisions within the Hariri establishment. 
A whole family might also have ‘weight’ if  it included many powerful or successful figures.  
Choices concerning who could join, and in what capacity, were informed by knowledge and 
connections within the networks of  the local elite. Each candidate’s ‘weight’ would be 
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measured on different levels, including financial capacity and family status, so as to 
determine the most appropriate position for them within the club. Knowledge of  this kind, 
concerning eligibility and suitability was in itself  a source of  power, and one that Ghandour 
surely possessed. In his ‘era’ decisions on new appointees’ admittance to the board were 
made after a process of  consultation amongst existing board members, a consultation that 
often resulted in a list of  candidates who would win the election uncontested.  
The concept of  weight corresponds with what Bourdieu calls ‘social capital’: he argues that 
‘the volume of  the social capital possessed by a given agent thus depends on the size of  the 
network of  connections he can effectively mobilize and on the volume of  the capital 
(economic, cultural or symbolic) possessed in his own right by each of  those to whom he is 
connected’ (Bourdieu 1986: unpaginated). 
The ability of  a certain member to ‘mobilise’ other members of  the bourgeoisie, or to exert 
influence on them and persuade them to join Nejmeh was described by members as 
mawna. In popular usage a person who has mawna over another is one who can influence 
that person, but not by exerting authority; he or she is obeyed on the basis of  respect or 
close relations and is given privileges or favoured treatment. In practice, mawna is a result 
of  the above networks of  relationships and is deeply embedded in the community’s power 
structures, but it also has affective elements. The term was the one Ghandour chose to 
describe how the board members were recruited; each existing member contacted those 
over whom he could exert mawna.  
Linguistically100, the word originates from the Arabic verb that translates as ‘to supply’, and 
s/he who has mawna over another is one who is responsible to provide for him or her. 
Nobody I spoke to automatically made a link between the current use of  the word and the 
implications of  its linguistic origin, though I think the term adequately explains the role 
and character of  such relationships in the patronage system. Despite mawna being an 
exercise of  power, it is not one that is exerted by a more powerful person over those 
possessing less power, but is instead used across horizontal relationships, as in brothers 
having mawna over each other. It is even possible in some instances, that a fan – although 
of  lower class or status - could have mawna over a board member with regard to a certain 
                                                 
100  The word mawna originates from the verb Maʾna – meaning on the online version of  the Arabic 
dictionary Līsān al-ʿarab http://baheth.info Accessed on 13/5/2010. 
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issue precisely because of  personal relationships, or a reputation for sound judgement, or 
some other form of  ‘bottom-up’ power s/he might possess.  
As a mode of  interpersonal influence mawna, with its affective element and its assumption 
of  a relative equality in power, differs from the more widely discussed concept of  wasta 
(Antoun 2000; Cunningham and Sarayrah 1993; Gubser 1973). Wasta or ‘going in between’, 
as described by Smith et al., refers to ‘the process whereby one can achieve goals through 
links with key persons in positions of  high status’ (2011: 3). In describing the relationship 
between the Zuʿama (leaders) of  the east Lebanese town of  Zahle and their clients, Gubser 
describes how a person’s resort to wasta from a zaʿim creates ties between the two and 
ensures the client’s political support. By contrast, mawna does create some sort of  
obligation, but this is usually between individuals of  relatively similar social standing, 
strengthening the ties between them. In such a situation a person’s acceptance of  an 
invitation to join the club would strengthen his position within that elite’s network but 
would not necessarily imply his subordination to it. 
Despite the similarities between Ghandour and Daouk, it was not just anybody’s mawna 
that secured Daouk as Nejmeh’s President. He was asked to take on the role by the club’s 
patron, in part as a compensatory reward for being side-lined in parliamentary elections. 
The reward was intended to grant Daouk prestige, but he was reluctant to accept it until 
persuaded by Prime Minister Hariri who reportedly told him that the club would surely 
become ‘one of  the most important clubs in the middle east’. Daouk told me that he finally 
accepted because of  his inability to ‘deny him a request’ and the ‘friendship’ that bonded 
him with Hariri. His use of  the words ‘friendship’ and ‘mawna’ was emphatic, but it masked 
the fact that power relations between the two men were quite different to those which 
existed between board members in Ghandour’s time. What was important for Daouk was 
not so much the social capital derived from relationships with fellow bourgeoisie board 
members, but primarily the social capital generated by his specific relationship to Hariri and 
his personal ability to provide a service to the Prime Minister.  
The affective language tying the zaʿim to his constituency was often adopted by Hariri 
himself. Throughout the 1990s, when Rafic Hariri was in power and his popularity rising, 
Future Television ran an advertisement that became a catch phrase of  loyalty to Hariri. The 
advertisement featured a band dressed in traditional urban Beirut costume. Their song 
addressed the ‘one loved by the soul’ asking him to ‘look towards the future’ and ‘not dwell 
into the past’ because ‘the future’ (again, Hariri’s magic word) is his. After further 
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expressions of  love101, the song’s subject is promised that ‘for your eyes’ the mawna is 
guaranteed. The words ‘for your eyes’ and ‘mawna’ became catch phrases of  loyalty for 
Hariri. 
Shifts in the Locus of  Power and Complicity Amongst Beirut’s 
Bourgeoisie 
Hariri’s exclusive funding of  the club after 2003 and his lack of  reliance on Beirut’s Sunni 
bourgeoisie to fund his charitable endeavours (Baumann 2012b) both worked to 
significantly alter the locus of  power, moving it away from board members and towards the 
patron. The board members of  the ‘Hariri era’ clearly affirmed their loyalty to Hariri and 
posited themselves as members of  the ‘Future Movement’, unlike Ghandour who for 
decades had tried to protect the independence of  the club. 
During Ghandour’s presidency (1969 - 2003), he relied on several smaller donors within the 
Lebanese business community, many of  whom eventually joined the board which then 
comprised a mixture of  donors from the business community and sports enthusiasts. He 
also managed to maintain the continued support of  various Muslim political Zu’ama, whilst 
avoiding presenting the club as being directly aligned with any of  them. The relationships 
he built for the club cut across social classes, different sects, religions, and political 
affiliations, though he was fully aware of  the differences that such disparate affiliations 
entailed. In my interview with him, he took great pride in never having been any one 
politician’s or donor’s subject or client:  
‘For 35 years, I was not counted as anybody’s follower, I used to get money 
from everybody and pay on top of  that from my own pocket, me and the 
members of  the board - so I don’t belittle anybody’s contribution, they all paid 
in to the club - and we remained on good terms with everybody.’ 
Evaluating the situation of  the club six years after he had left it, Ghandour, with his 
characteristic diplomacy highlighted what he thought were the two main mistakes 
committed by the recent management. Firstly, ‘the new boards relied exclusively on the 
Hariri family for funding’, and secondly ‘they gave more status and say to the Hariri family 
than the family itself  requested. Why? Allow the club some distance. Why would someone 
                                                 
101  Though Hariri was not mentioned by name in the first versions of  the song, but it was repeatedly used 
in his election campaigns, often overlaid with his images. For one of  the many versions of  the song see 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hoHjYj_qFZA - Accessed 26/01/2015. 
173 
say we are followers of  the Future Movement? OK, and we all follow one movement or 
the other, there is no need to get the club involved in that.’ Ghandour claimed that 
declaring allegiance was not necessary, that board members ‘gave Hariri more than he 
requested’ and that according to his limited experience of  working with Rafic Hariri, ‘Hariri 
never asked neither directly, indirectly or even insinuated that the club had to be part of  his 
following’. 
In the statements above Ghandour appears to prioritise loyalty to the club above all else. By 
contrast, Daouk’s motivation for presiding over the club was, as he described it, to maintain 
his own relationship with Hariri and thus maintain the club’s allegiance to the Hariri 
establishment - aims which took priority over ensuring the club’s independence. In fact, 
contrary to Ghandour’s assertions, both Daouk and Muheib Itani affirmed what they 
perceived as Hariri’s ‘right’ as sponsor to have the club within the ‘family’ of  the political 
organisation he led, and saw it as their duty to assert that right on his behalf. Muheib Itani 
explained this situation as only ‘natural’ given that the club received its funding from one 
source only.  
‘What is the problem? Don’t other clubs take pride in their belonging? And 
what is the problem if  one club issued a press release in which it takes pride in 
belonging to the Future Movement? I can’t see where the contradiction is, all 
clubs in Lebanon adhere to individuals or political, social and sectarian groups. 
If  a club is proud of  its political belonging to the Future Movement, where is 
the problem? Future Movement is funding it. [...] You can’t be in a club and 
badmouth he who is funding it.’ 
For Itani, the maxim ‘Celui qui donne, ordonne’ (He who gives, governs), was relevant: if  
you have ‘one donor you will have this result.’ Both Daouk and Itani presented themselves 
as being in the service of  the patron and they de-emphasised their relationship with the 
club’s popular constituency – particularly if  that constituency failed to pledge allegiance to 
the patron and thus had no instrumental value for him in the long run.  
Preserving Class Structures and Control of  the Elite 
To better understand the nature of  the change described above, it is useful to also highlight 
certain elements of  the club’s management which were retained unchanged. Walking 
through the offices of  both Ghandour and Daouk, it was easy to notice that the prestigious 
physical spaces they occupied indicated just one of  several similarities between the two 
men’s backgrounds. They were both successful in their careers, came from notable Beiruti 
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families and had a track record of  engagement in the public sphere, especially in Islamic 
and Beiruti charities and social organisations. In fact Daouk had been a member of  
Nejmeh’s General Assembly back when Ghandour was President, despite him not being 
involved in the club’s affairs at the time. Daouk summed up the relationship between the 
two men: 
‘I am his lawyer, I have a professional relationship with him. I’ve known him 
for many years as a lawyer, and the relationship was sustained. There is 
personal friendship too. He was also was my colleague at the ‘Islamic Centre’ 
and elected board member of  it before I even joined. Of  course, there is a 
relationship, this is Beirut, Daouk and Ghandour families are even related by 
marriage and blood.’ 
The idea that an affective ‘personal friendship’ between the two men truly existed is 
questionable. Nevertheless, Daouk’s description of  Ghandour is typical of  how almost all 
the men I spoke to discussed the relationships they had with men of  similar background, 
even those who were in practice competitors. Daouk and Ghandour belong to Beirut’s 
business elite and are of  the same socio-economic social class, so Daouk’s use of  the term 
‘friendship’ fits with the convention of  reserving the term to describe personal 
relationships with people of  similar class. Occasionally the term describes relationships 
with people from a higher social class. No one described their relationships with fans as 
‘friendship’ for the very reason that fans mostly belonged to a lower social class. Also of  
note is the fact that neither man, nor any other board member, disputed the implicit 
understanding that membership of  the club’s board was exclusively reserved for Beirut’s 
bourgeoisie, and never opened up to competition, or possible membership, by the fans. 
The nostalgic image portrayed by fans of  Ghandour and his era is one that complements 
Ghandour’s own charitable self-representation, and not one that praises his willingness to 
share power over the club or democratise its management.  
In addition to preserving class structures, both eras have in common a belief  in the value 
and adequacy of  entrepreneurial and business skills to take on a leadership role in the club. 
Parallel to Ghandour’s presidency being underpinned by his and other members charitable 
motives, those same members also emphasised their background as businessmen, and 
stressed that despite not knowing much about sports management when they joined they 
were sure to succeed in their roles knowing that they were successful in their private 
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enterprise The trust in the ability of  the entrepreneur to manage such a social enterprise 
has existed at least from the time that Ghandour joined the club in the late sixties.  
Defining boundaries of  belonging to the club is a dynamic process which has to take 
account of  the influences exerted by different presidents and their boards over time. For 
years during the ‘Ghandour era’ Beirut’s bourgeoisie maintained control over the club. 
Their control was rooted in notions of  respect and charity and Nejmeh was open to a large 
and diverse body of  fans. By contrast the ‘Hariri era’ introduced a different dynamic: a new 
line of  exclusion was drawn based on sect and political loyalty.  
Conclusion 
The changes within Nejmeh club affected patrons, members, and fans. This chapter has 
built on the previous one to demonstrate how the change in the club’s patronage and 
funding source altered power relationships within the upper tier of  the club’s management. 
Under super-zaʿim and mega-philanthropist Hariri, Nejmeh’s management team focused 
on prioritising entrepreneurial and professional skills and loyalty to the club patron above 
all other considerations – a development which was a ‘natural’ consequence of  accepting 
Hariri’s exclusive funding. Members of  previous boards had relied on what became 
impossible to guarantee sources of  funding, namely the donations of  diverse, small-scale 
donors who belonged to Beirut’s bourgeoisie. Such donors were motivated by charitable 
sentiment and the prospect of  increasing their own social capital and standing. Class-based 
access to the upper tier of  management remains an exclusive privilege of  the bourgeoisie - 
as it has been since at least the 1960s. Members of  lower classes remain excluded from the 
club’s board, and to a larger extent, its General Assembly.  
The above mentioned changes are not exclusive to Nejmeh, and signal among other issues 
the decline in power of  the industrial bourgeoisie in favour of  the commercial 
entrepreneurs – both in Lebanon and at the regional level (Perthes 2004). The relationships 
that entrepreneurs forged with Hariri were instrumental to their business activities and 
their access to lucrative government contracts. In the next chapter I focus on a lower tier in 
the club’s hierarchy and examine the ways in which Nejmeh’s membership and the 
leadership of  fans’ groups – members of  the petty bourgeoisie - were affected when the 
authority of  Hariri was being consolidated through bureaucratic and electoral processes 
within the club itself  and in the country’s politics more broadly. 
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6 
The Electoral Theatre 
  
The Day of  Fortune 
May 7th, 2009. Nejmeh Sport Club’s stadium is bustling with thousands of  visitors. They wave club flags 
and the stadium reverberates with their cheers. The visitors are not here for the love of  sports, nor is the 
space being used for its normal purpose. Today the Nejmeh stadium hosts the club’s patron, Saad Hariri, 
who is also the leader of  the Future Movement. He is here to announce the list of  candidates for the March 
14 Alliance for Beirut’s second and third electoral districts102. 
The green turf  which on ordinary days only the players are allowed to tread is packed with hundreds of  
plastic chairs for the audience. The chairs surround a raised wooden platform especially constructed for 
media personnel and cameramen. The stadium’s concrete terraces have also been transformed, as the 
normally burgundy stripes that match the team’s colours have been painted blue for this special event.  
On one side of  the stadium, there is another wooden stage which is separated from the rest of  the audience 
and patrolled by security personal. This large platform is a white-floored theatre-like space. On it speakers 
are seated in front of  huge images of  the assassinated leader Rafic Hariri, and the blue rays of  the Future 
Movement’s sun shaped logo. Facing the platform seats are provided for select invitees, namely the social, 
economic and political elite, including a few of  Nejmeh club’s board members. 
                                                 
102 The stadium was an ideal site for such an electoral event with its ample space and central location. It was 
rented from the club's board by Salim Diab who was leading the Future Movement's electoral campaign 
and was ex-general co-ordinator of  the movement, and incidentally Honorary President of  Ansar Club, 
Nejmeh's long time rival.  But it is not only location and size that are of  relevance to the choice of  the 
stadium. Nejmeh club had won Lebanon’s football championship on 26/4/2009, less than 10 days 
before the rally, and Riyadi club, also under Hariri’s patronage and whose stadium is a few meters away, 
won the country’s basketball championship in the same week. Additionally, and as was emphasised by 
Saad Hariri in his speech, it was the site where two years previously parliamentarian and Future 
Movement member Walid Eido, was assassinated by a bomb planted for him as he passed by the 
southern wall of  the stadium. Two of  Nejmeh’s players were killed with him. See figure 29. 
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Thousands of  Hariri supporters fill the rest of  the stadium in what feels more like a carnival than a 
political event. Loud speakers play songs dedicated to Rafic Hariri and his son, Saad. These songs have 
become the familiar sound track of  the whole elections period. One song promises that the paths that Hariri 
senior took will continue, asserting that his spirit is never absent103. The other entitled ‘The Day of  
Fortune’ (yawm al-saʿd)104, especially written for Saad Hariri, plays on the young leader’s name, Saad, 
meaning happiness or fortune. It describes him as free, proud, and more precious than one’s own offspring. 
Unlike the traditionally serious political and nationalist songs, these lively songs are similar in tune to the 
popular Arab dance rhythms, and along with the colourful flags and the sunny day they reinforce the 
celebratory ambience.  
The people present are of  all ages and both genders. Teenage boys are taking the chance to flirt with girls 
who do not have many opportunities of  meeting up with the opposite sex in public. Little kids enjoy the 
space, the flags, and the music. Chitchat amongst old friends and coincidental meetings give the feeling that 
one is in a neighbourhood café. I use my video camera and almost everyone is tolerant of  my filming. 
Mothers pose with their little daughters for photos, and young men in flirtatious mood, ask that I appear 
with them in the footage. Boys with drums play, dance, and stand on the chairs and repeatedly disobey the 
requests for calm.  
At first glance, I get the impression that there are more women and teenage boys present, and relatively 
fewer men. Soon though, I realise that the men are here in different capacities, as camera men in the centre 
of  the field, as uniformed guards all around the turf, organising the crowds, and in suits seated on the front 
seats. Kamel, a supporter of  the Future Movement, from the neighbourhood of  Tariq Al-Jadidah, describes 
to me the different uniforms and what they mean. Some are for the Future Movement members and others 
for employees of  Secure-Plus, a private security company affiliated with Hariri. The former are elegant in 
grey suits and neck ties while the latter have a military appearance wearing caps, beige shirts carefully 
tucked in, navy multi-pocketed trousers and combat boots105. 
The celebration lasts for a whole hour as we wait for the candidates, and although I expect that quiet will 
reign once the speeches start, this does not happen. Huge screens on both sides of  the stadium have been 
installed to project the speeches of  Saad Hariri and allied candidates. This is how those on the turf  are 
                                                 
103 For one of  the many versions of  the song available online see http://youtu.be/zN8W5ua7Zf8 
(Accessed 24/2/2015). While the words of  this song, like the rest of  the Hariri promoting media 
deserves analysis beyond the scope of  this thesis, of  relevance to this chapter are phrases describing 
Hariri as the foundation of  'the civilised Beirut'(al- ḥaḍarīah) and 'Lebanon's renaissance' (nahda). 
104 See http://youtu.be/6Puc8l74Vos - Accessed 24/2/2015. 
105 Despite expressing regret that he was unable to join the Future Movement officially due to restrictions 
imposed on him by his employer, Kamel also wore the navy trousers and beige shirt – though by not 
tucking his shirt in he differentiated himself  from the officially affiliated members.  
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able to see the candidates on the far side of  the stadium. In the hour long wait for the candidates to arrive, 
these screens have been projecting edited images of  the young leader and his late father, as well as footage of  
the famed demonstrators in downtown Beirut on 14 March 2005 who protested at the assassination of  
Rafic Hariri. Live footage of  the stadium itself  is being relayed, taken of  course with a wide angle lens 
which accentuates the size of  the crowd. 
Loud cheering accompanies the entry of  Saad Hariri, despite those of  us on the turf  only being able to see 
him on the screens. Hearing the speeches that follow, the crowd selectively choose to only hear the words that 
are worthy of  their applause; ‘Beirut’ , ‘dignity’, and ‘pride’ are inevitably repeated often to deliberately 
stimulate clapping. Between the drumbeats and the clapping not much else can be heard. The fact that 
people can not hear the speech or the names of  particular candidates is beside the point. They are in the 
rally and are sure to vote for the whole list ‘as it is’ or as said in Arabic ‘zay ma hiyye’; these were the 
instructions of  Saad Hariri - identical to the instructions of  his father before him.  
The magnitude of  the electoral event can be felt rippling out into the surrounding area. Close by, the seaside 
Café Rawda has also hung out its own welcoming banner for the event, speaking on behalf  of  Beirut 
‘which welcomes the son of  he who reconstructed it’. The Ferris wheel of  the adjacent amusement park – 
which is closed for today – is decorated with a large full length portrait of  Hariri senior. The walls of  a 
nearby store provide the backcloth for a portrait of  assassinated parliamentarian, Eido, and his son. 
Alongside, a ten meter long banner is displayed; it bears Future Movement slogans proclaiming the 
movement’s mission statement: ‘the state, security, prosperity, the constitution, and justice’. 
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Figure 28: Aerial photograph of  the Nejmeh Sports Club stadium in Manara.106 
 
                                                 
106  Source: Website of  Nejmeh Sports Club http://www.nejmeh-club.com/?page_id=221 accessed 
19/9/2015. 
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Figure 29: Nejmeh stadium transformed on the day of  the 2009 parliamentary electoral rally of  the Future 
Movement. 
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Introduction 
Saad Hariri, along with the complete list of  candidates that he announced on the day I 
describe, won the seats of  Beirut’s second and third district. This came as no surprise, and 
was expected even by opposing political actors whose participation in the elections was 
more of  a set performance than a genuine competition. Despite many taking pride for 
years in the country being the so-called  ‘only Arab democracy’, the consolidation of  the 
elite and the exclusion of  challengers107 meant that the distribution of  parliamentary seats 
was to a large extent decided upon by the way the electoral law was configured before the 
elections. In common with Lebanese parliamentary elections, the elections of  Nejmeh’s 
board members also often had predetermined results. As I explain in the next section, 
elections were held regularly and in accordance with the club’s bylaws, but the key members 
who had power over other General Assembly members usually agreed beforehand on the 
list of  names to be nominated for the board. The majority of  the club’s boards were in fact 
elected uncontested, yet the actual elections process continued to take place and 
bureaucratic electoral procedures were strictly followed.  
In this chapter I explore both the practice and the understanding of  Lebanese elections, at 
the national level and at club level. Looking particularly at the relationships between Saad 
Hariri - seen as a quintessential example of  a state elite member - and his supporters, I 
discuss the practice and function of  elections within a socio-political power-sharing system 
largely organised around clientelistic networks. I argue that the electoral process itself, and 
the performative opportunities it provides, serve several complementary functions. I show 
how, far from being an antidote to clientelism, elections contribute in various ways to 
strengthening of  the ‘clientelist habitus’ (Rutten 2007; Auyero 2012) even before the results 
are declared. In addition, the electoral process is an opportunity for the performance of  the 
patron’s power over his followers as well as over other contestants. The ability to mobilise 
followers is needed with respect to both co-members of  the political elite and to external 
powers. The assessment of  both groups is decisive in negotiations to allocate parliamentary 
seats.  
                                                 
107 The consolidation of  the elite, as El-Husseini (2004: 243) describes is a result of  a longer term process  
which involves three movements labeled as elite settlement, elite convergence, and co-optation, 
eventually resulting in 'the consolidation of  those elites in place in the system and the exclusion of  
challengers'. 
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Also central to that performance is the utilisation of  a global image – promoted and 
shaped by the media - of  the bureaucratic implementation of  elections. In the past year this 
image almost always included the smiling faces of  voters from across the globe parading 
electoral ink on their fingers, often shown to be synonymous with democratic 
representation. This image is closely tied to the neoliberal ideology of  the ‘good life’ which 
the Hariris, father and son, promoted and enacted in Lebanon. 
In current debate about whether the ‘state’ in Lebanon does or does not exist, especially in 
a context involving widespread corruption, sectarianism and clientelism, Leenders affirms 
the importance of  studying the state and its bureaucratic institutions and the way they are 
utilised by the politicians in determining access to resources and privileges to existing elite 
members. According to him, ‘the state’s omnipresence constituted a major ingredient of  
the elite’s strategies aimed at self-enrichment and political outmanoeuvring of  their rivals’ 
(2012: 231). In the same vein, I argue that elections, and their attendant bureaucratic 
procedures, not only work to limit political competition and facilitate seat allotment 
between existing elite members, but they also legitimise such means of  power distribution 
both at the popular and the bureaucratic level. In so doing they also provide a vehicle for 
the strengthening of  sectarian and clientelistic loyalties. The following section documents 
the ways in which elections are practised in Lebanon, and notes how these issues are 
discussed in the relevant literature. I situate that discussion within a broader anthropology 
literature of  the state, particularly that which has considered the desire for, and the fantasy 
of, the state (Taussig 1992; Navaro-Yashin 2002; Jansen 2014).  
The third section returns to a consideration of  Nejmeh club. It describes the two elections 
that took place in the ‘Hariri Era’ and the instrumental use of  official bureaucratic 
discourse and the procedures used to ensure the Hariri establishment’s complete control 
over the club. I also take account of  some of  the existing routes available to members to 
lobby for the changes they wanted made in the club. The fourth section looks at the 2009 
parliamentary elections in Beirut in which both Saad Hariri and Ghandour were competing 
candidates. By reviewing the electoral process, the roles of  various workers in the electoral 
machine, Hariri’s electoral rally and the election day itself, I explore both the way elections 
were practiced and perceived by Hariri’s followers and the way in which the campaign’s 
framing of  elections fed into the strengthening of  Hariri’s political position and patronage.  
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The State at my Finger Tips 
According to the Stockholm based global intergovernmental organisation ‘International 
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance’ (International IDEA): 
‘Elections are the cornerstone of  representative democracy. Through elections, 
governments obtain their democratic mandate and are held accountable for their 
performance in office. Flawed elections deprive people of  their voice in governance 
and undermine sustainable democratic development.’108 
In the 21st century, we have seen many celebrated so-called ‘first free elections’ taking place 
in historically repressive or autocratic regimes, including Afghanistan, Iraq, and more 
recently in Egypt and Tunisia after the revolutions. While perspectives which are critical of  
the ‘freedom’ of  elections or their efficacy in bringing about democracy abound on both 
the academic and popular level, elections continue to be implemented as elaborate globally 
mediated events – meaning that as political events they were largely shaped and extensively 
promoted by the media - on which many aspirations and expenses are bestowed. As in 
other countries around the world, many Lebanese people on 9th June, 2009 flaunted 
fingers stained with blue ink after casting their vote. Their actions were of  particular note 
given that the Parliamentary elections of  2009 took place in a period when the main 
political parties of  Lebanon appeared to have settled – albeit temporarily – the political 
conflicts which had divided the country since the 2005 assassination of  Prime Minister 
Rafic Hariri. This round of  elections was presented as central in assessing where the loyalty 
of  the Lebanese lay after the street clashes of  May 2008, and indeed tipped the balance in 
favour of  the March 14 political camp in its nationwide results (Khoury 2014).  
In practice though, the margin for actual competition in the 2009 parliamentary elections 
was just that, marginal. The electoral law agreed upon in the 2008 Doha meeting was 
certain to reproduce the existing distribution of  power between the political leaders as the 
division of  Lebanon into electoral districts each with a varying number of  seats and a 
sectarian composition was agreed upon by the same political leaders who were running for 
                                                 
108 See IDEA's website: http://www.idea.int/elections/ - Accessed 20/2/2015. 
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elections109. As the electoral districts were distributed under the Doha agreement, the five 
seats of  Beirut’s third district, a Sunni majority area, were guaranteed for the March 14 
political camp which Hariri represented. The four seats of  Beirut’s second district were 
distributed equally between March 14 and their political opponents, March 8.  
This was not a new trend in Lebanese politics; according to a 2005 report of  the EU 
Election Observation Mission to Lebanon (EU EOM), traditionally: 
‘[Elections] are not directly meant to produce a governing majority in Parliament, or 
to determine which party or political group will participate in government or join 
the opposition. Their primary function is to ensure the participation of  the elites 
and the representation of  the country’s regions, confessions and political families, 
through a specific system of  seat allotment, which actually limits political 
competition and confines it within each confession.’ (EU EOM 2005: 14)  
According to El-Husseini, ‘the Lebanese civil war led to a renewal and realignment of  the 
Lebanese political elite’, and the ‘Pax Syriana’ that followed supported elite consolidation 
(2012: 214). Central to the study of  Lebanese politics, according to El-Husseini, is 
understanding elite recruitment and formation, both of  which are largely dependent on 
clientelism and financial resources and rarely on the results of  the ballot box. To win the 
seats of  Beirut’s second and third districts, it was not necessary for Hariri to mobilise his 
supporters to vote for him in this round of  elections. This round of  elections, as described 
by many local newspapers, acted more as a referendum that had only minor impact on the 
already agreed upon distribution of  parliamentary seats in Beirut. Still, Hariri did invest in 
an expensive campaign, employing a large electoral machinery and organising several rallies. 
Recognising elections within the Lebanese political system as a tool for seat allotment for 
political elite members within a consociational political system invites questioning of  the 
value and function of  electoral campaigns for both the elite, and for the voters who took 
part in them.  
Contrary to policy literature that presents elections as an antidote to clientelism, I argue 
that for the Hariri establishment and its supporters, elections were instrumental in 
                                                 
109  The electoral law agreed in Doha was based on the 1960 law which defines the electoral constituency at 
the level of  the caza or district. The Doha agreement involved mainly electoral redistricting in some 
areas which served to further strengthen the power of  existing political elite, particularly that Hariri, 
Jumbaltt, Hezbollah and the Amal movement as power brokers of  their sects. For details see 
https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/nowspecials/qas_for_the_electoral_system_in_lebanon -Accessed 
29/6/2015. 
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strengthening the clientelistic hierarchy and habitus surrounding Saad Hariri. Some recent 
ethnographic work has explored the relationship between clientelistic and kinship networks 
and the electoral process, often arguing that the former have contributed to ensuring 
popular representation and the enactment of  democracy.  In her work on elections in 
Kyrgyzstan for example, Ismailbekova, discusses ‘how an indigenized understanding of  
democracy was fostered through the activation of  patronage networks and how, through 
the performance of  election, the democratic state came to be enacted’ (2013: 78).  She 
traces how within one community, local villagers who wanted to vote against the ruling 
party knowing full well that their votes would be manipulated, ensured their representation 
by using patronage networks and circumventing and violating the official state procedures. 
In this case, patronage and the locals’ exercising of  this agency to perform democracy go 
hand in hand against the bureaucratic procedure of  the state. Along similar lines, and in 
one of  the rare anthropological explorations of  elections in Lebanon, Obeid (2011), 
discusses the 2004 municipal elections of  the long-marginalised border village of  Arsal 
where she sees in its results a possibility to implement the changes that voters aspired to, 
even if  primarily these had to involve a process of  experimentation or ‘trial and error’ on 
the part of  the locals. She concludes that elections at the time constituted a blend of  
upholding lineage as a local form of  political representation which worked alongside the 
prospect of  accountable governance (Obeid 2011: 264).  
Five years later and over a hundred kilometres away from Obeid’s research site I explored 
parliamentary elections in Beirut, Lebanon’s capital and its political centre. Unlike the 
municipal elections described by Obeid, the space for voters to affect the results of  
elections at the national parliamentary level was much more limited. In addition, the years 
since the 2005 assassination of  Rafic Hariri and the withdrawal of  Syrian forces from 
Lebanon have witnessed political mobilisation and antagonisms that have led not only to 
the crystallisation of  sectarian identities (Beydoun 2012) but to the formation of  distinct 
political identities too. The elite, through the sharp antagonism between the March 8 and 
March 14 political camps, appeared capable of  dictating the political priorities and 
discourse which were evident in the electoral law adopted in the Doha talks of  2008. While 
this period produced the devoted supporters who were present at Hariri’s electoral rally, 
(described earlier), it nevertheless left many Beirutis apathetic towards this round of  
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elections. It was therefore no surprise that the voter turnout to the elections of  Beirut’s 
second and third districts did not exceed 27% and 40% respectively110.  
The concern of  the following sections is with people who attended the rally and those who 
actively took part providing support not just for Hariri and his candidates in this election 
round, but who also aided the members of  the Hariri Establishment more broadly. I argue 
that the elections provided an opportunity for the consolidation of  clientelistic ties. Starting 
with the dominant definition of  clientelism as a transactional relationship, where clients 
provide political loyalty in exchange for the patron’s favours (Gilsenan 1977), elections can 
be seen as an opportunity for the granting of  one-off  favours to clients by political 
patrons. The Hariri establishment’s disbursement of  money to its supporters, effected 
through employing a large electoral machine and providing transportation come election 
day, is not mere ‘vote buying’ given the pre-existing relations and loyalties that bind Hariri 
to his supporters, but is better understood as a way out from the longer term commitments 
for provision of  support and employment traditionally provided by Beirut’s Zu’ama. 
Equally, seen from the perspective of  supporters, elections provided them with the 
opportunity to  demonstrate loyalty and claim the Za’im as their patron whose privileges 
and handouts are exclusively theirs as his followers, and to which no other groups have any 
right. Silverman has described the bottom-up inceptions of  patronage and the use of  the 
‘ideology of  patronage’ as a ‘means of  drawing high status outsiders into local 
commitments’ (1977: 17).  For Hariri as a candidate, elections were an opportunity for the 
performative and ostentatious expenditure of  huge amounts of  money at an exceptional 
scale following his style in both politics and philanthropy as described earlier in this thesis. 
Indeed, supporters I spoke to actually took pride in their patron’s ‘generosity’ in 
comparison to the expenditure of  other candidates. 
The performative aspect of  elections, including the electoral campaign and rally, the voting 
process and the celebrations upon the victory of  Hariri and allied candidates played a 
greater role in the consolidation of  clientelism and far exceeded the simple exchange of  
favours and loyalty. The festivities surrounding elections and the competition that they 
involved provided an ideal opportunity to create a sense of  community among the 
supporters of  the zaʿim. They also had an affective element which contributed to 
                                                 
110 See Lebanese Elections website published by Ministry of  Interior and Municipalities for detailed results 
of  the 2009 parliamentary election http://www.elections.gov.lb/parliamentary/Elections-Results/2009-
Real-time-Results.aspx – Accessed 24/2/2015.  
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strengthening the symbolic and performative aspect of  the ‘clientelist habitus’ (Rutten 
2007).  Beyond the carnivalesque aspect of  the rally and elections, this habitus was 
constructed upon the rhetoric of  upholding the state and its institutions that the Hariri 
establishment enshrined in the campaign and in its opposition to Hezbollah, and was most 
bluntly stated in the slogan printed in the ten meter long banner hanging opposite the 
stadium on the day of  the rally - ‘the state, security, prosperity, the constitution, and justice’.  
In response to what he calls a ‘libertarian paradigm’ in anthropology which ‘posits the state 
predominantly as an imposed externality’ (Jansen 2014: 239) Jansen observed in post-war 
Sarajevo, a ‘desire for the state’ that is rooted in strong yearnings for ‘normal lives’. While 
this resonates with post-war Lebanon at the time of  Hariri’s ascendance to power, in the 
2009 elections there appeared to be a renewed desire for the state, not by necessity one that 
is motivated by the state’s functional role in the people’s day-to-day life, but by a global, 
media-promoted image of  democracy that fed into the ‘fantasy of  the state’ (Navarro-
Yashin 2002) that would locate them as citizens of  a ‘global’ and ‘democratic’ world. By 
dipping their fingers in the electoral ink on that June day in 2009, voters in Beirut became 
part of  the global ‘civilised’ world as one Hariri supporter described it. Their image 
overlapped with those of  the other voters around the world who have proudly exhibited 
blue fingers as proof  of  having overcome their autocratic regimes and entered the 
democratic realm.  
Such an image is not separate from the promises of  ‘prosperity’ and ‘security’ which Hariri 
made in his electoral slogan, nor from the image of  wealth and individual success that he 
presented of  himself. This image is embedded within an ideology of  ‘the good life’ which 
Wedeen (2013), following Berlant (2011), describes as entailing ‘not only the usual 
aspirations to economic well-being but also fantasies of  multicultural accommodation, 
domestic security, and a sovereign national identity’ (Wedeen 2013: 853). In her work on 
Syria, Wedeen argues that the ‘good life’ is part of  the neoliberal ideological project - one 
with specific capacities to maintain neoliberal governance through enlisting citizens into 
novel forms of  regulation, intervention, and protest (Wedeen 2013: 853). In that light, 
Wedeen’s argument parallels what Hilgers has called the ‘neoliberal disposition’, an aspect 
constituted by the triangle of  policies, institutions and dispositions. (2013: 78).  
The rhetoric of  the state, security, and sovereignty which Hariri and the March 14 camp 
championed stands at the centre of  the way political competition was framed against 
Hezbollah and the March 8 camp. Kosmatopoulos summarises a typology of  practices 
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applied by peace experts to analyse ‘state failure’, through which ‘Hezbollah is perceived to 
pose an existential menace to the Lebanese state due to the party’s unwillingness to 
conform to the state monopoly over organised means of  violence. Instead, it follows its 
own “parochial” interests and thus threatens the coherence and cohesion of  the state’ 
(Kosmatopoulos 2011: 129). In that sense, Hezbollah, as a non-state actor, is a threat to the 
‘good life’ which ‘combines economic liberalization with fears of  sectarian disorder and 
nonsovereignty’ (Wedeen 2013: 842). 
In winning these elections, Hariri supporters proved that they were different from 
‘Hezbollah’ and deserving of  the ‘good life’. They promoted their political ideology 
through the peaceful, state sanctioned tools of  democracy. The fact that the results of  the 
elections were already largely predetermined by the electoral law and distribution of  
districts agreed on with that same political competitor, namely Hezbollah, and that some of  
Hariri’s supporters in the rally were employed by a Hariri-funded quasi militia seemed not 
to undermine the image that Hariri supporters wanted to project for themselves and for 
their political leader. Neither did the knowledge that ‘getting things done’ in Lebanon did 
not really happen via the actions of  the state or the bureaucratic institutions, but instead, 
through the influences of  interpersonal and clientelistic ties. 
Consolidation of  Power: Taking Control of  the Club 
through ‘Legal Means’ 
This section narrates four junctures in Nejmeh’s recent history where the bureaucratic 
‘democratic’ regulations and structures within the club were used and / or bypassed. 
Starting with the way that the board was selected during Ghandour’s time, I move on to 
describe the transition period when Nejmeh passed into the hands of  the Hariri 
Establishment. I highlight the incongruity between the rhetoric of  institution building and 
democracy and the actual use of  democratic regulations to achieve control over the club. In 
contrast to this control tactic, I give examples of  the ways in which kinship and personal 
ties were deployed by existing members to affect the selection of  the board while the club 
was under the Hariri establishment’s control. While various options for decision making 
existed, ultimately the final decision on appointments to the board rested with the elite or 
the club’s patron. The clientelistic networks seemed to be more effective in actualising such 
a decision than direct votes were – although it is possible that such clientelistic networks 
were translatable into political support at the national level. 
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Despite the electoral process in the club being little more than a mere performance, 
Nejmeh members took pride in the democratic structures within Lebanese sports clubs 
compared to those present in other Arab countries. Just like the electoral rally mentioned 
above, the democratic structures and regulations of  Nejmeh were a facade that at once 
concealed and embellished the real mechanisms of  decision making and bringing forward 
‘representatives’. Nevertheless, they were maintained as a means of  feeding into and 
promoting the clientelist habitus which bound Hariri to his supporters. 
  
 
  
Figure 30: Elections of  Nejmeh Board members. Clockwise from top left; 1. Daouk casts his vote in the 2005 
elections. 2. Elected board of  2008 right after elections 3. Elected board of  2008 in the Nejmeh Office after 
distributing board responsibilities, pictures of  Prime Minister Saad Hariri appears behind them. 4. Elected board 
of  2011.111 
 
                                                 
111  Images 1, 2, and 3 are from Almustaqbal newspaper, issues dated 1. 24/10/2005 2. 17/11/2008 3. 
20/12/2008 – copyright is for the newspaper. Image 4 is from Nejmeh’s website http://www.nejmeh-
club.com/?page_id=2356 Accessed 19/9/2015). 
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Board Membership during the Ghandour Era 
As in the Lebanese parliament, elections for the board of  Nejmeh club - security situation 
permitting - took place fairly regularly and in accordance with the club’s written bylaws. 
The newspapers often reported on the election results, announcing the names of  the 
winning ‘candidates’ and publishing formal photographs of  new board members. Still, the 
electoral process within Nejmeh (and most other sports clubs in Lebanon) was an act: 
members of  the General Assembly merely went through the motions of  attending the 
elections meeting to ensure a quorum. The bylaws stipulated that a new board was to be 
elected every three years, yet according to interviews with three of  the club’s Secretary 
Generals and recorded club history, boards have generally been elected uncontested. 
During the ‘Ghandour Era’, the actual selection of  board members took place long before 
the date of  elections, and generally after consultation with external funders and the current 
board members who were paying their own membership fees as well as that of  several 
others over whom they had authority. It was a situation in which the membership – and 
money – of  several key members talked. The negotiation on possible board members 
usually produced a carefully selected list of  candidates; a mix of  people who would 
guarantee continuity of  funding for the club and the capability of  ensuring actual club 
management. 
Sports clubs in Lebanon, as mentioned in earlier chapters, are registered with the Ministry 
of  Youth and Sports as ‘sports associations’ governed by a General Committee (haīʾa 
ʿa ̄ma) whose members elect an Executive Committee (haīʾa ʾida ̄ri ̄a) responsible for the 
club’s management. Lebanese laws provide general regulations regarding membership and 
elections, that are further elaborated in the bylaws of  each club112. Many members I spoke 
to prided themselves on what they described as the ‘democratic’ structures of  sports 
associations in Lebanon, compared to some other Arab countries where members of  
sports associations are government appointed. At the same time, none of  the members 
                                                 
112 Two decrees governed the operation of  sports clubs at the time that this research covers. The first is 
decree 6997 dated 10/01/2002 which concerns the establishment and governance of  youth and sports 
associations. Concerning elections, it stipulated that in order to vote, among other conditions, a 
candidate must have been a General Assembly member for at least a year, and to have paid his/her 
membership fees in full. This last condition was deleted from the later amended decree 213 dated 
27/3/2007. Both decrees also gave the Ministry of  Youth and Sports a monitoring role on the sports 
associations, which are obliged to send the ministry yearly plans and budgets, a list of  members, as well 
as lists of  candidates and members before every election.  
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seemed to be under the illusion that it was the actual act of  casting their vote that produced 
the board. For example, according to Zahi, a General Assembly member in the 1990s: 
‘In Lebanon, this is known. He who pays gets the General Assembly, so he guarantees 
votes for him come elections time. He can get his driver, his wife..[…] Nobody joins the 
General Assembly unless he has somebody on the board, and each party is responsible for 
paying membership fees for those he got into the club. Nobody joins the General 
Assembly if  he has to pay his own membership fees.’ 
Zahi’s own membership fees back when he was a member were paid by a board member at 
the time with whom he was politically affiliated. He was not critical of  the system as long 
as there were multiple donors and players, but he did criticise the exclusivity of  control 
over the General Assembly after the Hariri establishment took over: 
‘Hajj Omar [Ghandour] used to cover some members in the General Assembly, but others 
could still get in. There is a rhythm in Lebanon that we can’t break away from [..], and I am 
not against the idea, if  Hariri is to pay then.. bon appétit, but what if  Hariri is broke, or no 
longer wanted to support? What would happen to the club? At least at Omar Ghandour’s 
time there were multiple donors.’ 
Additional practical, personal, and social considerations were taken into account besides 
financial capacity to contribute to the club. On the practical level, there needed to be a 
couple of  members who had the time to engage in day-to-day operation of  the club, 
particularly taking minutes, following up on administrative matters and documentation sent 
to the Ministry of  Youth and Sports, accounting and relationships with the fans. On the 
social level, as the board fronted the club’s public image, a certain sectarian balance was 
also maintained. Regardless of  their political patronage and the sectarian composition of  
their fan base, most major clubs’ boards included token members belonging to a variety of  
sects. In Nejmeh, Baroudi claimed that diversity existed in the membership of  board 
members and that it was of  paramount importance to him rather then being just tokenism 
for appearances sake: 
‘It was me who formed that last board. I spent nine years in the club, and was instrumental 
in choosing the members of  the board of  the last three years. Not only did I want a mixed 
board, I wanted each member on it not to be sectarian.. I wanted to make sure that at 
heart.. inside his home he was not sectarian.’ 
Indeed, a picture of  members of  the final board to manage the club before it moved to 
Hariri’s patronage was still displayed in Baroudi’s office six years after he left Nejmeh and 
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he took pride in having promoted the diversity of  its members and in taking the lead in 
forming it as Secretary General at the time.  
The Transition ‘Elections’ and the Limits of  the ‘Democratic’ Process 
The selection of  members of  the first board in the ‘Hariri Era’ involved a consultation 
process that was at once similar to yet different from the previous processes of  fashioning 
a new board in Ghandour’s time. According to board members active in 2002, President 
Ghandour’s and Secretary General Baroudi’s negotiations with the Hariri Establishment 
had resolved in the formation of  a board that incorporated old members who wished to 
stay on Nejmeh’s board. These men were accepted by the establishment along with new 
board members selected by the new patronage. The purpose of  keeping old members was 
to ensure continuity in club management as new members would not necessarily have 
sports management experience.  
Leading the process of  fashioning this new board was Muheib Itani. In his capacity as 
Prime Minister’s Rafic Hariri’s ‘client representative’ – as he described his role –  Itani was 
responsible for the negotiations to ensure the ‘smooth transition from Omar Ghandour’s 
presidency to Hariri’s direct control’; ‘I had no official role’ he says, ‘I was assigned by his 
Excellency to support Sheikh Bahaa113 in the club and its management’. An engineer by 
training and graduate of  London’s Kings College,  Itani had taken on many management 
positions in both the private and public sector in Lebanon. He was head of  Lebanon’s 
electricity company in the 1990s when the sector was recovering from the many years of  
civil war, and was Director General of  the Lebanese port. He also worked for several 
companies owned by Hariri since the 1980s, including Saudi Oger, Oger Liban, and 
Almustaqbal Newspaper.  
‘I did the negotiations, I negotiated directly with Omar Ghandour and what we agreed on 
was that we would clear the club’s debt and that Omar Ghandour pulls his people out of  
the General Assembly so the main sponsor has the freedom to govern. The new 
management structure was done by me, I suggested Fanj114 because he was in love with 
Nejmeh club, had the good reputation, and the capacity. True he is a personal friend, but 
                                                 
113 Bahaa Hariri is Rafic Hariri's eldest son, and the family member directly assigned the leadership of  the 
club and appointed as its 'Honorary President'. 
114  Nejmeh club’s President from 2003-2005. 
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he was chosen because he knows about football and loves it and has been a Nejmeh fan for 
a long time115.’ 
In regards to Fanj’s political affiliation Itani stressed that ‘Fanj was chosen primarily for his 
qualifications, and had ensured the first championship for the club… but that he belongs 
to Hariri’s political group, this is nothing to be ashamed of, at the end of  day it is Hariri 
that is funding… and it is his right’. 
Seen from the perspective of  Baroudi, who was involved in the negotiations from 
Nejmeh’s side, the Hariri Establishment wanted the club to be handed to them ‘clean’ and 
to have ‘a board to their taste’; they needed to make sure that Ghandour resigned and that 
the ‘board members they select all win in the upcoming elections’. Baroudi himself  was 
supposed to be one of  the members who was to stay with the new board, but he explained 
how, as the negotiations proceeded, he became disillusioned with the Hariri establishment, 
or what he called ‘Rafic Hariri’s entourage’ including members of  parliament and personal 
aids who were leading the negotiation on his behalf. He recalled how ‘every time I went to 
a meeting with [negotiators on behalf  of  Hariri] I would feel the extent to which I would 
hate myself  if  I chose to continue with the club under their management’, and he claimed 
that many members were excluded based on political and sectarian bases, as a process that 
for him fundamentally changed the spirit of  Nejmeh.  
Unable to exert any significant influence in the negotiations, particularly as many of  the 
existing board members just wanted to get out of  the club by then, Baroudi attempted to 
use the legal platforms available to him, namely the board elections planned for March 
2003, to affect the course that the change in the club’s management was taking. The final 
list of  nominees to the board was agreed with Baroudi’s name on it, and only one opposing 
candidate nominated himself  with almost zero chance of  winning given the existing 
agreement of  most members who had power over the General Assembly. The only 
opposing candidate was Riad al-Assaad, a Shiite who already served on Nejmeh’s board. 
On the day of  elections, Baroudi withdrew his candidacy, thereby enabling Raid al-Assaad 
to win a seat on the board without a ballot. 
Riad Al-Assaad was politically well connected and had better access to financial resources 
than Baroudi who hoped that if  the former was to be elected on Nejmeh’s board he would 
                                                 
115 Fanj being a fan of  Nejmeh was disputed by many fans I interviewed, who claimed to have never seen 
him in the stadium attending a game and never having even heard of  him.  
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be a more powerful member, possibly able to maintain the ‘spirit of  Nejmeh’. As Baroudi 
described it, Al-Assaad could have been the David fighting the Goliath of  the Hariri 
establishment, if  he had been given the support of  other dissatisfied members. In practice 
though, and despite Al-Assaad actually becoming a member of  Nejmeh’s board, he was not 
invited to a single meeting. After his election he held a number of  press conferences 
criticising the new management and patronage, but he soon fell silent. According to 
Baroudi, what actually happened was that: 
‘Sheikh Bahaa called Riad Al-Assaad, and invited him to lunch.. over lunch he said to him 
“come on Riad, we are friends and this is not worth it” and then gave him the boot, three 
years later he gave him the boot .. and he never once attended a board meeting of  the club. 
He could do nothing because he also has interests.. it was not really like [Bahaa Hariri] 
pressured him, he just told him it was not worth it’. 
Baroudi blames his own ‘naiveté’ at the time for the course that the events took, but the 
above account proves the limitations of  relying on bureaucratic and democratic procedures. 
Taking Control of  the General Assembly 
Once the Hariri establishment became the sole patron of  the club, or in Baroudi’s words 
had the ‘clean’ board it desired, a process of  consolidation of  power at the level of  the 
General Assembly was started. At the time I interviewed him, Itani appeared convinced 
that the manoeuvre by Baroudi was evidence of  Ghandour’s lack of  commitment to fulfil 
his side of  the deal, and a desire to partially control the club. Control of  the General 
Assembly was thus essential to ensure the new patron’s ‘freedom to govern’ as Itani 
described it. Practically, this ability to govern was implemented by raising the membership 
fees from 100 USD per year to 1,000 USD thus making it prohibitive to most older 
members. In parallel, 400 members all of  whom were affiliated with the Hariri 
establishment - and on whose behalf  the establishment paid the yearly membership fees - 
were accepted into the club. This way, Itani ensured that at the time of  any subsequent 
elections the Hariri establishment would be able to guarantee the results of  the elections in 
its own favour and would not risk losing control over the club. Itani’s description of  this 
process in my interview with him in September 2010 in a small cafe in the Beirut Central 
District provides an example of  the contradiction inherent in his use of  the rhetoric of  
‘legal means’: 
Itani: ‘The gentleman’s agreement that he would remove his [Ghandour] members 
did not happen, and Omar Ghandour sustained his capacity through the General 
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Assembly membership to control the club, so we got 400 new members into the 
General Assembly, to ensure that he does not have the chance to control the club, 
and then we dismissed [members supporting the old management] through legal 
means. You are supposed to send a warning for members to pay their membership 
fees, and none of  them paid their fees, and there is a set procedure for that, I think 
after two years of  not paying you can dismiss members’ 
Muzna: ‘So you removed the old members?’ 
Itani: ‘We removed those who were not paying their membership fees, and the older 
members were not paying their fees. The new members paid their membership fees 
and stayed.’ 
Muzna: ‘But you had raised the yearly membership fees, no?’ 
Itani: ‘Yes, that is right, because we want at the end the club to be able to stand on 
its own feet, and not remain a financial burden. Our aim was, once the club starts 
winning. and management becomes professional.. we also later removed some of  
our own members, so we got back to a reasonable number of  General Assembly 
members at around 150, but the members who joined at the beginning were mainly 
to prevent the old membership from regaining control, and once that goal was 
achieved we removed those new members. They submitted their resignations and 
left.’ 
In Itani’s description, the new management adhered to bureaucratic procedure in strict and 
performative ways. As several of  the old General Assembly members explained to me, 
including Zahi who I quote earlier in this section, old members either received written 
warning to pay outstanding fees, or were told that membership fees were raised when they 
attempted to pay them. Zahi for example, like many others was incapable of  paying 1,000 
USD and were thus ousted from the club automatically. The new members who were 
formally approved, as many informants and newspaper articles mention, were the staff  of  
organisations within the Hariri establishment. By virtue of  this ‘membership’ in the club 
they were asked to attend election meetings – again to ensure quorum to legalise a pre-
selected board which won without a ballot . Claims of  raising the membership fees to 
support the club to ‘stand on its feet’, were once again performative in character given that 
membership fees were paid by the establishment as a means of  channelling their money 
into, and by extension their power over, the club.  
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Alternative Means to the Legal 
Within this bureaucratic rhetoric which made claims to democratic and legal procedures, 
members still appeared to rely on personal and clientelistic networks to affect the 
management of  the club; a tactic which seemed to be the most accessible and effective 
means of  exercising influence.  
I had the opportunity to witness the usage of  these networks while I was doing fieldwork 
in the period around the time of  elections of  another board for the club at the end of  
2008. Several fans and members spoke to me of  their dissatisfaction with Farshoukh, the 
Secretary General at the time. They also told me of  their attempts to ensure Farshoukh 
would not get re-elected for another term. Farshoukh performed his role on the board as a 
salaried staff  member of  the Hariri establishment and not as an elected volunteer as had 
been the custom. According to Itani he was supposed to support the organisational and 
managerial uplifting of  the club. Instead of  approaching members of  the General 
Assembly, who in principle should have been electing the board, fans tried to reach out 
directly to the club’s patron via various people associated with the Hariri establishment.  
According to Karim, a fan with good contacts within the club, several individuals tried to 
nominate themselves to the board, but the existing board ignored their applications. So 
instead, he and other fans approached those who ‘have their people in the palace116’ and 
handed a file to one of  Hariri’s aids.  Their file gave information on corruption taking place 
in the club and suggested alternative candidates for the board. Karim claimed that until 
then ‘Saad Hariri had no idea what was really happening in the club’. Saad was responsive, 
saying that he would revisit the list of  nominees to the board. Yet despite Saad Hariri’s 
promise, no alternative list was proposed so the same group of  fans and members then 
resorted to using their connections to solicit the support of  Bahia Hariri - Saad’s paternal 
aunt and fellow politician. When I asked what kind of  contacts they, as fans and club 
members, had to both Saad and Bahia Hariri, Karim assured me that ‘no one is cut off  a 
tree’ and that there were many Nejmeh members who had their ‘family weight’ and ‘weight 
in the palace’ to guarantee that the voices of  fans would be heard. 
                                                 
116 Using the word 'Palace' Karim is talking about the Hariri residence in Beirut commonly called 
'Qoraytem Palace', because of  its size and perceived grandeur and Qoraytem being the neighbourhood 
where it is located. 
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According to Karim, Bahia Hariri then discussed the Nejmeh club crisis directly with her 
nephew.  I quote Karim’s account of  what he claims were her words to Saad: ‘My dear 
nephew’, she said, ‘may god bless you, Nejmeh club is a significant one and we have to 
safeguard it. We should get rid of  this bunch of  z’uran. A delegation from the club will 
soon come see you, make sure to see them and take what they say into consideration’. 
Karim found no problem in relaying what ‘Sitt Bahia’ said to her nephew word by word 
and even acting out the meeting as if  he had been present and could exactly quote what she 
said. He also repeated remarks of  Saad Hariri’s, and by presenting what Saad and Bahia said 
as direct quotations, he conveyed a sense of  closeness and intimacy with the two 
politicians. Yet at the same time he repeatedly created a distance between ‘us’ - me and him 
- on the one side and ‘them’ - the two Hariri leaders - stressing that we ‘have no idea what 
they are really like’, that they are ‘really busy’, that ‘they have their own considerations’. 
He continued to assure me that he and other ‘good’ people in the club had their own way 
of  influencing the authority of  Hariri. By mentioning the Arabic proverb, ‘no one is cut 
off  a tree’ he not only conveyed the value of  an individual’s connections, but how these 
connections are embedded in his or her kinship network. In popular usage, someone ‘cut 
off  a tree’ is possibly an orphan, or a traveller distant from his family; an unfortunate soul, 
often the subject of  pity. This is not true of  the Nijmawis, who come from well-established 
Beiruti families with electoral and financial significance and good social connections. With 
Bahia’s intervention, the delegation of  members succeeded in getting an appointment with 
Saad and secured the changes they required in the board. Farshoukh was not re-elected, 
and instead, long-standing club member, Saadeddine Itani, became Secretary General. 
The same story encapsulates another important element that is worth pointing out, one 
that assumes that Bahia would have influence – or mawneh117 - over her nephew, despite him 
being the political leader of  the establishment. Bahia is not only a relative, but she is also an 
elder; despite her being a woman, age gives her an authority within the family over her 
younger nephew. Ghandour’s description of  his discussion with Rafic Hariri for the 
handing over of  the club conveys a similar respect for age; ‘he sent for his son Bahaa, and 
told him ‘your uncle Omar wants to leave the club and wants you to become the club’s 
President’, and Bahaa answered by saying ‘whatever you want’, and ‘this is how we agreed 
that Bahaa becomes President.’ By his use of  the word ‘uncle’, Rafic Hariri created a sense 
                                                 
117 For an elaboration of  the concept of  mawneh see Chapter Five.  
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of  closeness with Ghandour and gave him authority over his son. The son duly accepted, 
with no indication of  interest in the club, but out of  respect of  his father’s will - no matter 
what it was. 
Beirut’s Parliamentary Elections 
The ethnographic account below describes the ways in which those present in the stadium 
on the above described May day related firstly to elections, secondly to the candidacy of  
their political leader and thirdly to the state they wished him to be their representative 
within. I speak specifically of  those who publicly and actively showed loyalty and support 
to Saad Hariri, by working in his electoral machine, attending the rally, and celebrating his 
win. While those people did not form the majority, (within Beirut’s third district for 
example 60% of  the electorate did not vote), they were key in bolstering Hariri’s power and 
lending credibility and legitimacy to the electoral system and the rule of  the elite. 
The rally and the electoral process more broadly can be read as supporting the political 
patronage of  Hariri. For one thing it provided the opportunity for one-off  disbursement 
of  money to supporters but no commitment to making continued payments. Together they 
provided opportunities for the performance of  Hariri’s signature style of  power over his 
supporters. The events were truly exuberant and large scale, involving lavish expenditure of  
money, exorbitantly flamboyant electoral rallies and celebrations, and costly media 
campaigns. The festivities surrounding elections and the competition that they involved 
were opportunities for creating a sense of  community among supporters; a means of  
introducing an affective element alongside the instrumental character of  clientelism. 
Coupled with the bureaucratic procedures and technicalities of  holding elections which 
together work to legitimise the power of  the elected official, this affective element further 
contributed to the strengthening of  a fantasy of  the state as modelled by Hariri, and 
championed by an award winning Minister of  Interior. It was a fantasy that to a large 
extent paralleled images of  the elections taking place globally and was portrayed in the 
media as the symbol of  democracy and people’s participation.  
The Electoral Machine 
In the run up to the elections, the different parties set up centres in the neighbourhoods 
where they had candidates, the aim being to rally supporters and facilitate the 
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administrative registration processes of  voters. There was a centre on almost every corner 
in Beirut. Club fan, Mahmoud, was working in one of  the Future Movement’s electoral 
centres in the Ras el-Nabe’ neighbourhood118. With the help of  two or three other staff, 
Mahmoud was responsible for contacting all the voters in the district, asking them who 
they would be voting for. If  they were voting for Hariri, Mahmoud would offer them a free 
lift from their house to the polling station. His task ended once the voting preference and 
transport needs were determined. Lists were handed over to logistics officers who ensured 
that transportation was appropriately allocated on the day. This assignment was one of  
several that each centre was entrusted with before the date of  the elections. Other tasks 
included helping out in the registration of  the eligible voters, advising those registered 
about the location of  their polling stations, and developing contact lists with addresses and 
phone numbers of  all voters within each district. There were many other tasks to be carried 
out on the day of  elections; picking up voters, handing over names of  the Hariri-supported 
list of  candidates at the entrance of  polling stations, monitoring the electoral process 
throughout the day, and counting votes in parallel to the official counting process. There 
were also several other jobs, including printing t-shirts and caps with the logos of  the 
Future Movement on them and the provision of  food and refreshments for the people 
working on the hot summer election day. 
I went to visit Mahmoud in the centre three days before the elections. As he was not there 
when I arrived I was warmly welcomed by one of  his colleagues, possibly because I was a 
female visitor in a mostly male space. The fact that I was not there for work or for electoral 
purposes did not lessen the hospitality I was shown. I was invited to sit on the balcony and 
offered both coffee and the company of  the person in charge of  the centre. The ambience 
was very sociable and lively, and the perceived duty to serve me coffee, was used as a 
pretext for making coffee for all present and taking long cigarette breaks on the balcony. 
The workload did not appear to be particularly heavy, and the only external inquiry made 
during my presence was by two young women asking about work opportunities during the 
campaign, and the location of  the polling station they should attend on election day. One 
                                                 
118 The area of  Ras el-Nabe’ was a mixed one, and had witnessed several clashes between the young men 
based there. Several civilians were killed in the area in May 2008, and a special effort was made, as 
Mahmoud explains, to ensure that it had a neutral, non-partisan appearance. Lebanese flags were hung 
outside and no pictures of  any of  the candidates were displayed. The external neutral image gave way 
indoors at the election centre where clear pro-Hariri political slogans adorned the walls and elections 
were openly discussed. Everyone present was certain that Hariri's candidates were sure to win the 
elections. 
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of  the workers there asked me what district I voted in and if  I knew the exact polling 
station I should go to. He looked it up for me from a specially printed list with a picture of  
Hariri on the cover. His service, and that of  the centre more generally, of  informing voters 
about their polling stations was virtually superfluous, as all the information was provided 
on the Ministry of  Interior’s website as well as by elected mayors in the neighbourhoods.  
For the 2009 elections, the Hariri establishment assembled an electoral machine employing 
thousands of  people. Mahmoud had been working for the elections for the past two 
months and told me that he would be paid around 700 USD. He said that in the area he 
was responsible for alone there were over 300 such employees, and double that number 
working on election day only, when each worker expected to be paid 100 USD for a single 
day’s work.  
This tactic, according to Mahmoud, was not vote buying. While he confirmed that Hariri 
was indeed directly paying his supporters, he saw the arrangement as provision of  
employment opportunities, even though the work was short term and the workers were 
under-occupied. He claimed that in the centre he worked in, no such request for work was 
refused. On the day before elections, he would assign the various tasks to the people at his 
centre. Those, as he said ‘with less experience’ would not be assigned any particular task, 
but would still be employed and paid: ‘no one is rejected, everybody takes part. At the end 
of  the day they will get paid. These are their dues and they have the right to be paid.’  In 
Mahmoud’s view, as a Za’im, Hariri should have been providing such favours to his 
clientele, as at election times there is always an increased need for human resources to 
support the campaign. As he described it, this did not contradict the electoral process; the 
same people would have voted for Hariri whether they were paid or not.  
The dyadic relationship described by Johnson (1986) between the Za’im and his clientele 
which existed among the Sunni communities of  Beirut has long changed. If  votes were the 
main object of  exchange that clients could offer their patron, these votes were of  lower 
value in the 2009 elections as the elite had successfully consolidated their power already, 
and had managed to maintain their place in the parliament through the agreement on the 
electoral law. However, the existing elite still needed the support of  their constituencies and 
it was more important for this to be shown in a performative way rather than in a 
transactional form: crucially, the elections provided an opportunity for the maintenance of  
the existing constituency by providing favours to them in the form of  short-term 
employment. The relationships between the patron and his clients  therefore came with no 
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strings attached and resembled, if  one were to make a comparison, a one night stand and 
not a life-long marriage.  
The Candidate’s Generosity 
Later Mahmoud arrived at the centre. As I was having another cup of  coffee with him  
many boxes containing brand new computers and printers were delivered. Without 
objection from the staff, I took part in setting up the equipment that would be used on 
election day, to count the votes and give early predictions of  the results. Around a dozen 
printers and a smaller number of  laptops were placed in one room on a single large 
conference table in its centre. We were told that the people who would work on it would 
come later and we were then asked to leave the room before it was locked. Someone asked 
a question that had been on all our minds; what would happen to the equipment after 
elections, and would any of  it be donated to a particular organisation or individual? The 
expensive looking equipment could be seen as yet another potential profit to be made from 
helping out in the elections, just like the bonus of  getting a free t-shirt and basketball cap. 
Voters and supporters made use of  such opportunities to extract services from a patron 
that they had already selected as Za’im. As they requested employment, they tried to gain 
rewards for their loyalty which was not immediately dependant on the payment they would 
receive. Criticism of  the sudden surge in financial support by Hariri at election time was 
voiced by Mahmoud and other supporters who remembered that in the years preceding the 
elections longer term financial commitments to institutions under Hariri’s patronage were 
scarce and were often not honoured.  However, supporters recognised that elections were 
times of  exceptional expenditure and they tried to maximise every chance of  benefiting 
from the availability of  extra cash. The amount actually spent, and how much of  this 
expenditure actually trickled down to the ordinary supporters, is hard to gauge. The 
exaggerated expenditure of  the Hariri establishment was not frowned upon by Hariri 
supporters nor was it seen as discrediting the electoral results. On the contrary, highly 
visible and generous campaign spending benefited the patron in his public performance of  
power.  
Supporters I spoke to actually took pride in their patron’s ‘generosity’ in comparison to the 
expenditure of  other candidates. I witnessed this competitive element on election day in a 
location where representatives of  both Hariri and the opposition party, Amal Movement, 
were working in close physical proximity. All electoral campaign employees received free 
meals, and when these were provided from an expensive restaurant the gesture was 
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understood to prove the generosity of  the politician employing the workers. One Amal 
Movement representative made sure the emptied boxes in which his meal had been 
delivered were displayed alongside his colleagues’ to show off  that he had received an 
expensive meal. He bragged loudly about gourmet dishes which had most probably not 
been in the box in the first place. As I joked with him about it, he told me that the Hariri 
representatives received meals from ‘Socrate’ a well known restaurant in Beirut, and he 
wanted to make sure to let them know that opposition party employees also received a 
decent meal and not ‘cheap falafel sandwiches’. 
Making use of  an electoral machine with such a massive staff  and budget was not a feature 
exclusive to Saad Hariri’s popular political behaviour, but was first introduced by his father, 
Rafic Hariri in the 1995 elections (Sader 1998). The strategy is one of  several 
manifestations of  the approach introduced by Hariri senior, characterised by the 
importance of  money in politics (El-Husseini 2012) which in due course came to influence 
political culture in Lebanon. Money was lavished, even squandered, on supporters to flaunt 
power, but only where and when it had the performative power to persuade constituents, 
and other political actors alike. 
To complete the picture of  this process from the position of  the elite, one needs to go 
back and question the actual sources of  a patron’s power; the resources that grant him 
financial means. One is his capture of  state resources, and this – although distributed 
among ruling elite – requires that other elite in this power sharing system appreciate the 
size of  his constituency. Another is the support received from external powers, namely 
Saudi Arabia in Hariri’s case, and for that too popular support needs to be visible. On 
election day, the number of  ‘electoral observers’ who are wearing a cap and t-shirt 
displaying the Future Movement’s logo is just as important as the number of  voters who - 
despite knowing that this is a performative rather than a functional act -  cast a vote in 
support of  Hariri and his candidates. 
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Figure 31: Electoral Rally of  the Future Movement in Nejmeh Stadium on 7th May 2009.  The Ferris wheel of  
the adjacent Luna Park appears in the background, as do some of  the slogans of  the electoral campaign: ‘the state, 
security, prosperity, the constitution’. 
 
Figure 32: Female supporter of  the Future Movement taking a picture at the electoral rally of  the Future Movement 
at Nejmeh Stadium, 7th May 2009. On the left is one of  the large screens broadcasting the speeches of  the 
candidates from the other end of  the stadium. Above it are pictures of  assassinated parliamentarian Bassel Fleihan, 
Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, and Minister Walid Eido. 
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Figure 33: Youth supporter of  the Future Movement wraps his flag at the end of  the electoral rally. The flag is a 
mosaic of  four flags, clockwise from top left, flag of  the Future Movement with image of  Rafic Hariri and his Son 
Saad Hariri, Lebanese flag, flag of  Future Youth – the youth division of  the Future Movement, and logo of  the 
Tariq Al-Jadidah panthers. The flag of  the Riyadi club hangs on the youth’s waist. Nejmeh Stadium, 7th May 
2009. 
 
Figure 34: Young supporters glad to pose for the camera. Electoral rally of  the Future Movement in Nejmeh 
Stadium; 7th May 2009. 
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The Carnival 
In research on sports and politics in Lebanon I observed, like many before me, (see 
Giulianotti and Armstrong 1997) the many ways in which stadiums are used as stages, by 
players on the turf  seeking to win a game or a championship, as well as by fans, managers, 
politicians, and the media. 
As described at the beginning of  this chapter, in Nejmeh stadium in May 2009, many stages 
and performances were in evidence. The politicians were on their separate stage, 
observable directly by the lenses of  cameras and select elite members only. The people 
themselves, those for whom the festival was supposedly organised, were on the turf, being 
observed by the elite and the media’s cameras, but only capable of  seeing their politicians 
on the big screens that were set up for the occasion. The media had centre stage, 
transmitting and translating the images of  the politicians and their politics alike. On the big 
screen the politicians appeared within reach and responsive to their supporters’ cheers. 
Even before they arrived and after they had left, politicians were made ‘present’ via 
artistically produced video clips and photo montages. Cameras panned across the crowd 
feeding images up to the giant screens: wide-angle lenses had the effect of  exaggerating the 
size of  the crowd. The stadium had an added advantage; it belonged to Nejmeh which only 
10 days previously had won the country’s football championship. The neighbouring Al-
Riyadi club had won the basketball championship a few days later. Both clubs were under 
Hariri’s patronage and their recent triumphs added to his prestige and popularity. 
The ‘numerous crowd’ as Al-Mustaqbal newspaper described the supporters present in 
Nejmeh on that day, largely served their electoral purpose by attending the electoral rally. 
Their presence was understood to publicly confirm popular support for the Za’im and the 
accuracy of  the allotment of  Beirut’s parliamentary seats as agreed upon by the ruling elite. 
As the candidates entered the stadium, the master of  ceremonies urged the supporters to 
cheer for the candidates and ‘to make their voice heard’. In an atmosphere similar to that 
of  the weekly demonstrations of  2005 which followed the assassination of  Rafic Hariri, the 
people were assembled en-masse in the electoral rally to be deliberately ‘displayed’. By 
adopting wide-angle filming techniques and methods of  portrayal identical to those used 
during the events of  2005, the media played their part in co-opting the crowds into 
becoming part of  Hariri’s live, and highly expensive, performance of  exorbitant power. 
To the supporters, the electoral rally provided an opportunity for coming together, for 
belonging and celebration. The speech of  the politician emphasised that sentiment and 
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built on the affective side of  the patron-client relationship, including sectarian sentiments. 
Examining Hariri’s rally day speech highlights some of  these elements. Hariri began by 
addressing the crowd as the ‘loyal people of  Beirut’, as his own and his father’s people, kin 
and family. He explained the choice of  the date of  the rally which coincided with ‘the first 
annual anniversary of  that wretched day when insanity thought it could invade the steadfast 
and Arab Beirut’ – a direct reference to the Hezbollah military takeover of  the city of  
Beirut in May 2008 and the ensuing clashes. Hariri also emphasised the choice of  location: 
‘near the damned location where one of  the heroes of  Beirut, of  March 14 and the Cedars 
Revolution, martyred deputy Walid Eido and his son martyr Khaled fell’. To one side of  
the stadium, a large picture of  Eido was displayed high up alongside a picture of  Rafic 
Hariri and his political ally and parliamentarian, Bassel Fleihan, who was killed in the same 
explosion.  
The reference to the martyrs and May 2008 also appeared in one of  the mottos the 
electoral campaign adopted and launched on that day: ‘We will not forget, just like the sky 
is blue’. This motto was repeated by the master of  ceremonies and printed onto a large 
backcloth hung behind the stage where the candidates spoke. The reference echoed well in 
the ears of  the supporters, and the lady sitting next to me translated that as her own wish: 
‘God willing we will win, we should win’ and when I asked what would happen if  not, she 
explained that ‘they [Hezbollah] will humiliate us [the Sunnis of  Beirut]’. Naji echoed a 
similar sentiment: ‘the criminal acts they committed against the people of  Beirut on May 7, 
we will pay back on June 7, god willing’. He said he was ‘happy, very happy’ and confident 
of  winning because ‘god is with us’. I took him by surprise when I asked him what if  
Hariri did not win the elections – a close to impossible scenario given the agreement 
between the elite – he answered that it would be OK and that ‘we would continue, in a 
civilised manner’. Naji spelled out a sentiment echoed by supporters of  Hariri in the 
stadium, the participation in the elections and choosing democratic peaceful means offered 
proof  that they were different from their political opponents who supported Hezbollah 
and who continued to resort to arms. The fact that Naji himself  carried arms in the 1980s 
for the Arab nationalist militant group al-Murabitun and that at the time of  the electoral 
rally, and for at least a year before that, he was on the payroll of  Secure Plus, (the private 
security company that acted as a quasi militia for the Future Movement) appeared to be 
beside the point. He bought into and accepted the role of  representing the image that 
Hariri wanted to portray of  the ‘us’, the crowd in the stadium that day. 
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Beyond the reference to 2008 and the political identity of  the group, the ambience in the 
stadium - as in the electoral centre that I visited earlier - was joyous and festive. It was one 
you wanted to be in, to belong to. The free flags being distributed, the music and the 
fireworks – which made the departure of  politicians unnoticeable – all added to the 
convivial spirit.  
Blue Fingers 
The festive mood continued on the day of  the elections and the streets of  Tariq Al-
Jadidah, the neighbourhood at the heart of  Beirut’s third district, were decorated with 
pictures of  Hariri. The area was bustling with youth leaving electoral centres showing off  
fingers stained by electoral ink as proof  that they voted – or in practice that they affirmed 
their loyalty to Hariri. Later, as results were declared announcing the expected victory of  
the list of  candidates led by Saad Hariri, supporters on several streets performed the 
traditional dabke dance to the beats of  large speakers or live drums, and celebratory 
fireworks continued late into the night.  
The appearance of  fingers stained in indelible blue ink were a new feature of  the 2009 
round of  elections. It came at the same time as a larger a set of  procedural reforms that 
were pushed through by the Minister of  Interior supervising the elections. Media outlets 
described in detail the electoral procedures and regulations, and the function of  the 
electoral or indelible ink in preventing electoral fraud. The minister – a young lawyer with a 
record of  activism for electoral and political reform among Lebanon’s civil society – 
celebrated the creation of  the Supervisory Commission on the Electoral Campaign, 
holding elections in all of  Lebanon’s districts on one day and the publication of  the voter 
register. In recognition of  the role played by the ministry in this round of  elections, Baroud 
received the 2010 IFES Manatt Democracy Award119, and won the United Nations Public 
Service Award, the ‘most prestigious international recognition of  excellence in public 
service’, in the category of  ‘fostering participation in public policy-making decisions 
through innovative mechanisms’ where, ‘as s a result of  new management approaches 
adopted in administrating elections, the Ministry of  the Interior and Municipalities 
                                                 
119   See http://www.elections.gov.lb/Municipal/news/Ziyad-Baroud-Receicves-the-2010-IFES-Manatt-
Democr.aspx?lang=en-us Accessed 23/7/2015. 
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(MOIM) achieved a number of  successes which have raised the benchmark for any future 
elections.’ 120 
Yet many of  these procedures were re-appropriated by Hariri’s supporters and his electoral 
machine. The voter register for each district, used by his representatives in the electoral 
centres, was reprinted off  the Ministry of  Interiors’ records, complete with a glossy cover 
illustrated with Hariri’s pictures. The blue finger became a symbol of  support for Hariri in 
Beirut: everyone knew very well that if  you did not vote for Hariri there was no need for 
you to be concerned by the elections in the third and second districts121. Incidentally, 
Beirut’ third district was where I voted, and as I passed the streets of  Tariq Al-Jadidah that 
day and spoke to Naji and his friends, I was asked repeatedly to show my blue stained 
finger, to prove that I had voted. True, I did have the chance to cast my vote, technically ‘in 
a democratic way’ as Hariri mentioned in his speech in on 7th May, but I had no real say in 
selecting representatives to the parliament. The rhetoric of  democracy was well served but, 
as confirmed by the ensuing report of  the Lebanese Association for Democracy of  
Elections (LADE) on the 2009 elections ‘at the end the electoral process does not 
determine, independently, the formation of  power structures, but existing power balances 
at various levels which do, and change or modify the will of  the voters’ (LADE 2010: 11).  
Still, the bureaucratic procedures and technicalities of  holding elections were not 
performed in vain. They were used to legitimise the power of  Hariri, who was ‘technically’ 
voted for democratically. As voters and political representatives went through neatly 
arranged voter lists, followed strict rules on casting their votes and paraded fingers dipped 
in the imported and all important blue electoral ink, they reconciled their clientelistic 
loyalties with a hollow, yet well rehearsed democratic rhetoric which echoed regional and 
global mediated representations of  democracy. 
                                                 
120 For details see the list of  UNPSA list of  winners available on 
http://unpan.org/DPADM/UNPSDayAwards/UNPublicServiceDay/2010PublicServiceDay/tabid/13
06/language/en-US/Default.aspx - Accessed 25/2/2014. 
121  According to the report of  the Lebanese Association for Democracy of  Elections, winning candidates 
in the third district received over 70% of  the votes, as in several other districts in which some candidates 
received 94% of  the votes, reflecting the extremely limited ‘real competition’ and margin of  choice for 
the Lebanese voter (LADE 2010: 10) 
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Figure 35: Elections and the parading of  electoral ink. From left to right, first row: 1. Indonesia 2009 2. Egypt 
2012, Second row: 3. Lebanon 2009 4. Liberia 2011 5. Mali 2013, Third Row: 6. Iraq 2010 7. Lebanon 
2010.122 
                                                 
122  All photos are under a creative commons license that allows reuse. Photo credits 1. Australian 
Department of  Foreign Affairs and Trade -https://www.flickr.com/photos/dfataustralianaid/ 2. 
Jonathon Rashad -https://www.flickr.com/photos/drumzo/  3. Sana Tawileh - 
https://www.flickr.com/photos/sanatawileh/  4. UN Photo, Photo ID 482798 - 
https://www.flickr.com/photos/un_photo/ 5. IRI - https://www.flickr.com/photos/usaidafrica/ 6. 
U.S. Navy Photo by Chief  Petty Officer Michael D. Heckman, US Department of  Defence - 
https://www.flickr.com/photos/39955793@N07/ 7. HiBR - https://www.flickr.com/photos/hibr/ 
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Conclusion 
Despite being celebrated as the cornerstone of  representative democracy, I argued in this 
chapter that elections, as observed in Nejmeh club and the 2009 parliamentary elections of  
Beirut, are actually tools of  elite consolidation. I have shown how electoral processes were 
used to consolidate instrumental clientelistic ties and strengthen the clientelist habitus, 
providing one-off  opportunities for the disbursement of  money by the patrons and in 
parallel creating affective and performative bonds that tied Hariri more closely to his 
constituency. In particular, the slogan of  ‘the state, security, prosperity, the constitution, 
and justice’, under which the Hariri Establishment campaigned for these elections, fed into 
a fantasy constructed around, firstly, the neoliberal ideology of  the good life and, secondly, 
the bureaucratic performance of  rules and regulations – at least rhetorically both 
aspirations stood in opposition to the image of  Hezbollah as a non-state actor. Such a 
construction is an extension of  the performative and extravagant style followed by Hariri 
in his public engagement, and is not free of  the incongruity between the rhetoric of  state 
building and institutionalisation as voiced in the club and beyond on the one hand, and in 
clientelistic and extra-state practices on the other.  
In the next chapter I discuss this incongruity in more depth, particularly in relation to the 
use of  violence and the politics of  inclusion and exclusion. I explore this topic against the 
backdrop of  escalating violence in Beirut by narrating a key period in Nejmeh’s history 
which was described by many as a moment of  rupture within the club. 
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7 
Anatomy of Division 
 
‘A dog that barks with you is better than a dog that barks at you’ 
Lebanese proverb 
‘Each Zaʿim will need some Zuʿran’ 
Nejmeh club fan 
 
Two Matches and a Press Release 
19th September, 2006123. Cite Sportive, Beirut. It was a sunny, hot and humid day despite the summer 
approaching its end. Nejmeh was playing against the Malaysian team, Selangor, in one of  the Asian 
Football Confederation’s (AFC) cup matches. The stadium held between 3,000 and 5,000 spectators, a 
number smaller than the usual crowd which Nejmeh attracts. On one side of  the stadium, a group of  
youths had taken off  their shirts. They cheered and chanted, waving Nejmeh flags as well as those of  
Hezbollah and the Amal Movement. They cheered for Nejmeh, and in dissatisfaction with its management, 
some of  them cheered for its captain Moussa Hjeij who, because of  a disagreement with the management, 
joined them on the terraces instead of  the field. Also in attendance by invitation from Nejmeh’s 
management were kids from the orphanage of  an Islamic charity. In the directors’ box Nejmeh was better 
represented; the occupants included the club’s President Daouk and Secretary General Farshoukh, as well 
as most of  the board members and the head of  the Fans’ Office. Also sharing that privileged space were 
Rahif  Alameh, LFA’s secretary general, a representative of  the Minister of  Youth and Sports, the 
Malaysian consul in Lebanon, and Nejmeh’s previous President, Omar Ghandour.  
                                                 
123  Matches described in this vignette took place well before field research for this dissertation started and 
the description provided is based primarily on newspaper coverage from three major Lebanese papers 
namely Al-Akhbar, Assafir, and Al-Mustaqbal, as well as some of  the accounts of  fans and members 
interviewed. 
212 
This was the first sports event to take place in Lebanon after a seven-week war with Israel. A cease fire 
had put an end to the hostilities a little over a month earlier, but the destruction in the country and its 
infrastructure was massive, especially in the south of  Lebanon and the residential areas of  the Southern 
Suburbs. The debates on relief  and reconstruction as well as hundreds of  casualties and over a million 
refugees further embittered what by then had become a chronic political deadlock between Hezbollah and the 
Hariri led camp which blamed Hezbollah for a unilateral decision to instigate the war. 
With the match ending nil-all, the team secured a qualification to the AFC cup’s semi finals. In its 
coverage, newspapers reported on the team’s unsatisfactory performance and levels of  fitness. One of  them, 
Al-Akhbar newspaper124, mentioned a clique of  fans whose cheers had a ‘sectarian, confessional, and 
regional tone and attacks on some political figures’125, and that the internal security forces intervened and 
arrested some of  the youths. Remarkably, the Hariri owned Almustaqbal newspaper failed to mention any 
sort of  disruption in the match, but rather commended the presence of  internal security forces and their 
efficiency in dealing with the spectators.  
In the tense political and security situation, some troubles in the stadium might have been expected. Indeed, 
on the day of  the match, the editor of  Al-Akhbar’s sports pages – a long time Nejmeh fan and the first 
president of  the fans union in the 1970s – wrote partly anticipating and partly warning of  the 
‘cacophonous tunes’ which could be played in the stadium on that day by the ‘rioting clique’ after ‘a blazing 
summer’126: he hoped for appropriate security measures to avoid troubles in the stadium.  
The next day, in response to the chants by that disorderly group of  Nejmeh fans criticising Hariri and 
supporting his political rivals, Nasrallah and Berri, the club’s management issued a press release. In it, the 
board distanced itself  from the sectarian chants of  the ‘disorderly and suspicious crowd’ and affirmed the 
club’s ‘Beiruti identity’ and ‘belonging to the family of  the Future Movement under the za’ama (leadership) 
of  Saad Rafic Hariri’, and ‘pride in the continuous direct patronage of  the Hariri family’(figure 36). By 
making such statements they excluded a large percentage of  the fans who did not see themselves as belonging 
to the same political ‘family’. 
26 September, 2006. Following a week of  public condemnation and clamour about the skirmish in the 
match, Nejmeh’s management decided to limit access to the next match. When Nejmeh met the Bahraini 
Muharrak team in AFC Asian cup’s semi finals on 26th September, tickets were not sold at the door and 
                                                 
124  Al-Akhbar at the time had only been in circulation for less than two months. The journalist in charge of  
its sports pages was a long time Nejmeh fan, but the coverage of  the match seemed not to be politically 
motivated, particularly as they target fans who have cheered for Hezbollah, and the paper had aligned 
itself  with the pro Hezbollah agenda. 
125  Al-Akhbar 20/9/2006. 
126  Al-Akhbar 19/9/2006. 
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invitation cards were distributed to selected spectators only. The intention was to only invite fans that were 
personally known to management or members and trusted not to cause trouble. However, the political chants 
and insults were even worse despite preventative measures taken by the club’s board. In what appeared to be 
an attempt to demonstrate loyalty to Hariri, a group of  fans came to the match prepared to rectify the 
badmouthing of  the club’s patron in the previous match by cheering and chanting his praise. This instigated 
fights among fans, with the non-Hariri aligned fans understanding it as an attempt to further marginalise 
them because of  their political sympathies. The first half  was fraught with the exchange of  insults and 
quarrels between the fans on the terraces despite attempts by board members and the LFA’s Secretary 
General to calm them down. It is also clear that some spectators entered the match without having invitation 
cards, as according to management, only 1,500 tickets were printed while newspapers and those present 
report that several thousands more were in the stadium. The match ended with Nejmeh’s defeat; ‘an 
orphan, victim of  its divided fans’ as As-Safir newspaper reported the next day.  
Introduction 
The events of  the two matches and the associated press release by the management were 
what many fans described as the ‘straw that broke the camel’s back’. It was the time at 
which a boundary of  ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ within the club was created and a ‘critical event’127 (Das 
1995) in the club’s history. Although, as elaborated in earlier chapters, the redefinition of  
the club and its identity was a process that started even before the take-over of  the club’s 
patronage by the Hariri Establishment, these events were the first when belonging to 
Nejmeh club was publicly pronounced as exclusive to those who supported Hariri and the 
Future Movement. 
In this chapter I present how these events and the reactions to them were justified, 
understood, and reacted to by the different constituencies of  the club, namely the club’s 
management and representatives of  the Hariri establishment as well as fans from both 
sides of  what by that time was a divided club. I argue that division within the club was a by-
product of  individuals’ attempts to improve their position within the clientelistic network 
of  relationships. These sectarian and political divisions are produced through a mutually 
enforcing relationship between verbal and physical aggressions against the perceived 
                                                 
127  Das defines 'critical events' as events after which, 'new modes of  action came into being which redefined 
traditional categories' (1995: 6), and new formations of  community emerge. Whereas she uses the term 
to describe events and societies at a much larger scale, I use the term at the scale of  the club to illustrate 
the extent to which the press release in particular redefined the identity of  both Nejmeh as a community 
and the meaning of  club fandom. 
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opponents of  the za’im. The intention of  such aggressions is to affirm a supporter’s loyalty 
to his chosen leader  and as I observed, they are often initiated or volunteered in a bottom-
up process by supporters and fans, although also instrumentally used by those higher up in 
the clientelistic hierarchy. 
The chapter examines in particular racketeering by strong-arm men or in other words the 
vocal (and at times violent) performance of  loyalty on the part of  followers and clients of  
Saad Hariri.  Tracking the role of  the strong-arm men outside sports and on the streets of  
Beirut, particularly those employed by a Hariri-commissioned private security firm, I 
discuss the public performance of  loyalty by strong-arm men as a strategically instrumental 
tool for the patron and his supporters. For the patron, this tool allowed him to flaunt the 
strength of  his popular following to other members of  the political elite. While this 
paralleled the display of  a large following at times of  elections, it is of  particular 
importance at times of  heightened conflict, particularly as the conflict context opens up 
opportunities for instrumental gain to certain groups who are willing to resort to violent 
behaviour and who more often than not justify such actions through the use of  territorial 
and sectarian discourse. Yet the use of  violence contradicts both the discourse and 
representation of  the Future Movement. Violence is incompatible with the declared ideals 
of  members of  the bourgeoisie who promote the Future Movement as a non-violent 
movement dedicated to striving for state sovereignty and restricting the use of  force to the 
state alone. These people view Hezbollah’s maintenance of  an armed wing as illegitimate. 
Partly because of  this ideal, and at times despite their usefulness to the Future Movement, 
the angry, disenfranchised, and vocal fans in the stadium were described by the club’s 
management as ‘disorderly’, ‘suspicious’, and at times as zuʿran. For fans affiliated to the 
Future Movement, the period allowed for the performance of  loyalty to the new patron 
and the acquisition of  his favour while in parallel it marginalised those fans who were 
unwilling to engage in such displays of  loyalty. 
While Chapters Five and Six focused respectively on the role of  the bourgeoisie and the 
electoral process in reformulating the identity of  Nejmeh, this chapter looks at bottom-up 
dynamics and the roles of  the regular fans, including both those that support the Hariri 
establishment politically and those who don’t.  
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section engages with literature on the 
use of  violence in Lebanon within the clientelistic system, and attempts to link it with 
broader anthropological literature which has discussed the relation between the elite and 
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the masses in the instrumental and symbolic use of  violence. In the second section of  this 
chapter I further analyse the events within the club described in this chapter’s vignette, 
looking at the various narratives set forth by different actors within the club and ways in 
which these narratives have redefined the club’s identity. In the third I move out of  the 
club into the broader political context, and discuss the events of  May 2008. I argue that the 
impact of  these events is paralleled in various settings - social relationships in Beirut, the 
publicly proclaimed identity of  the city, and within events taking place in Nejmeh club 
itself. I look more specifically at the use of  strong-arm men, and examine prevalent 
rationales and motivations for their employment. 
From Qabadays to Zuʿran 
Within the realm of  sports, the denouncement of  hooliganism and violence in the stadium 
coincided with broader global social and economic processes. Football and other spectator 
sports increasingly became the ‘property of  middle-class popular culture’ (Giulianotti 1999: 
35). Policies aimed at ridding football stadiums of  hooliganism went hand in hand with the 
commodification of  football when the game became more lucrative as it attracted media 
coverage and revenues from advertising contracts. Daouk’s denunciation of  the unruly fans 
in the Nejmeh stadium as a ‘disorderly group’ was thus rooted in a glocal128 sports and 
political discourse that publicly condemned violence, although in Lebanon and other 
countries, violence was nevertheless often put to use.  
Such a duality can be understood through the political science literature which discusses the 
‘dual government’, or argues that a type of  ‘deep state’ or a ‘state within a state’129 (or in 
this case a ‘movement within a movement’) operates covertly within the state apparatus and 
freely uses violence for political interest. Yet in the case of  the Future Movement, and at 
different levels of  its hierarchy, the overt show of  publicly adhering to non-violent means, 
the utilisation of  democratic tools and state institutions took place alongside concealed 
subsidisation of  the covert formation of  extra-state security apparatus. The duality between 
the public message of  the Future Movement and its private practices is one concerning 
                                                 
128  The term glocalization as Robertson  proposes refers to the ‘simultaneity --- the co-presence --- of  both 
universalizing and particularizing tendencies’  (1997: unpaginated). The term is particularly useful in 
understanding the interrelationships between the global and local in football (see Giulianotti and 
Robertson 2004) 
129  For more on the terms see Glennon (2015) on the 'deep state' in the USA, and Norton (2013) on Egypt. 
Numerous academic and journalistic pieces have used these terms with a wide range of  meanings 
attached to them. 
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representation and is not a result of  conflicting forces operating within the movement. The 
contradictory tactics I describe parallel many other dualities that characterised the Hariri 
establishment’s political discourse and practice, including that of  democracy versus vote-
buying, and championing the state and its institutions versus pushing for privatisation and 
allowing space for corruption in state operation. To that end, Hajj-Saleh’s theorisation of  
the ‘overt’ and ‘covert’ state, as in the example of  the Syrian regime, is pertinent. For Hajj-
Saleh (2015), the Syrian regime publicly champions the non-sectarian state and vehemently 
criticises sectarianism as a cause of  discord or fitna, (in the colloquial usage meaning 
internal discord or dispute), while at the same time it maintains political control through 
reliance on sectarian networks for protection and access to resources. According to Hajj-
Saleh, ‘sectarianisation’ thus is a tool for political and social control: it creates a network 
comprising a privileged few who benefit from the regime’s continued control while they 
provide protection for it130. 
This explanation of  the ways in which political control and the loyalty of  strong-arm men 
is maintained has parallels in the operation of  the Hariri establishment, but it does not fully 
explain the loyalty expressed by Hariri’s supporters. On the face of  it, the loyalty system 
works like this: the fan, or the strong-arm man working for Secure Plus, who is publicly and 
vocally supporting Hariri, is able to gain a route towards improved position within the 
clientelist system of  the Hariri Establishment. The exclusion of  the fans who did not or, 
due to their sectarian identity, could not belong to the ‘family of  the Future Movement’ 
thus became a by-product of  the crystallisation of  networks of  support for Hariri and his 
establishment. 
Yet my observations from the field of  willingness to engage in violence on the popular 
level bridge culturalist and rationalist explanations. Members of  the elite – in this case of  
the Hariri establishment - might well have been inducing the masses to take on fighting or 
violent roles for political gain, and the zuʿran or thugs were happy to oblige, given the 
incentive of  personal gain. In parallel though, people spoke about the need for the 
protection of  the Sunni community, seeing it as under sectarian threat. Their wish for such 
protection evolved against a well known history of  the heroic actions of  the Qabadays.  
                                                 
130  Hajj Saleh's discussion is published in three consecutive articles available on 
http://aljumhuriya.net/33057, http://aljumhuriya.net/33115 and http://aljumhuriya.net/33153 - all 
accessed 15/3/2015. 
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Johnson (1986: 82-96) in his account of  clientelism in Beirut in the 1970s, described a 
primarily transactional relationship between the zaʿim or the political leader and a number 
of  local bosses or strong-arm men who he calls Qabadays131. According to Johnson the 
zaʿim provided the Qabaday, who often would have a criminal record, with protection from 
the law in return for political loyalty. Qabaday’s loyalty ‘was expressed by recruiting and 
controlling the clientele, working for the zaʿim in elections, organising mass 
demonstrations of  support and, occasionally fighting for the zaʿim in battles with his 
opponents’ (1986: 83). Qabadays were ‘leaders pushed forward by the masses’ (Johnson 
1986: 83) and because of  that were a potential threat for the zaʿim who was to some extent 
forced to cooperate with them on the ground. Yet for many ‘he was a moral leader, he was 
a man of  the people, a helper of  the weak and poor, a protector of  the quarter and its 
inhabitants, and a communal champion’ (Johnson 1986: 82). Gilsenan (1996) in research 
conducted in North Lebanon in the 1970s also described the role of  the Qabadays in the 
rural areas of  Akkar, again as individuals who emerge from the people (ordinary farmers in 
his case), who are feared and reputed for their strength, independence – though without 
challenging the authority of  the patron - and ability to use violence. Unlike their 
counterparts in urban Beirut, Qabadays in the north did not have the capacity to mobilise a 
larger base of  clientele but were active wherever the zaʿim’s coercive force was needed. 
Both authors mentioned above traced changes in the roles of  Qabadays during their 
research. As the socio-economic scene in the north of  Lebanon changed, Gilsenan speaks 
of  the ‘impotence’ of  Qabadays (1996:278-279). In one incident he posits the Qabaday as 
opposed to the figure of  a female head of  a local school who ‘represented progress, culture 
and education’ and who ‘could be made a figure of  transcendent values, respected and 
acknowledged as superior to the ways of  the village’ (1996: 278). In relation to this novel 
female figure of  authority and ‘rather than appearing as the admired figure of  the 
courageous, tough, “true man”, the Qabaday figured as a blunderer who committed crude 
and clumsy coercion devoid of  social awareness’ (1996: 279). 
Johnson, on the other hand, spoke of  changes rooted in Beirut’s urbanisation process, with 
the reduced importance of  the extended family and the breakup of  the quarter as a social 
                                                 
131  Johnson provides two linguistic origins of  the word Qabaday, one from the Arabic verb qabada meaning 
to grasp or hold and the other from the same word in Turkish meaning bully or swashbuckler (1986: 82). 
In the popular usage of  the word that I observed in Beirut while doing research, the word had the 
positive connotations of  strength and courage and ability to defend oneself  and ones' community. 
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unit out of  which the Qabaday derived his legitimacy. In that case, Johnson argued that the 
‘zaʿim capitalised on his clients’ mythological conceptions of  social organisation, and in 
some cases actually created an artificial quarter or family identification’ (1986: 95). More 
important is the politicisation of  the Qabadays as the Lebanese Civil war raged in 1975. At 
this time the Qabadays became increasingly dependent on support from external forces, 
including funding from Egypt, Libya, and the Palestinian factions. Collectively these strands 
of  support allowed the Qabadays to break out of  the power of  local zuʿama, thus 
diminishing the role of  the latter132. 
During my research in Beirut between 2008 and 2010 the predominantly Sunni 
neighbourhoods were being watched and ‘protected’ by strong-arm men. Superficially their 
role seemed to differ little from Johnson’s observation of  the Qabadays ‘traditional duty of  
defending their quarters against outsiders’ (1986: 182) in addition to racketeering on behalf  
of  the political leader. However, I never once heard the word ‘qabaday’ with the positive 
connotations associated with it used to describe the Hariri-affiliated strong-arm men. Like 
similar youths from other communities, they were mostly described as zuʿran and were 
denounced, at least publicly, for what they did and how they did it regardless of  who was 
employing them - even if  they were hired by the political leaders themselves. A similar 
labelling of  strong-arm men as zuʿran back in the 1980’s also carried ‘negative implications 
of  bullying and aggressive behaviour’ but this epithet was then reserved to the strong-arm 
men of  opposing political groups (Johnson 1986: 83).  
Within Secure Plus, the role or strong-arm men has been reinvented in the past decade 
within a changing urban context and Hariri’s leadership style. Yet, knowledge of  the 
Qabaday’s past actions provided what Fearon and Laitin call a ‘culturally approved script’ 
of  action, one which allows the middle-class and bourgeoisie to lend its support and 
bolsters connections with the strong-arm men (2000: 874). As in the example of  Solidere’s 
logo for the reconstruction of  Beirut, an ‘ancient city for the future’, a fine line is trodden 
between the traditional role and public image of  Qabadays, or strong-arm men, in 
protecting their neighbourhoods and the more recent corporate establishment of  an armed 
militia under the guise of  a security company. The neoliberal policies and dispositions put 
                                                 
132  The civil-war period has impacted in many ways the use of  violence at the community level in Beirut, 
including the perception, prevalence of, and function of  strong arm racketeering as militarisation 
prevailed. These dynamics are beyond the scope of  this chapter, which focuses particularly on the role 
of  the strong-arm men within the clientelistic power distribution within the Sunni communities in 
particular in periods of  relative calm. 
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forward by Hairiri, have ‘become integrated and entangled in systems of  older dispositions, 
and in other systems of  dispositions already being constituted’ (Hilgers 2013: 84).  
The context of  the emergence of  strong-arm men in Beirut after the assassination of  Rafic 
Hariri is also significantly different to the period that Johnson describes. Firstly, continued 
urbanisation and a consequent influx of  rural migrants to Beirut, particularly during the 
war, meant that there were not many neighbourhoods which enjoyed family based cohesion 
and shared Sunni sectarian identity – circumstances seen by some as justifying provision of  
protection. Possibly more important is the recruitment process used to secure the services 
of  strong-arm men. While some of  those I encountered were from the Tariq Al-Jadidah 
neighbourhood, keeping watch from the rooftops of  their own apartment buildings, many 
were salaried staff  members of  a private security firm – Secure Plus - and instead of  being 
‘pushed forward by the masses’ (Johnson 1986: 83), these men came from the poor rural 
areas of  Lebanon and not the quarter they were supposedly defending. 
The reliance on a corporation to perform the duties of  security – which coincides with the 
neoliberal policy of  privatisation – paradoxically goes hand in hand with the Hariri 
establishment’s self-presentation and the neoliberal ideology of  the good life referred to in 
the previous chapter (Berlant 2011). The neoliberal entails ‘fantasies of  multicultural 
accommodation, domestic security, and a sovereign national identity’ (Wedeen 2013: 843). 
In other words, among the Hariri establishment at the time there was a contradictory 
duality of  verbally rejecting violence yet, at the same time, arming young men133.  
                                                 
133  This contradiction might also be the product of  what I observe as a – rather schizophrenic - change in 
popular attitude towards the use of  violence in the post-war period; one that combines conflict fatigue 
and the public denouncement of  the use of  violence on the one hand with the inability to completely 
repudiate violence because of  the habitual familiarity with its tools. Such a claim though still requires 
both theoretical and empirical scrutiny. 
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‘Once again, well known disorderly groups attempt to drag Nejmeh Sport Club into dangerous side 
battles that have nothing to do with the club, and to make use of Nejmeh’s name in instigating 
political, communal and sectarian fitna which does not reflect sportsmanship. As such, the club 
would like to clarify the following: 
1. Nejmeh Football Sport Club takes pride in belonging to the family of the Future Movement 
under the Za’ama of Saad Rafic Hariri, and takes pride in the continuous direct patronage of the 
Hariri family, and its indirect patronage for over a decade, which has contributed to the club’s 
advancement on all levels. 
2. Nejmeh Football Sport Club vehemently rejects what happened during the club’s match with 
Malaysian team Selangor in the Cite Sportive stadium when disorderly suspicious and implanted 
groups launched political and sectarian chants and slogans. Nejmeh club has nothing to do with 
such groups and is dishonoured by their claims of belonging to its fans, and the club will not be led 
to the trap of fitna which such clubs groups are attempting to do, knowing that it is easy to implant 
such suspicious and harmful elements in a sports event to misrepresent the country in front of the 
Asian confederation and visiting teams.  
3. Nejmeh Football Sport Club already took, and will further take a number of measures to restrain 
this disoriented and disruptive group and to rebuff and distance it from its match, even if that 
means holding matches without spectators, as the club is dishonoured by such groups’ claims of 
belonging to its body of fans who in the majority have committed during the match to the team’s 
civilised chants. 
4. Nejmeh Football Sport Club affirms once again its Beiruti identity, and from the capital Beirut 
voyages across the homeland and to different areas and groups. 
5. In response to attempts to instigate fitna and the rumours that some are trying to spread, NFC 
affirms its belonging to the to the legitimate parent football association, which is the Lebanese 
Football Association and its support to decisions and actions aiming to improve Lebanese football. 
6. NFC warns those “fishing in murky water” that it will not be silent if faced by any infringement 
against it from any group or person.’  
Issued on Wednesday 20/9/2006, and signed by both Nejmeh President Mohammad Amin Daouk 
and Secretary General Abdullatif Farchoukhe. As published by Lebanese daily Almustaqbal on 
21/9/2006 – my translation 
Figure 36: Press Release by Nejmeh Sport Club Management 
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Figure 37: Picute of  press release issued by the board of  Nejmeh Sports on 21/9/2006. The press release asserts 
Nejmeh’s belonging to the ‘family’ of  the Future Movement. Article also includes the statement by Akram Chehayeb 
and a picture of  Nejmeh’s board and players accompanied by Malaysian team visiting the tomb of  late Prime 
Minister Rafic Hariri. The article is inserted in the text as a photograph for the benefit of  Arabic speakers who 
might wish to consult the Arabic text, and to illustrate the way it was presented by both newspaper and club. As-
Safir 6/10/2006. 
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On the Straw that Broke the Club’s Back 
The chapter’s opening description of  the events that took place during the Nejmeh 
matches in September 2009 sketched a neatly rearranged chronology of  the varied 
narratives I heard about that period. In fact though narratives I heard from club fans and 
management diverged in two important ways; firstly in the chronology of  the matches and 
press release and thus the causal links between them, and secondly in the perceived 
intensity of  violence and extent of  the damage caused in the matches. I was only able to 
understand the sequence of  events after reconstructing it from newspaper archives (see 
table 9).  
Table 9 - Key Events of  the AFC cup related dispute within Nejmeh 
19 Sept 2006 
Nejmeh versus Malaysian team Selangor 
Cite Sportive Stadium - AFC Asian cup quarter finals 
Score: 0 – 0 (Nejmeh qualifies for the semi finals) 
21 Sept 2006 
Board of Nejmeh issued a press release blaming ‘disruptive’ and ‘barbaric 
groups’ who did not belong to the club for troubles in the match. Press release 
asserts the club’s ‘pride in belonging to the Future Movement’s family headed 
by Saad Hariri’ and stresses the club’s ‘Beiruti’ identity – published in Lebanese 
papers on 21/9/2006. 
26 Sept 2006 
Nejmeh versus Bahraini Muharrak team 
Cite Sportive Stadium - AFC Asian cup semi finals 
Score: 1 – 2 (Nejmeh exits the tournament) 
In brief, two main narratives exist. The first concerns the way the club management 
presented the political chants in the first match as being seriously provocative and 
necessitated that the management should respond by affirming loyalty to the club’s patron. 
The second narrative is that of  the fans who were not aligned with the Future Movement, 
and who stressed that the chaos in the first match was minimal and expected and claimed 
that it was the press release of  Nejmeh’s board which exacerbated the situation.  
Most reporting on Nejmeh following the first match and the club board’s press release in 
fact condemned both the management’s exaggerated response and the press release. In As-
Safir, an editorial entitled ‘Nejmeh club, where to?’ published under what is probably a 
pseudonym, spoke about the ‘reckless acts of  a group of  young boys’ who the writer 
argued were mere adolescents, and the management’s ‘unwise response’. Similar articles 
interviewed key sports personalities and gauged their reactions to the events in Nejmeh, 
with many voices including that of  the previous Nejmeh President who was at the match, 
criticising the politicisation of  Nejmeh’s identity by the management - but not the fans in 
the stadium. In fact, what probably made the events of  the first match appear so significant 
was the management’s and parliamentarian Chehayeb’s reaction to them.  
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According to reporting at the time – and matching the narrative of  fans un-aligned with 
the Future Movement - it was the second match that Nejmeh played within the AFC Asian 
cup semi finals on 26th September, 2006 - particularly as it came after the press release was 
issued – which witnessed significant clashes despite the attendance at the game being 
restricted exclusively to those fans invited by the management. Nejmeh fans fought among 
themselves. Pro-Hariri fans cheered for the club’ patrons in an effort to prove their political 
loyalty after the earlier game, while fans who did not support Hariri chanted for his political 
adversaries as a provocative, vengeful response to the club’s press release that had so 
alienated them.  
The context of  when the match was played is important to clarify the underlying 
sentiments that might have triggered the problems in the first match. Going through the 
archives of  the above period, I would have had to have been completely blind to ignore the 
political context in which the games were taking place, particularly as I read the newspaper 
headlines for that day. Pro March 8 fans reading the Al-Akhbar newspaper were informed 
about the accusations against Sanioura, the Hariri-allied Prime Minister, of  ‘obstructing the 
reconstruction’ (Al-Akhbar 19/9/2006) of  predominantly pro-Hezbollah areas destroyed 
by Israel in its war on Lebanon only weeks earlier. Pro March 14 fans reading Al-Mustaqbal 
newspaper were told about Hezbollah’s plans to ‘topple the government’ (19/9/2006). 
Probably at the height of  the political crisis, chants insulting to Hariri, the club’s patron, 
should have come as no surprise. The pro Hezbollah fans resident in the Southern 
Suburbs, who for years had known the club as the marginalised team on the football scene 
with whom they could identify, would have found it hard to reconcile the idea that Nejmeh 
at the time was in the hands of  their political opponent. Among the March 8 supporters, 
Hariri and his allies were seen to have failed to provide adequate support to fellow 
Lebanese during the war that damaged much of  their neighbourhoods and caused 
considerable destruction and grief, and to have obstructed the reconstruction of  these 
neighbourhoods. As I mention in the vignette opening this chapter, troubles in the game 
were almost inevitable given the background tension.  
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Table 10 – Differing narratives of  the AFC cup related dispute within Nejmeh 
 Nejmeh Board134 Fans not aligned with the Future 
Movement135 
As-Safir 
coverage 
Assessment 
of the events 
of the first 
match  
‘Indescribable things 
happened.. they cursed 
Hariri, they cursed the 
Sunnis.. they cursed 
everybody.’ 
‘What happened was 
massive.. it was of an 
international calibre and 
papers wrote about it’ 
‘There were a few problems, from the 
fans that is. Maybe it was at that time that 
they got annoyed’ 
‘They opened another door for the 
spectators who went to the larger seating 
area on the other side and I could no 
longer control them […]the police 
officers provoked them, and they in turn 
provoked the police and that was it’ 
‘A group not more than 500 people. […]. 
Had there been 10,000 or 20,000 
shouting and badmouthing the Hariri 
family. I would have wondered why is it 
they were doing it and why would they 
do that when Hariri was supporting the 
club.. 500 men are just a minority.’ 
‘reckless 
acts of a 
group of 
young boys’  
 
 
Justification 
for / 
reaction to 
press release 
issued by 
board  
‘Because of all the cursing 
and humiliation, we then 
demanded that we issue a 
press release that matches in 
extent what had happened.’ 
‘What would you do? Get 
slapped and not respond? I 
was compelled to do 
something’ 
‘Nejmeh club began in Beirut, its roots 
are here but it has branched out, but 
[Daouk] cut out all these branches, and 
said Nejmeh is a Beiruti club and its 
belonging is to the Future Movement, 
and he who loves Future Movement is 
welcome to Nejmeh and who doesn’t 
love and support it is not. This was the 
straw that broke the camel’s back.’ 
the board’s 
‘unwise 
response’ 
Assessment 
of the events 
of the 
second 
match  
‘Zuʿran, we know them.. they 
found a hundred ways to 
sneak in, they forged tickets.. 
printed forged ones and the 
cite sportive is big with many 
places to climb into the 
stadium through.. this is what 
we realized later..[…] Many 
parties were supposed to 
prevent them from entering.. 
because we had agreed with 
them that only those with 
tickets were allowed in.. but 
they didn’t. 
‘[two current club members] brought a 
few guys from Tariq Al-Jadidah, they 
dressed them in Nejmeh clothes despite 
them not being Nejmeh fans, they gave 
them Hariri’s pictures and got them into 
the stadium. A group that is not in 
attendance to watch the match, but to 
cheer and chant ‘God, Hariri and Tariq 
Al-Jadidah’ 
‘ they got tickets somehow, from 
somebody intending to cause fitna […], 
but then the decision came from higher 
places, people from the police and the 
government insisted that they go in and 
they did.’ 
Assafir: 
Nejmeh ‘an 
orphan, 
victim of its 
divided 
fans’ 
                                                 
134  All quotations in this column are from club president at the time Daouk. 
135  All quotations in this column are from Sami and Abu Ahmad, fans who have since distanced themselves 
from the club. 
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Performing Loyalty: the Obligation on Club Members and Fans 
In my interview with club President Daouk in 2010, he described the troubles in the first 
game of  2006 as intense, justifying the issue of  a public statement: 
‘[the press release] was after a match where indescribable things happened.. they 
cursed Hariri, they cursed the Sunnis.. they cursed everybody, I don’t want to be 
unjust to anybody .. [troubles in the match] caused such a clamour then.. we tried to 
contain it, we did try to contain it...’ 
Daouk explained that in the face of  such events, he had an obligation to respond. 
According to him this obligation was imposed by fans who accused him of  not fulfilling 
his role as club President, and by fellow board members some of  whom were also 
members of  the Future Movement: Daouk saw the obligation to respond as his duty 
towards the club patron: ‘What would you do? Get slapped and not respond? I was 
compelled to do something’. Daouk, like many other club officials (as discussed in Chapter 
Five), found it unacceptable that Saad Hariri funded the club while its fans insulted the 
patron in the stadium. He was clear that it was his duty and role to affirm loyalty to the 
club patron: 
‘Are we supposed to deny that.. that he [Hariri] is funding the club and has helped it 
advance beautifully and then they [the fans] badmouth him and humiliate him, 
badmouth his sect and humiliate it, and we are not allowed to say a word about it? 
[…] Because of  all the cursing and humiliation, we were required to issue a press 
release that matches in extent what had happened.. what happened was massive.. it 
was of  an international calibre and papers wrote about it. They then were accusing 
us of  not performing our role.’ 
A public statement made by the parliamentarian Akram Chehayeb contributed to 
problematising the political chanting in the first match and then putting pressure on the 
management to respond by framing the chanting as an infringement on the club’s patron 
by his political opponents. Chehayeb, who other than belonging at the time to the same 
political camp of  Hariri, had no direct relation with either the club or the Future 
Movement issued a statement on the same day - published two days after the match in 
Almustaqbal newspaper - again condemning the troublemakers: 
‘In a live TV broadcast of  a match between a Lebanese and an Asian team, 
television viewers and myself  were alarmed by a bitter reality that requires our 
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attention and efforts to remedy it with wisdom and responsibility, so sports 
stadiums do not get transformed into competitions in profanity instead of  the 
required sportsmanship. Simply and for 45 minutes, since the time that live 
broadcast started on LBC, slogans and swearwords targeting Lebanese national and 
sovereign powers, and in contrast to chants glorifying other politicians as well as 
Syria and Iran. [..] the danger of  such chants is that they clearly indicate that there is 
a ‘maestro’136 managing such profanity, knowing that this does not protect 
‘victory’137 or preserves the country and we should be careful that Lebanon’s unity 
and people’s dignity is not a ball that can be tossed around by those who are 
spiteful, and that Lebanon is more precious and honourable than Syria and Iran 
which were applauded by the ‘maestro’ (Almustaqbal 21/9/2006). 
Such reactions portrayed the troubles in the match not as the spontaneous hooliganism of  
unruly fans, but as organised political action that was coordinated by high ranking 
politicians targeting Saad Hariri. In that sense, it was necessary for the management to 
affirm loyalty to the club’s patron. According to Daouk, the press release was not issued 
upon request of  the Hariri establishment who ‘have no time for things of  the sort’, though 
as he emphasised, they were sure to be disturbed by such acts. Ghandour, the club’s 
previous president seemed to assume a greater distance for the management in its 
relationship with the club’s patron, and emphasised that during his time at the club, the 
Hariri establishment never directly asked for any public show of  loyalty in return for the 
funding received. Yet beside the above justification that stems from Daouk’s understanding 
of  what is the patron’s ‘right’, it was hard to clearly define in the club’s management at the 
time exactly where the Hariri establishment ended and the club’s board began. Two club 
officials, namely the ‘elected’ board member Secretary General Farshoukh, as well as the 
club’s Media Officer were appointed by the club’s patron and were part of  his 
establishment. Daouk hinted at the board and some ‘others’ being involved in drafting the 
controversial document. Added to that, many board members had business ties with the 
Hariri establishment which they might have prioritised over the internal cohesion of  the 
club. 
                                                 
136  Maestro was the word used in Arabic, literally meaning music conductor, but used for individuals or 
groups controlling political groups behind the scenes. 
137  In reference to Hezbollah’s self  proclaimed 'divine victory' in the summer 2006 war with Israel. 
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The public display of  loyalty was not limited to the words of  the board members, but was 
soon followed by a public display of  loyalty at the level of  fans themselves who performed 
in the second match pro-Hariri chants and cheers outweighing those used by opponents in 
the previous match. As Daouk asserted, fans also dutifully asserted that ‘it is his right”; it 
was the patron’s right to prohibit public criticism of  him within a space that he was 
funding. While I could not speak to any of  the fans actually involved in the pro-Hariri 
chants – or at least none of  them professed their involvement directly to me – in piecing 
together the different accounts of  the day of  the second match, it appears that a few fans, 
possibly in complicity with some board members and the security forces, organised the 
pro-Hariri chanting in the second match. 
Karim, a Sunni Nejmeh fan who was a supporter of  Hariri and still close to the club at the 
time of  fieldwork, confirmed the claim that the chants in the second game were organised 
by pro-Hariri Nejmeh fans. He described those fans as ‘a few malicious individuals’ who 
‘with the aim of  destroying the image of  Nejmeh club and presenting it as belonging to a 
sole neighbourhood and sect, asked some groups to bring fans from just one 
neighbourhood, in other words that they would only bring Sunnis’. This member’s 
statement could be read as a criticism of  the group that he aligned himself  with politically. 
Rather than accusing outsiders or a ‘maestro’, he saw the problem as being with some fans 
who aimed to change the identity of  the club and restrict it to members of  the Sunni sect 
and the supporters of  the Hariri Establishment only. According to him though, this was 
not done at the request of  the Hariri Establishment, but more as a way of  improving their 
standing in relation to the patron. Karim said that Hariri himself  did not know of  such 
actions and would not have approved of  them. For those ‘trouble makers’, just as with the 
management, such a display of  loyalty was not for the sake of  gains within the club; the 
club was merely a stage that provided opportunities to demonstrate loyalty and to gain 
status within the Hariri establishment for benefits that extended beyond the confines of  
the club itself. 
Again, club fan, Sami, shared the same view - that the chants for Hariri in the second game 
were acts of  deliberate disruption: 
‘There was another Asian match, to which they bring a group - a plot to which [two 
current club members] contributed - they bring a few guys from Tariq Al-Jadidah, 
they dress them in Nejmeh clothes despite them not being Nejmeh fans, they give 
them Hariri’s pictures and get them into the stadium. A group that is not in 
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attendance to watch the match, but to cheer and chant ‘God, Hariri and Tariq Al-
Jadidah’. 
Yet neither the club management nor Daouk condemned the pro-Hariri chants. Despite 
the fact that entry to the second game was restricted to a number of  selected fans upon 
receipt of  invitation cards from members of  the board. 
 
Figure 38: Some of  the coordinators of  Nejmeh fans offices in various areas. Some of  the fans pictured had been 
away from the club for several years when the picture was taken but were on an exceptional visit to the stadium for a 
friendly match between old Nejmeh and Al-Ansar players; 12/8/2009. 
Nejmeh becomes an Exclusive Club 
Ensuring continued loyalty to club’s patron after the events of  the first match was 
important to guarantee continuity of  funding. For those who affiliated themselves 
politically or based on sectarian belonging with Hariri this was generally not problematic, 
and for some of  those it even provided an opportunity for gain beyond the club itself  to 
prove that they belonged to the political camp of  the affluent and influential leader. For 
those who were not part of  Hariri’s clintele, such efforts at proving loyalty further alienated 
them, especially after a longer process of  what they perceived as the labelling and 
classification of  fans by management according to their background as well as the growing 
political antagonism in the broader context. Those fans had been alienated and excluded 
from the club in two ways; firstly by the redefinition of  the club as belonging to the ‘family 
of  the Future Movement’ and secondly by the management distancing itself  from fans who 
vocally opposed Hariri’s politics. 
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One example of  these now excluded fans is Abu Ahmad, a Shiite who politically supports 
the March 8 political camp, and has since distanced himself  from the club. When I 
interviewed him in 2009 in a small park close to his shop in the Southern Suburbs, Abu 
Ahmad was still passionate about Nejmeh despite it being three years since he last went to 
the club. He had been a Nejmeh fan since he was only eight years old, and recalled being a 
ball boy in its matches in the late 1960s when Lebanese football giant, Shbaro, was 
Nejmeh’s goal keeper. A blacksmith by profession, Abu Ahmad not only coordinated the 
club’s Fans’ Office in one of  the areas of  the Southern Suburbs, but also served for many 
years in the club’s ‘discipline team’, a voluntary position similar to that of  a safety steward 
in English football. As a member of  the ‘discipline team’ a fan is encouraged to ensure that 
cheering remains sports related and is expected to intervene if  a dispute between fans 
appears to be escalating or if  any of  the fans breaks the rules while on the terraces. Fans 
acting as stewards are usually chosen because of  their wide base of  relationships with the 
larger body of  fans and the respect held for them which gives them the ability to intervene. 
Abu Ahmad was not new to problems in the stadium and like others who took on that 
role, he knew fans in his area by name, had daily contact with them and if  needed could 
prevent a particularly disruptive fan from coming to the matches. 
He was in attendance at both of  the problematic matches, and claimed that the troubles in 
the first match were spontaneous and not worth the response from the management, much 
as the media reporting had portrayed it: 
‘There was another match before [the press release] where there were a few 
problems, from the fans that is. Maybe it was at that time that they got annoyed. I 
was at that match. Before it started I had marked a block of  seats for my group of  
fans so they are in one part of  the stadium, but they opened another door for the 
spectators who went to the larger seating area on the other side and I could no 
longer control them. I went there and spoke to them and all, but I just couldn’t 
control them, because it was done, disorder had already started... and the police 
officers provoked them, and they in turn provoked the police and that was it.. I 
could not control them. We could not control them. So then the decision of  Daouk 
came out of  suspending the Fans’ Office and suspending everything138.’ 
                                                 
138  Interview conducted on 10/6/2009 in Arabic; the translation is mine. 
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Like other fans, he expressed his perception of  the events in the first match as marginal by 
the way they narrated the story, beginning with the second match which according to them 
witnessed much more flagrant disturbance, despite the precautions management had 
attempted to take. He also claimed that the disruption was caused by fans and members 
from within the club and the Tariq Al-Jadidah neighbourhood: 
‘It was the last.. last match. We were playing an Asia cup match, not a local one. We 
tried to defend, we tried.. eventually we realised that vinegar’s bacteria is from 
within. It was not people who came from Jounieh or from the Southern Suburbs, it 
was people from that very neighbourhood [Tariq Al-Jadidah] who instigated a fight, 
so that they cause some kind of  rupture.. yeah, and they managed to do so, I am 
telling you they succeeded [...] I was standing in front of  the Cite Sportive, and a 
group of  200-300 spectators arrived, holding flags of  the Lebanese Forces and the 
Progressive Socialist Party, and cursing Sayyed Hassan and Mr. Nabih. They came 
from outside in this form, and I took pictures of  them, I have pictures of  them that 
I have kept and did not show to anybody, but I did show them in the club, and told 
them to see the flags of  the Lebanese forces. They arrived close to me, I was 
responsible for the stadium, and responsible for that match. They arrived next to 
me, encircled me and started shouting and cheering. They had tickets, they got 
tickets somehow, from somebody intending to cause fitna. They wanted to cause 
fitna in the club, I did not allow them to go in. [...] I tried to control the situation, 
but then the decision came from higher places, people from the police and the 
government insisted that they go in and they did go in.’ 
Only in his description of  the second match did Abu Ahmad talk about a deliberate act of  
disruption, a group of  people who came to the match with the sole intention of  causing 
problems, and who were allowed to do so by ‘higher authorities’. There was a conspiracy 
between them and the security forces, and Abu Ahmad’s efforts to protect the club, from 
his point of  view, were not only obstructed but also frowned upon. Yet despite making 
direct reference to particular members of  the club, whose names I heard being mentioned 
in relation to this event by other fans and members, he retained an element of  ambiguity. 
He spoke of  disruptive elements from within the club, just like grapes which have in them 
what they need to ferment into vinegar.. 
Abu Ahmad was still bitter about that period, including the press release by the board: 
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‘Daouk’s press release was before the match; he said ‘we want to dissolve the Fans’ 
Office’, assuming there was a Fans’ Office still, and ‘we want to do this and that, 
and this club is part of  the Future Movement and he who wants to be part of  the 
Movement can be with us...’. 
After the second game, Abou Ahmad, a Shiite from the Southern Suburbs who supported 
the Amal Movement claimed that he felt he was no longer welcome in the club: 
‘I did go to the club afterward, to the stadium at the time of  the training and tried 
to talk about it. First Daouk came out and did not even talk to me, then another 
board member came out, I asked him “what is it’ hajj?” and he says “you are 
asking? Don’t you know what you have done?” and I ask, “what have I done?” he 
says I did not accept to allow some people in, that I am working against the club’s 
policy. This is when I just stood aside.’ 
To be a member of  Nejmeh, as Daouk stated in the press release you needed to, one, be 
from Beirut, which with the layers of  meaning associated with being a member of  the 
Sunni sect and, two, to ‘belong to the Family of  the Future Movement’. Abu Ahmad then, 
who was neither from Beirut nor a Hariri supporter was not a Nijmawi according to Daouk 
despite being a Nejmeh fan for decades. 
Fans from other areas of  the Southern Suburbs, who saw the claim that Nejmeh is a Beirut 
Club as excluding the Shiite community, also voiced complaints about the press release. In 
a creatively written text which was published in the local newspaper, As-Safir, fans from the 
Haret Hreik office of  the Southern Suburbs affirmed their belonging to Nejmeh club, but 
not to any particular political group or sect. The ‘great people of  Nejmeh’ as they called 
themselves, speaking to their ‘honourable management’, wrote: ‘Your road-map139 might 
force us to distance ourselves from your ship and get closer to the coast, and we might not 
maintain the oath we have taken upon ourselves, and might need a sanctuary to take us in 
after you have abandoned us.’ All words in italics in the above translation from the club’s 
press release are also the names of  other competing football clubs, all based in the 
Southern Suburbs and all with a distinct Shiite sectarian identity. The fans who were from 
the mostly Shiite Southern Suburbs not only threatened to leave the club, but also 
                                                 
139  In reference to the internationally brokered Palestinian-Israeli peace plan. 
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threatened to join the opponent who would more ‘appropriately’ suit their sectarian 
belonging.  
Such a statement, though a clear attempt to contest the management’s press release 
publicly, allowed the fans from the Southern Suburbs to distance themselves from the 
zuʿran and their political slogans by affirming that they ‘took refuge in sports to escape the 
poisons of  politics’. It is also nuanced enough, possibly as it comes from the less powerful 
party in the equation, to convey heartfelt disagreement yet without burning the bridges 
with the management. In practice none of  the signatories to the above press release did 
join a different sports club. However, as in the dilemma of  those outside the sectarian 
based clientelistic system (as discussed in Chapter Five), they remained ‘outside the pitch’ 
and excluded from the networks of  football fandom unless they matched their sports 
preference to their political and sectarian identity.  
The press release issued by Nejmeh board on 21/6/2009 thus truly became the straw that 
broke the camel’s back - a load too heavy already with the tension between the historically 
predominantly Sunni urban centre of  Beirut and its mostly Shiite suburbs, possibly best 
summarised by club fan Sami: 
‘Nejmeh club was assigned, to its misfortune, a president, who is an ex-General 
Assembly member, a member of  Nejmeh who couldn’t love Njemeh for sports, so 
loved it by political decree. Mr. Daouk, on TV and live, speaking to people waiting 
for a sweet word from him to bring the fans back to the stadiums and not leave it in 
its grave like silence… we expected that he would say “yes, Nejmeh is a Beiruti club 
and started originally in Beirut but it belongs to the whole of  Lebanon”... . but he 
appeared on TV and said Nejmeh club is a Beiruti club, and we had heard that 
Beirut is only for Beirutis. […] He appeared again, and we expected after all the 
criticism he received that he would fix the mistake he made. This is not right, 
Nejmeh club began in Beirut, its roots are here but it has branched out, but 
[Daouk] cut out all these branches, and said Nejmeh is a Beiruti club and its 
belonging is to the Future Movement, and he who loves Future Movement is 
welcome to Nejmeh and who doesn’t love and support it is not. This was the straw 
that broke the camel’s back.’ 
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Figure 39: Text of  press release issued by Nejmeh fans in Haret Hreik in response to Nejmeh’s board press release 
of  21/9/2006. As-Safir 6/10/2006 
Preserving the ‘Purity’ of  Sports Stadiums 
The rhetoric of  Daouk had yet another layer that further widened the distance between the 
club’s board and Nejmeh’s fans from the Southern Suburbs.  The press release condemned 
the chants against Hariri in the first match and blamed it on ‘disorderly suspicious and 
implanted groups’ which ‘Nejmeh club has nothing to do with’ and ‘is dishonoured by their 
claims of  belonging to its fans’. In my interview with him, Daouk repeatedly used the word 
zuʿran as an adjective to describe the troublesome fans: 
‘There is a group known to be a group of  outlaws so to speak, and nobody has any 
influence (mawna) over them […] some of  them they say are drug addicts... they 
come and let their anger out in the stadium.. and they understand nothing of  
politics.. what is important for them it to scream and cheer and make themselves 
heard.’ 
In press interviews around the same period of  the matches, Daouk stressed that his efforts 
to sustain ‘the purity’ of  his sports engagement produced yet more distance between the 
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club and some of  its fans. This language of  ‘purity’ hit a nerve for the fans of  the Southern 
Suburbs. Abu Ahmad described to me how before the second match, he was given tickets 
to distribute to fans from his area, but was told to ‘only give them to decent fans’. He 
complained that this carried an assumption that he only knew the zuʿran. For many years 
the reputation of  Nejmeh fans has been of  them being troublesome and zuʿran, but more 
often than not it was the fans from the Southern Suburbs, Abu Ahmad’s neighbourhood, 
who had the most notorious reputation. In an argument that is rooted in a more complex 
ambivalent relationship between Beirut and its suburbs140, the fans from the Southern 
Suburbs, and Chiah in particular, have always been singled out as a hub of  the ‘zuʿran’. 
Zahi, another fan who left the club and despite not being from the Suburbs himself, 
complained of  the singling out of  the Chiah fans: 
‘There was precedence, some groups of  fans were always accused, and the words 
used to describe them were sensitive ones. They always said “the zuʿran of  Chiah”. 
I have heard that many times. What does that mean? Who told you that those 
zuʿran are from the Chiah, and who said that the people of  Chiah are zuʿran? Why 
are you always describing them as such? I am not from Chiah to defend them, but I 
have worked with fans on the ground [...] you want to work with the fans, you can’t 
go about describing them as zuʿran’ 
The significance of  singling out the Chiah fans needs to understood within the political 
crisis in the country and the wider dispute over Beirut’s sectarian and political identity and 
in the light of  a longer process of  differentiation between Beirut and its suburbs. As 
described in Chapter Three, the suburbs were for years home to the disenfranchised 
immigrants from Lebanon’s rural south and the country’s misery belt. Signalling out the 
mostly Shiite fans from Chiah, which is one of  the oldest areas of  the suburbs and home 
of  many Nejmeh fans carried with it sectarian and class connotations that reached far 
beyond the boundaries of  Nejmeh club. Because of  these background factors, the press 
release of  the club’s management and its affirmation of  the ‘Beiruti identity’ was criticised 
by some fans and media as a process of  ‘sorting out’ (farz) or classifying of  fans based on 
sectarian and political criteria. It was a process which many fans described as having started 
                                                 
140  See Chapter Three for an extended discussion of  that relationship. 
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when the Secretary General of  the same board had questioned fans about their political 
allegiances around a year earlier. 
Add to that, and as Abu Ahmad pointed out, blame only targeted him and other members 
who were not Hariri supporters. For example, despite attendance in the second match 
being mainly by invitation, he claimed that troublemakers were not those that he or board 
members had invited: 
‘That match I am telling you about, we took our precautions, we only allowed in 
those who were recommended by somebody we know.. we did not want to get 
anybody who was an azʿar, those zuʿran a number of  them are known – not by me 
personally - but they are known to the Fans’ Office.. Zuʿran, we know them.. they 
found a hundred ways to sneak in, they forged tickets.. printed forged ones and the 
cite sportive is big with many places to climb into the stadium through.. this is what 
we realized later..[…] even more than that, there was collusion.. Many parties were 
supposed to prevent them from entering.. because we had agreed with them that 
only those with tickets were allowed in.. but they didn’t.’ 
In the above statement, Daouk wanted to show that those who caused the trouble did not 
belong to that ‘selected’ group; they were outsiders and had ‘sneaked in’ and the small 
group of  zuʿran become a scapegoat, blamed not only for the chaos in the stadium but for 
Nejmeh’s defeat in that match. This rhetoric corresponds to the way the sports pages of  
the Hariri owned Almustaqbal newspaper discussed the troubles in the matches, blaming it 
on a ‘sick bunch’ using ‘dirty tactics of  spreading the poisons of  division’ (Almustaqbal 
26/9/2006); the newspaper also described the trouble in the matches and those causing it 
as a ‘disease’. This argument corresponds with how the Hariri establishment presented 
itself, as discussed in Chapter Six, as a peaceful movement concerned with championing 
pluralism and coexistence. The duality between rhetoric and practice is evident here again, 
as Daouk condemns the zu’ran while benefiting from their vocal support when needed.  
Soon after the second match, following the initial reactions to the troubles that took place 
in it and some criticism of  the management’s ‘selected’ fans, the argument began to shift. 
In newspaper coverage the heart of  the problem was portrayed not as the press release 
issued by the management, but as general hooliganism by Nejmeh fans, or football fans 
more broadly. The Minister of  Youth and Sports, who was part of  Hariri’s political camp, 
in an interview with As-Safir newspaper, criticised disparaging sectarian chanting in the 
stadiums and spoke about it is as a ‘disease’ which was invading Lebanese sports and the 
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Lebanese political scene more broadly (As-Safir 30/09/2006). A few days later, 
Almustaqbal newspaper, the Hariri establishment’s mouth-piece, interviewed the club’s 
players all of  whom condemned the ‘offensive chants, and called for civilised support 
which matches the reputation of  the club’ (Al-Mustaqbal 2/10/2006), in what proved to be 
a management prompted public proclamation. Similar condemnations were also issued by 
the members of  the LFA in the days that followed, with its Secretary General, Alameh, 
quoting Chehayeb’s very words by stressing that ‘the maestro’ should not be allowed to use 
the sports arena as a ‘space to detonate national unity, or a bridge to sectarian and religious 
fitna’ (As-Safir 2/10/2006). The LFA’s Vice President described what happened as a 
disease, and spoke about the need to protect Lebanese football and its ‘pure stadiums’, as 
they are the ‘lungs that allow us to breathe together as members of  one country’ (As-Safir 
2/10/2006). The problem by that time became the ‘disease of  sectarianism’ seeping into 
the football stadiums through a minority troublesome football hooligans who were 
probably supported by disruptive external agents. The issue was not a problem with the 
clubs’ management, patrons, or sports policy more broadly. 
In practice though, after those events, Nejmeh emerged as a club divided along political 
and spatial lines. As befitting the broader Lebanese sports scene, Nejmeh and its fans now 
belonged to one political camp and to the city of  Beirut: it was no longer the club 
acclaimed by many fans as being ‘from Beirut but for the whole of  Lebanon’. 
Mercenary or Local Hero? 
The rupture within Nejmeh Club mirrored tension and division present within Beirut at 
the same time. Most notable are the events of  May 2008 which were to the city of  Beirut 
what the two games of  2006 and the subsequent press release were to the club; a critical 
event, a time when the city was being claimed, its identity negotiated, and the language of  
inclusion and exclusion being evoked. 
Popular and political disagreement had been brewing since 2005 following the assassination 
of  Prime Minister Hariri. Accompanying the political deadlock and a series of  
assassinations and explosions, the country’s populace polarised and experienced numerous 
street clashes between the supporters of  the Future Movement on the one hand and the 
members of  the Amal Movement and Hezbollah on the other. The March 8 supporters, 
then in opposition, staged a sit-in which paralysed Beirut’s city centre from December 2006 
May 2008. The same group withdrew their representatives from the government rendering 
it virtually defunct. Following a number of  political decisions which were perceived by 
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Hezbollah as aimed at disempowering their armed resistance to Israel, and the growing – 
though largely denied - militarisation on the part of  their political opponents, the armed 
wing of  Hezbollah implemented a military take-over of  the city of  Beirut. Once Hezbollah 
had succeeded in disarming its opponents, it handed military authority over to the 
Lebanese Armed Forces. The clashes of  2008 in Beirut, Mount Lebanon, and the North 
where the most violent the country had witnessed since the end of  the civil war in 1990: 
they claimed the lives of  80 people and caused more than 200 injuries141.  
In protesting at Hezbollah’ moves, members of  the March 14 camp denounced the use of  
violence using a territorial and sectarian argument which paralleled the one used in Nejmeh 
board’s press release. Yet prior to the clashes, in contradiction to their non-violent self-
representation, young men were actively being recruited to work in the private security 
firm, Secure Plus which was funded by the Hariri establishment. I explore the motivation 
for this relationship, taking into account the practical and rational motivation for the resort 
to violence and militarisation, as well as the rhetorical and symbolic ideals attached to it. 
Militia, Private Enterprise, or Civil Defence? 
According to a report published by the French ‘Le Figaro’ (Minoui 2008) and based on 
interviews with one of  the managers of  Secure Plus, the company was established towards 
the end of  2006, and comprised two sections. One had around 600 uniformed guards 
carrying out security services in hotels and commercial centres. Most of  this contingent 
were ‘unemployed youth’ who ‘Saad Hariri wanted to support financially’ an aim that 
supported their being hired as guards. The other section was less formal and included 
volunteer civil members (who were nonetheless paid $300 per month) recruited from all 
over Lebanon: this group were contracted to do security rounds in different 
neighbourhoods day and night. Though the manager interviewed appeared quite candid 
compared to other officials interviewed in other reports, he described the work of  the 
employees as ‘civil defence’ and strongly denied that the neighbourhood security personnel 
were armed or even trained to carry arms, though he stated that many Lebanese were 
                                                 
141  The number of  deaths and injuries is based on Kosmatopoulos (2011). The violent escalation ended 
with the Doha Agreement, brokered by Qatar and the Arab league and negotiated in Qatar's capital city 
by the various Lebanese parties concerned. The agreement gave Hezbollah veto power in a new cabinet 
of  national unity, paved the way for the election of  a new president and for an electoral law to govern 
the 2009 parliamentary elections. For details see: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7411835.stm - Accessed 
23/3/2014. 
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already armed. Observers in that period indicated a marked rise in sales of  small arms all 
over Lebanon, a sign of  increased militarisation more generally. 
The report mentioned above was produced before the events of  May 2008. On May 12, A 
few days after the beginning of  the Hezbollah takeover, the Los Angeles Times issued a 
report which asserted, based on the claims of  Lebanese security experts and officials, that 
the Future Movement had ‘built a Sunni Muslim militia [in Beirut] under the guise of  
private security companies’, and its fighters ‘were trained and armed to counter the heavily 
armed Shiite Muslim militant group Hezbollah and protect their turf  in a potential military 
confrontation’ (Daragahi and Rafei 2008). The same report indicated that Secure Plus 
refused requests for interviews and ‘Hariri’s media office denied there were any official 
links between Secure Plus and the Future Movement’ (Daragahi and Rafei 2008). By 
contrast, the report also quoted a Hariri spokesperson saying that the movement believed 
in the rule of  law and included ‘members of  parliament, not fighters’. Saad Hariri in a press 
conference given a day after the above article was published, and as a response to 
Hezbollah’s takeover of  Beirut, further distanced the Future Movement from Secure Plus 
and the use of  violence more generally. In his speech Hariri declared that ‘the use of  
weapons has nothing to do with [Future Movement’s] history, ethics, or political 
organisation’, and that the only militia the movement had was that of  the 40,000 university 
graduates which the Hariri Establishment had given scholarships to in the past. He 
described the perpetrators of  the attack again as zuʿran142.  
In line with the self  presentation of  the Hariri establishment, Saad Hariri throughout his 
speech, used a rhetoric that championed the state and its institutions and claimed to strive 
for civil peace. At the same time, and just as in the Nejmeh board’s press release, Hariri 
accused his opponents of  being barbaric and zuʿran because of  their use of  violence and 
their attack on media institutions. He asserted that the move would cause fitna in Beirut 
and throughout the country.  
The public denouncement of  violence and denial of  resorting to arms on the part of  the 
Future Movement, taken with the anti-sectarian position it adopted, was inconsistent with 
the practices of  the establishment at the popular level and indicated once again the 
dichotomy between self  presentation and actual political practice. Several football fans I 
                                                 
142  For the full speech see http://www.14march.org/print_popup.php?Type=Archive&ID=37341 – 
Accessed 14/3/2015. 
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encountered were actually on the payroll of  Secure Plus and were working in direct 
coordination with the Future Movement. In fact, when I was in the house of  a sports fan, 
Taha, who I learned had a role coordinating between the company and its personnel on the 
ground, I witnessed an exchange on the expected date for receiving salaries. As I asked 
what this was about, Taha replied ‘Hariri’s security company of  course’, and he dismissed 
me as ignorant by rhetorically asking if  I was actually residing in Lebanon. The presence of  
militants was far from hidden; on the street Hariri’s claim that no relationship existed 
between the Movement and Secure Plus was understood as one for media consumption or 
as I was told repeatedly ‘it was just talk’. Apart from the guards patrolling the streets of  
Beirut, I continued to hear from Taha and Naji about their role in watching over the 
neighbourhood, particularly as they lived in Tariq Al-Jadidah, close to the area of  Mazraa 
which was a stronghold of  the Amal Movement. I was told of  times when they allegedly 
thwarted attacks on the neighbourhood or about the details of  clashes that took place and 
were reported in the news143. Naji himself  had started paying a mortgage for an apartment 
based on the salary he was receiving, and was in financial distress in September 2009 when 
– probably once the parliamentary elections finished - he and thousands of  other Secure 
Plus employees were dismissed144. 
The Utility of  the Zuʿran and the Middle Class 
While their presence was popularly acknowledged, the recruits of  Secure Plus were 
necessarily supported by the community members as protectors of  the neighbourhood. 
Like Hariri himself  – and board members of  Nejmeh in their relationship to militant fans 
– club fan and member, Mahmoud, distanced himself  from those who ‘clap, cheer, and 
scream’ calling them ‘zuʿran’. Mahmoud, for long time a self  employed travel agent who 
could be seen as belonging to the petty bourgeoisie, was not a member of  the Future 
Movement although he was a supporter of  Hariri. Apart from the salary that he earned, the 
relationships that he could cultivate through his work in the electoral office provided his 
main motivation for working for the campaign. 
‘They keep on suggesting that I join them in the [Future] Movement. This does not 
serve my interest. I support him, yes, I work with him, help him, probably for a 
                                                 
143  Reports of  clashes I was told about are to be taken with a pinch of  salt, particularly as I soon realised 
they were often over emphasised, possibly in displays of  masculinity exaggerated for my benefit as a 
female researcher. 
144  As reported by several television stations, including Aljadeed TV on 10/9/2009. 
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remuneration. I am working for the elections now, they will pay me my dues, and 
afterwards I will just leave. That is it. I might be invited to an event or something of  
the sort, and I would go. Today for example, there is the [electoral] rally in Tariq Al-
Jadidah, I am going, I have no problem with that, but I will not go clap, cheer, and 
scream. There are other people who are sent to do that.’ 
To describe fellow supporters of  Hariri as zuʿran is far from being a compliment, although 
Hariri’s employment of  such young men did not discredit him as a leader. Such support 
was regarded in fact as a necessity for every leader according to Mahmoud: 
‘Each zaiʿm needs a few zuʿran. That is how I would explain it. If  I am planning to 
become the zaʿim of  a certain neighbourhood, who would come and clap and cheer for me 
every time I am giving a speech? If  I am just starting as a leader, and need to convey how 
much people admire me, I need to advertise myself.’ 
Mahmoud explained the process and hierarchy of  this leadership mode, which at the 
bottom ranks included the zuʿran, mostly youths from a certain neighbourhood who not 
only clap and cheer, but carry arms, stand guard, and start quarrels whenever needed. Their 
motivation for taking this role was mostly financial, and as Mahmoud said, they could be 
swayed into another camp if  paid a larger sum, although such a purchase of  loyalty was not 
necessarily easy. He rhetorically asked me, ‘when the Future Movement wanted to start a 
militia, who would have been willing to carry arms with them? Would I carry arms? Would 
you? We might lend our support, but we wouldn’t start shooting bullets on the streets.’ 
According to him, those who were willing to work with the security company, were poor 
men interested in the few hundred dollars they could get out of  it;  
‘A person could be an employee getting 400$ dollars a month, Saad Hariri comes to 
him and tells him to work as a security guard at night, in return to another $400. 
That person would grab a chair and sit guard. They give him some basic training on 
the use of  weapons to be able to defend himself, but he is still getting those $400. 
Come now ask a guy to do the same thing but without giving him any money, he 
wouldn’t do it. He might support Hariri, but would he risk his life? He wouldn’t do 
it.’ 
That the zaʿim would continue to cover a follower or an intermediary, knowing well that 
this person was only giving support because of  the financial compensation, was natural in 
Mahmoud’s view. He used another not so flattering description of  the zuʿran, by citing an 
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Arabic proverb; ‘having a dog bark with me, is better than a dog barking at me’. To call 
somebody a dog in Lebanon is quite offensive, and the saying was given on behalf  of  a 
leader who approximated his own followers to dogs. The zuʿran’s ability to cause trouble 
was a double-edged sword: a leader would rather have this group of  supposedly 
mischievous and lower status individuals working for him, as their work against him or for 
an opponent would probably be damaging. 
The way Mahmoud explained Hariri’s and the strong-arm men’s decision to engage in a 
relationship based on the demonstration of  loyalty and violence – as well as his own 
decision not to - is a rationalist, interest-based one. His explanation was to some extent in 
line with Fearon and Laitin’s (2000) summary of  narratives by several theorists on the 
construction of  conflict boundaries and antagonisms. Such theory describes how elites 
induce the masses towards violence for political gain, while young men – if  available to 
perform the role of  thugs – respond because of  personal motivation. Mahmoud’s own 
class position allowed him to simultaneously distance himself  from the members of  a 
‘barbaric’ lower class who were receiving direct gains from involvement in the fighting - 
and preserving his own image as civilised and modern – while at the same time he was 
benefiting from his performance of  loyalty towards the Future Movement. 
Popular and Discursive Justification of  Strong Arm Racketeering 
Beyond the practical / rational basis for the youth of  the Tariq Al-Jadidah and other 
neighbourhoods taking on the role of  strong-arm men racketeering on behalf  of  Hariri, I 
observed an oratorical construction which supported that role. This included different 
dynamics operating in parallel, one was the historic and popular script of  heroism and self  
defence, and the other was a sectarian communal identity based one.  
Around the same period that Secure Plus was established, a first year graphics student 
designed – upon the request of  a friend of  his – a logo for his neighbourhood. The 
student, who was interviewed by the local newspaper, The Daily Star (28/2/2007) 
explained that ‘every store has a logo and every political party. Why can’t our 
neighbourhood?’. The logo he produced featured a black panther and bore the letters TJ, 
the initials of  Tariq Al-Jadidah. His design went public and became popular following 
demonstrations on 14/2/2007, the second anniversary of  the assassination of  Prime 
Minister Hariri. On the day the designer himself  was surprised to see his logo on flags and 
t-shirts in the demonstrations. As I was doing research, flags bearing the logo were being 
sold on the streets of  Tariq Al-Jadidah and young people held flags that they had made by 
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stitching the logo together with the flag of  the Future Movement. In other areas, I also 
observed how the name inspired the construction of  territorialised identity; in the 
predominantly Sunni border village of  Chebaa145, pro-Hariri youths called themselves ‘the 
Eagles of  Chebaa’: the choice of  the Eagles as an emblem for the group was inspired by 
the area’s mountainous nature146. Again, in the small Roumi neighbourhood of  the Mazraa 
area, a young man sprayed the walls with pro Amal movement graffiti, adding the signature 
of  the ‘Lions of  the Roumi neighbourhood’147. 
The ambiguity of  the emergence of  neighbourhood watch groups within Secure Plus, 
contributed to their perception as a popular, voluntary initiative from the people; a 
perception that fed into and benefited from the emergence and growing popularity of  the 
panthers logo. In the article mentioned above, one shop keeper expressed his intention of  
selling blue coloured buttons bearing the logo, a move that the reporter argued would 
‘would blur the line between political party and neighbourhood unity, since the colour blue 
is associated with Hariri’s Future Movement’ (Daily Star 28/2/2007). The reporter also 
spoke of  the term ‘Panthers’ being applied to the youths in Tariq Al-Jadidah who had 
organised unofficial patrols in the neighbourhood.  
 
Figure 40: Logo of  the Tariq Al-Jadidah Panthers. 
                                                 
145  Chebaa is a South Lebanese village, the largest in the mostly Sunni area of  Arkoub. The village has been 
of  significance in the current conflict due to its location on the border and the political variety it 
embraces despite its homogenous sectarian composition. Information about the Eagles and their 
training was obtained from a local Chebaa resident who was close to the Future Movement, although I 
do not know if  the group was informally initiated or if  it had the support of  the Future Movement. 
146  Interestingly, Johnson (1986) speaks of  the appearance of  a short lived Sunni militant group in July 1975 
in yet another Beirut neighbourhood called the 'Eagles of  Zaydaniyaa' (Johnson 1986: 182). 
147  In the mixed Roumi Neighbourhood, there probably is no real group apart from that piece of  graffiti 
and one young man with a lot of  free time and spray paint. 
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The expressed need to ‘protect the neighbourhood’ of  Tariq Al-Jadidah built on a 
predominantly sectarian discourse which posited the political conflict and the threat against 
the neighbourhood, and the city of  Beirut more generally, from the perspective of  the 
Future movement supporters, as a response to a sectarian threat against members of  the 
‘Sunni’ communities. Most prominent of  those was the declaration made by Lebanon’s 
Mufti Qabbani, the highest Islamic Sunni authority at the time, in the wake of  the May 
2008 events. Mufti Qabbani asserted that Hezbollah’s ‘attack on Beirut is an attack on the 
dignity and security of  the people of  Beirut’ and he claimed that ‘Sunnis are fed-up with 
such security encroachment’148. Despite the Future Movement’s claims of  being a non-
sectarian group, the public display of  support from the Mufti for the Future Movement 
was nothing new and was typical of  the Movement’s self  representation; Qabani as early as 
December 2006 had convened Friday prayer in the Grand Serail, the government’s 
headquarters which was presided over at the time by the Future Movement affiliated Prime 
Minister Siniora (Almustaqbal 2/12/2006). Friday prayers continued to be convened in the 
Grand Serail for over a year under the excuse that security concerns prevented the Prime 
Minister from leaving his quarters, but in fact the move was a clear declaration of  sectarian 
identity (Al-Akhbar 24/9/2008). Numerous similar examples have indicated the strategic 
choice of  the Movement’s conforming to rather than transforming the sectarian Lebanese 
socio-political order even before the assassination of  Rafic Hariri (Baumann 2012a).  
In that sense, the movement’s use of  the sectarian representation can be seen as an 
example of  how the elite were taking advantage of  constitutional and other institutional 
rules and norms which allowed them to centralise or arrogate power if  they could claim 
that the group faced a security threat (Fearon & Laitin 2000: 855). This public discourse at 
the level of  the leadership both fed into and was used by the supporters on the ground. 
Supporters, as I argued in the previous section, might adopt this discourse as a justification 
for their own pursuit of  financial gains, as in the case of  staff  of  Secure Plus, but at the 
same time as the adoption of  the logo and the presumed need to ‘defend the 
neighbourhood’ indicate, they also subscribe to what Fearon and Laitin call ‘scripts of  
proper or heroic action that invite young men to reenact them’ (2000: 874). A script which 
built on both the historic legacy of  the Qabadays, and their role in protecting the 
neighbourhoods as Johnson (1986) describes it, as well as the production of  a unifying 
                                                 
148  For a summary of  Mufti Qabbani's speech on 7/5/2007 see 
http://www.elaph.com/ElaphWeb/Politics/2008/5/328514.htm – Accessed 19/3/2015. 
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emblem like the logo, provided a unifying sectarian identity promoted by religious 
authorities and members of  the political elite alike.  
To return to Naji for example149, while he was clearly motivated by the extra income that 
could be made working for Secure Plus, the justification that he provided for his 
engagement was more complex. Naji had spoken to me of  his role as a fighter with the 
Mourabitoun against the Syrian Army back in the 1980s and he described his current role 
as a continuation of  that previous engagement in defending the area. In the current 
conflict, Naji’s paid role within Secure Plus complements a perceived obligation to defend 
the neighbourhood. As described in the previous chapter, such a role as he himself  
expressed it, was not contradictory with his acceptance of  the Hariri’s establishment’s 
rhetoric of  democratic civic engagement. The ideal of  the unity of  the neighbourhood, 
and the need for its protection against a perceived politico-sectarian threat which justified 
his salaried militant role with Secure Plus assuaged any possible contradiction with the 
democratic non-violent values he claimed to subscribe to. 
The culturally approved script of  the need to protect the neighbourhood brought together 
young men under the umbrella of  the Future Movement and crystallised support for the 
organisation. In parallel though, it carried within it the exclusionary discourse that depicted 
those who were either not in Hariri’s political circle or were not members of  the Sunni 
communities as outsiders to both the neighbourhood and the city. The press release issued 
by Daouk after the games in 2006 took pride in the club belonging both to ‘the family of  
The Future Movement’ and to Beirut, excluding those who were not from Beirut or 
supporters of  the Future movement. Similarly the political rhetoric around the dignity of  
Beirut and its people being sabotaged by the Hezbollah take-over posited any Hezbollah 
supporter as an outsider to the city. This tactic was coupled with Saad Hariri’s portrayal, in 
his speech, of  those taking part in the attack as zuʿran and by the media’s publication of  
images showing them as thugs. 
                                                 
149  It is important here to differentiate between two types of  Secure Plus recruits; the first were young men 
from rural areas who often did not know Beirut well and were there primarily for the money. The 
second were local residents of  Beirut whose duties were within the neighbourhood they lived in: they 
probably had more of  a stake in contributing to the work of  the company. Naji is an example of  the 
latter. 
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Figure 41: Future Movement supporter carries a mosaic of  flags. Clockwise from top left, flag of  the Future 
Movement with picture of  Rafic Hariri and his Son Saad Hariri, Lebanese flag, flag of  Future Youth – the youth 
division of  the Future Movement, and logo of  the Tariq Al-Jadidah panthers. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the practical and rational as well as the rhetorical and symbolic 
aspects of  the vocal (and at times violent) performance of  loyalty by football fans within 
Nejmeh. It has also revealed the role of  strong-arm men in their support of  the Hariri 
Establishment at the time of  conflict escalation. The approach of  the Hariri 
Establishment, both within and beyond the club, was characterised by a duality which 
combined, on the one hand, an overt anti-sectarian discourse that publicly rejected the use 
of  violence and called for coexistence with a repeatedly denied support for armed men 
working under the guise of  a private security company and, on the other hand, a nuanced 
sectarian discourse. This duality(in which support for armed men was denied) allowed the 
elite to make instrumental use of  violence while at the same time maintaining a ‘modern’ 
and ‘civilised’ image of  support for the state and the rule of  law. For supporters, practical 
ad resource driven motivation for the performance of  loyalty was combined with 
acceptance of  a rhetorical and symbolic justification for the use of  violence based on the 
ethos of  honour and the need to protect one’s own neighbourhood from sectarian threat. 
The result of  this process was rupture along sectarian lines within both the club and the 
city.  
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In the wake of  the events described in this chapter, rupture both in the club and the 
country appeared to be too deep and too difficult to reconcile. The concluding chapter of  
this thesis consolidates the discussion of  clientelism and sectarianism and the practices of  
emergent elites and presents prospects for further research. 
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8 
Conclusion 
 
Football 
The pitch said: / 'Twenty-two players / Running, attacking, defending / 
Planning, dodging, and shooting /... the crowds are cheering 
Yet.. / there is no ball /  
Oh God! / How ridiculous has the conflict become? 
Mourid Barghouti150 
 
‘I support Hariri, but Nejmeh club is special. Even in the first meeting with Bahaa Hariri 
[…] I told him, Nejmeh club is not owned by its management, or its general assembly, and 
not even its fans. It is owned by the whole of the Lebanese people, just like the gold at the 
Lebanese Central Bank, it can’t be touched. Bahaa, replied saying ‘Amaneh, my dad has 
entrusted me with this club’. […] I would have liked Nejmeh to retain its distinctiveness, 
for it to stay, following how we [in the club] all loved each other, for the whole of the 
country. I didn’t want it to become partisan.’ 
Nejmeh club board member and long time fan. 
 
The Match Ends Nil-all 
Winter 2011, Sidon Municipal Stadium. Nejmeh is playing in one of  the LFA championship matches. 
My husband-to-be is in Lebanon on his second visit and will be finally watching a match played by the club 
he had heard so much about. After five seasons, the stadiums are now open to the fans and for the first time 
I am able to buy two tickets to a Nejmeh game instead of  watching from the director’s box by special 
permission with a select few. We are both excited to see Lebanon’s most popular club – the Manchester 
United of  Lebanon as I claimed – play with the support of  its vibrant fans. Yet the scene on the stands is 
disappointing; the audience, though mostly Nejmeh fans, is not more than three thousand and the team’s 
                                                 
150 Poem is from Palestinian poet Mourid Barghouti’s Complete Works, p. 117. 
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performance is at best mediocre. While the game is purposely scheduled for a week-day in the middle of  the 
day as a strategy to minimize attendance and trouble during the match, this does not explain the low 
attendance. I try to compensate for the poor performance by offering my fiancée traditional football match 
snacks, boiled fava and lupin beans and cheap instant coffee but this seems not to do the trick, and we leave 
before the match ends. The stadium, which is at the entrance of  Hariri’s home city, Sidon, feels as 
dilapidated as the match and the team; the tiling is broken and the floor is often uneven, both marks of  
poor craftsmanship and, most probably, corrupt contractors.  
The ambience is disappointing, and is starkly different from the festive mood that greeted me when I went to 
a match with my, by then, husband, to watch his local team, Norwich City Football Club, or the Canaries 
as they are nicknamed. Although Norwich City  was not in the Premier League at the time, we marched 
through the city's streets and alleys with thousands of  fans on their way to the game, who appeared to have 
a pre-match routine. The stadium was full to capacity as the fans joined together singing for the team and in 
front of  me a proud father hugged his young son who proves he knows the words to the team’s song by heart.  
Despite Norwich losing two nil, we left the game excited and content. 
This was not the football culture I knew in Lebanon, not during field work nor after then ban on fans’ 
attendance in the stadiums was lifted. In Sidon in the summer of  2011 when Nejmeh was playing, the 
scene in fact looked wretched and dystopic.  
The Story of  Nejmeh’s Transformation 
I set off  to the field many years ago to understand the negotiation, reproduction, and 
subversion of  socio-political antagonism. The questions I raised were guided by literature 
that emphasised the role of  elite in fomenting antagonism in their process of  consolidation 
of  power (see Fearon & Latin 2000) and the corresponding arguments that ordinary people 
also contribute to this antagonism as they pursue their own goals (Brass 1997, Kalyvas 
2006). I thus chose to focus on how this construction of  antagonism is negotiated at 
various levels of  the political hierarchy, particularly as a new model of  elite emerged and 
gained power in Lebanon. I took Nejmeh as an example of  a club which once brought 
together fans from a wide spectrum of  political and sectarian belonging, and I explored the 
process by which the club’s identity was reinvented and the fans were divided. I argued that 
sectarian antagonism is a by-product of  power consolidation, but not one that is solely led 
by the elite. It is, rather, recreated by actors across the political hierarchy. The thesis has 
presented the was that power consolidation is negotiated within clientelistic hierarchies and 
the processes of  elite formation. 
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The changes in Nejmeh that this thesis has narrated are described by some football fans as 
the ‘death’ of  Nejmeh Sports Club. The narrative of  how, as fans of  the most popular 
Lebanese club, they felt deprived of  their ‘lover’ or ‘home’ and the many years of  their lives 
spent in the club’s service. What fans lamented was the transformation, over about a 
decade, of  an inclusive and popular football club into a partisan space under the control of  
one political group. The transformation was instigated by the efforts of  Nejmeh’s 
leadership which were intended to ensure not only its sustainability but its improvement in 
a manner that befited its ‘glorious history’. Yet many years later the club still suffers 
financially and seems less able to sustain itself  than ever before. Beyond Nejmeh, the post 
civil-war period brought with it aspirations of  growth and prosperity, in socio-economic 
and political contexts as in the domain of  sports. As in the club, these aspirations have not 
materialised; indeed the dismal situation of  the club has mirrored the general political and 
economic degeneration experienced in Lebanon. 
When my field work ended Nejmeh was under the complete control of  the Hariri 
establishment and the club’s patron at the time Saad Hariri, and there was virtually no 
power in the hands of  other actors in the club. This, I argued, mirrored the consolidation 
of  political power in Lebanon in the hands of  a small number of  political elite members 
who shared power within a power sharing sectarian arrangement. In the thesis I elucidated 
the process by which this consolidation was achieved both in the club and beyond. I have 
anchored it within a twenty year process of  invention and reinvention of  Beirut’s identity 
and glocal changes in favour of  a neoliberal economy. While on the surface Nejmeh 
appears to have been divided across sectarian lines, my closer examination elucidates more 
critical transformations in the political hierarchy and the anticipated role of  the elite and 
the urban bourgeoisie. 
In particular, I described the emergence of  one model of  entrepreneurial elite which 
championed a laissez-faire capitalist economy; namely that of  late Lebanese Prime Minister 
Rafic Hariri, followed by his son Saad Hariri. The anthropological literature on elite 
cultures and elite formation in general, and on Arab societies in particular, is relatively new 
and rapidly developing, and this thesis contributes to the field by providing a thick 
description of  the emergence, formation, and consumption of  a redefined model of  elites, 
which appears to be increasingly prevalent in Lebanon and the wider region.  
I focused on Hariri’s instrumental and spectacular use of  wealth in the production of  a 
political image of  a unique leader, Hariri, capable of  transforming dreams into a reality. 
250 
Hariri promoted a post war Lebanon yet to be built – as both state and infrastructure – 
aspiring to the highest standards151, within a peaceful, democratic and non-sectarian 
political context. Such imagery captured the imagination of  many of  the Lebanese 
emerging from years of  civil war and related, in part, to Hariri’s political beginnings as a 
mega-philanthropist and a self-made, professional and successful entrepreneur. The 
rhetoric of  democratisation of  state institutions, and non-sectarianism was also 
championed by Saad Hariri, even when conflict escalated after the assassination in 2005 of  
his father Rafic Hariri.  
In fact, such a model made use of  tried and tested tools of  power and governance even 
though it self-presented as novel, not least in the development of  hierarchical relations in 
clientilism, violence, vote buying, corruption and sectarianism. As my research within 
Nejmeh showed, changes introduced by the post war neoliberal economic policies that 
Hariri championed not only further strengthened his political power and leadership 
position among Beirut’s communities but also marginalised other actors within the socio-
political and clientelistic hierarchy. Spaces like Nejmeh, which once managed to survive 
outside the smothering patronage of  one leader or another, have no means of  viability 
today.  
The dismal situation of  both country and club was to a large extent the result of  
subscribing to a political machine which at once nurtured these aspirations for growth and 
prosperity while also constituting the main hindrance to their achievement. This situation 
can be compared to that Berlant presented in relation to neoliberal aspirations for the 
‘good life’, which she considered to be largely a form of  ‘cruel optimism’; that is, the desire 
                                                 
151  Such promises are best summarised by Makdisi in one of his critiques of the downtown reconstruction 
plan championed by Solidere. Comparing the promises made in 1997 with present day Lebanon is 
further testimony to the tenuousness of these promises: ‘The reclaimed land, for instance, will require an 
impressive infra-structure to protect it from the sea, consisting of submerged caissons and a lagoon 
formed by artificial breakwaters. The new road network will be backed up by a series of tunnels and 
extensive underground parking facilities (for 40,000 cars).The central district will have its own dedicated 
underground power supply system. It will also have the most advanced telecommunications 
infrastructure in the world. The telecommunications services will allow for high-speed data 
communications, transactional databases, and of course international communications via satellite earth 
stations and international submarine fibre-optic cable links. Beirut's basic copper phone network will be 
backed up in the central district by digital fibre-optic lines capable of carrying video signals as well as 
audio. Finally, the district will be covered with GSM cellular service provided by no fewer than ten base 
stations (GSM represents the leading edge of digital mobile telecommunications). Finally, the central 
district, which is already close to the city's port, will be served by Beirut's newly expanded international 
airport (which is being upgraded to serve 6 million passengers annually) via the new expressway. And, 
for those who prefer the luxury of travelling by yacht, two marinas will be directly incorporated into the 
central district.’ (Makdisi 1997: 683-684) 
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and aspiration for something which in practice ‘actively impedes the aim that brought you 
to it initially’ (2011: 1).  
In the two sections that follow, I highlight a number of  more specific findings that have 
emerged from this research in relation to the two main themes that I have explored namely 
the the operation of  clientelism and elite formation. I also indicate possible avenues of  
further research, which were beyond the scope of  this thesis. 
Beyond Sectarianism and Clientelism 
Rivalry, opposition, and conflict are recurrent themes in the study of  football (Kuper 2006; 
Montague 2008; Armstrong and Giulianotti 2001). More often than not, these features are 
related to the opposition of  two football clubs symbolising rival ethnic, religious or political 
identities. The vast majority of  literature about sport in Lebanon has followed this trend 
with a focus on sectarianism, often presenting clubs as internally unified communities with 
well-defined sectarian identities. I have demonstrated, to the contrary, how sectarianism was 
only one of  several instruments for achieving control over a sports club and its members. 
Appreciating that football is a ‘repository of  various identities’ (Armstrong and Giulianotti 
1997), it is important to examine the many spatial, political, and religious identities present 
within each sports club and even those held by every individual fan. Hence I chose to 
describe conflict within the body of  one club’s membership and fans rather than between 
two competing clubs and detailed the many ways in which Nejmeh’s identity was invented 
and reinvented over several decades. 
This thesis has also explored conflict and contestation in sports beyond the much-
examined sports hooliganism in the stadium. I began by exploring the club’s management 
at the upper tier and negotiations outside the stadium on issues of  funding and 
governance; both topics have previously been largely neglected in the literature on sports in 
Arab countries. In addition, I approached fans not merely as spectators but as political 
actors within a larger web of  political affiliations, a tactic which allowed me to show how 
their performance in the stadia was only one of  several avenues of  political action, both 
within the club and beyond.  
Some of  the features of  sports patronage and fandom which are unique to Lebanon 
illuminate the study of  the Lebanese political scene and the transformations within it in the 
past two decades. For example, mainstream sports literature suggests that fans cheer for the 
club that represents their regional and sectarian identity but, in Nejmeh, club members and 
fans were requested to subscribe to a certain identity before they were allowed to support 
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the club. In other words, they needed to ensure that their loyalty fits the political camp of  a 
new club patron, whose patronage was critical since there were no alternative sources of  
club funds at the time. Fans who sustained their allegiance to the inclusive and multi-
sectarian Nejmeh club they knew before the change in patronage found themselves outside 
of  the club. They still wanted to support it but they were excluded if  their political and 
sectarian belonging did not fit with Nejmeh’ new patronage. Indeed, the case of  Nejmeh 
illustrates how difficult it is in Lebanon today to sustain a high ranking sports club outside 
of  political and sectarian patronage and partisanship. 
In addition, this story of  Nejmeh’s patronage illustrates a transformation in the relationship 
between political elites and their constituencies in the post-war period. In the Lebanese 
context, a sports club is a convenient icon that complements other symbols of  a leader, yet 
a club is not essential to winning popular support. Indeed, even in the case of  this most 
popular of  Lebanese clubs, it was fans and members who were looking for a patron to 
ensure Nejmeh’s future rather than the political elite who were attempting to gain control.  
Mapping pre-war clientelistic networks in Beirut, Johnson suggested that a zaʿim maintains 
the support of  his clientele by (a) returning regularly to office to ‘influence the 
administration and continuously provide his clients with governmental services’ and (b) ‘by 
being a successful businessman, so that he can use his commercial and financial contacts to 
give his clients employment, contracts, and capital’ (1977: 209). Accordingly, state 
institutions are mere instruments for the zaʿim through which political status can be 
maintained and a base of  clients expanded.   
Yet as this thesis has illustrated, the political climate is such that elite individuals occupying 
the ‘top tier’ have, through the systems of  consociational power sharing, consolidated their 
control over the majority of  state institutions and functions and surpassed the need for the 
ballot box to maintain political power. In what is popularly termed in Lebanon the system 
of  apportionment in agreement between the politicians themselves, each Lebanese political 
leader is allocated his share of  the Lebanese populace as well as state resources through the 
use of  sectarian identity-based politics. Competition between brokers and clients for the 
favours of  a zaʿim further consolidates his power. The loyalty which a zaʿim desires is not 
an end in itself; it is a tool to sustain political control and capture of  government resources. 
Political popularity also puts leaders in a position to receive international support extended 
by regional and international players to communitarian leaders and thereby achieve means 
to influence political agendas in Lebanon. Within such a political climate, the spectacular 
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performance of  loyalty by a leader’s constituency is to a large extent of  greater political 
utility in determining the share of  funding and power that a leader receives than 
supporters’ electoral behaviour. The obligations of  elites towards their clients in return are 
minimal and the support extended to them is often – as the case of  Nejmeh clearly 
indicates – inconsistent.  
As these words are written in 2015, the Lebanese people are ‘represented’ by the same 
members of  parliament who were elected in the June 2009 elections discussed in previous 
chapters whose mandate expired more than two years ago. As the configuration of  the new 
allotment of  parliamentary seats awaits agreement between the political elites and the 
unfolding of  regional events, existing parliament members appear to see no need to turn 
the matter back to Lebanese citizens whose opinions on this issue appear inconsequential. 
In what can be seen as yet another ‘theatrical’ production, parliamentarians did, however, 
take the time to vote twice on an extension to their mandate - which was modified on an 
exceptional basis following a post war ‘new legal tradition, that of  the “exceptional” and 
“temporary” arrangements’ (EU EOM 2005: 16). The voting took no more than 10 
minutes152 and complied with bureaucratic and legal procedures.  
Elites and the Marketing of  Dreams 
I have illustrated the process of  forming a redefined model of  the political actor in 
Lebanon, that of  the entrepreneurial elite, as it is negotiated at different social and political 
levels by a variety of  actors. I have shown how this process combines both instrumental 
and rational elements with symbolic and affective ones. Central to the process is the large- 
scale deployment of  wealth, won and used in global neoliberal policies and 
philanthrocapitalism. The performance of  wealth translates into long term viability in the 
public eye and seems to promise the ability to make dreams a reality. Paradoxically, this 
promise is far from achievable as the same elite also contribute to the precariousness, 
corruption, and brutality of  their supporters’ lives. Beyond the provision of  protection and 
support in exchange for political loyalty, Nejmeh fans and aspiring members of  various 
Lebanese communities gave their loyalty in exchange for a future promised to them. A 
                                                 
152  For details see Al Akhbar English. 2013. ‘Protests as Lebanon’s Parliament Extends Mandate’, May 31. 
http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/15966; and Lakkis, Hasan, and Wassim Mroueh. 2014. ‘Lebanon 
MPs Extend Parliament’s Mandate by More than 2 Years.’ The Daily Star, May 11, sec. Lebanon News. 
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/Nov-05/276509-aouns-bloc-will-boycott-
session-set-to-vote-on-parliaments-extension.ashx both accessed 27/8/2015. 
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well-presented fantasy of  what is yet to come – as promised by the elites – is more 
conducive to the promise of  loyalty than the meagre benefits than can be offered in 
practice today.  
In this fantasy of  the future, Nejmeh is guaranteed funding and is thus considered capable 
of  competing in the sports arena without further concerns about its sustainability. Whereas 
in Lebanon, and as perpetrated by the rhetoric of  the elite, a non-sectarian non-violent 
democratic state rules and achieves prosperity for those who believe in it. This future for 
both Nejmeh and Lebanon matches an image that is imagined by fans of  the ‘civilized’ and 
‘modern’. Yet the ‘Future’ here is not merely ‘a magical word coined by Rafic Hariri' (as 
described by his son). The Future translates people’s dreams and aspirations into a 
spectacle, a performance. The spectacle itself  then becomes the object of  desire, despite it 
being well beyond the reach of  people who aspire for it, and possibly different to what they 
truly desire. The dream for Nejmeh for example, would it, as for the teams of  other 
countries around the globe, to have full-time professional players in a modern stadium and 
computerized day-to-day operation. Yet the club’s long standing popularity stems from its 
strong roots in the community and from being the team of  the underdog. In another 
example presented in Chapter Five, in Lebanon, much as in other countries, many people 
enjoy casting their fingers in electoral ink and voting, even though they know that this 
process does not mean actual democratic rule. The symbolic system necessary for 
sustaining clientelistic relations between an elite and its constituency (Auyero 2000) thus 
transcends sectarian, regional and national identities while advertising and the media create 
an imagined community, but not one of  the present moment and of  the national alone, but 
a promised future global one. 
The spectacle and the future aspiration attaching to it obscures the underlying political 
negotiations, is necessary to sustain popular loyalty since the promised future remains 
elusive. In actuality the duplicity of  rhetoric and practice prevails. The club is broke; its 
operation is far from ‘modernised’ and it in no way matches the global imaginary that has 
been promised. The rhetoric which champions democracy and state institutions is 
combined with widespread corruption and vote buying. In addition, as Chapter Six 
demonstrates, a non-sectarian, non-violent rhetoric coexists with sectarian favouritism and 
the arming of  young men. A monumentalisation of  the past (Herzfeld 2000) and 
championing of  the ancient and rooted city  of  Beirut and Nejmeh club is the route to 
both the city and club’s obliteration and to the ‘reconstruction’ of  a ‘Future’ founded on 
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their debris as exemplified by the Solidere project discussed in Chapter One (Makdisi 
1997).  
Directions for Future Research 
In sports as in politics, those who are most marginalised by the clientelistic system are not 
those who are at the lowest ranks of  sectarian based clientelistic hierarchies. They are, as 
this thesis has argued, those who chose to be outside of  or who did not fit within their 
assigned sectarian leader’s clientelistic hierarchies. These are for example the Sunnis who 
chose not to pledge allegiance to Hariri and are outside of  his favour and are therefore of  
little use within the networks of  competing leaders. They are also the Nejmeh fans who do 
not support Hariri politically but wish to remain part of  the club they have supported for 
years. While other sports spaces that match their sectarian and political identity might be 
open for them, their belonging there is also conditional to pledging allegiance to whatever 
power governs those alternative groups. This issue, which I noted in Chapter Five, merits 
further exploration that was beyond the scope of  the research for this thesis. While a 
minority of  Nejmeh fans joined competing sports clubs supported by different actors 
within the March 8 political camp, the majority which probably constitutes around half  of  
the club’s fans, have not found an alternative space for themselves in the realm of  sports. 
Existing literature on clientelism often presents patron-client relationships as an all 
encompassing system. An exploration of  the role of  people who are arguably outside of  or 
occupying liminal spaces within a clientelistic power sharing system, or those 
disempowered by refusing to engage within it, could enrich our understanding of  the 
potency of  political clientelism and the many forms of  resistance to it.  
As Arab countries go through a period of  radical transformation, the thesis also invites 
exploration into the role of  the spectacle and the emergent models of  entrepreneurial elite 
in future political formations beyond Lebanon. Other countries in the region are 
embarking on what the aid community labels a period of  ‘transition’, which promotes a 
neoliberal model of  state building and reform and a capitalist economy similar to that of  
post war Lebanon. This transition grows parasitically on dreams and aspirations for change 
which people on the Tunisian streets and Tahrir square have nurtured, and it also modifies 
these aspirations for freedom and justice. 
These transformations take place within a global context where, despite the evident fragility 
of  neoliberal promises, anticipation of  a better future and hopes for economic prosperity 
are sustained. The promise of  making dreams a reality – not far from the ‘dreamland’ 
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which Mitchell describes in Egypt (2002) – feeds into the ‘cruel optimism’ which Berlant 
(2011) discusses. Within Arab transformations, further study of  both the elite with their 
fantastical promises – associated with positions of  power - and their clients, who consume 
these promises is a necessary endeavour. As new systems of  governance are constructed on 
the remnants of  allegedly toppled regimes, elites seem to reinvent themselves and ensure 
their continuity in central positions. Key individual political and economic actors –both the 
longstanding within the systems of  power and the newly emergent - along with the systems 
that have kept them in place and which ‘reproduce’ them – need to be better understood if  
only to offer some respite from the naivety and fervour of  the revolutionary moment. 
Further study of  elites will be enriched by tried and tested anthropological perspectives that 
have been beyond the scope of  this study. Analysis of  kinship and family would help us to 
understand how emerging elites reinforce their status within existing networks as well as 
extending them through business partnerships. ‘Philanthrocapitalism’ is a model of  public 
engagement that has been adopted not only in Lebanon but also in the gulf  region, and 
appears to be of  increasing international significance. Further ethnographic study might 
show how political and economic influences are affected by contingent fluctuations in oil 
prices or the policies of  international aid agencies. Sustained attention to 
philanthrocapitalism is particularly critical in the context of  the surrent Syrian refugee crisis 
that has elicited aid - which often carries a political agenda - from individual 
philanthropists. 
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